OpenID Foundation Certification Program

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OpenID Certification Program Overview

- A light-weight, low-cost, certification program to serve members, drive adoption and promote high-quality implementations
  - Identity Providers launched in early 2015
  - Relying Parties launched in late 2016
  - Financial-grade profiles launched in 2019
- Each certification makes it easier for those that follow and helps make subsequent deployments more trustworthy, interoperable and secure
- All certified implementations are freely available at https://openid.net/developers/certified/
- OIDF certification pricing has been widely accepted
## Certification Program Success

616 certifications of 200 deployments

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Certification Type</th>
<th>Total Certifications</th>
<th>Total Deployments</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>OP</td>
<td>436</td>
<td>125</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total OP Deployments</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>RP</td>
<td>94</td>
<td>34</td>
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<tr>
<td>Total RP Deployments</td>
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<tr>
<td>FAPI</td>
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<td>36</td>
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<tr>
<td>Total FAPI Deployments</td>
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<tr>
<td>FAPI-CIBA</td>
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<td>3</td>
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<tr>
<td>Total FAPI-CIBA Deployments</td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FAPI-RP</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>2</td>
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<tr>
<td>Total FAPI Deployments</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(April 2021)
Open Banking Adoption of FAPI & FAPI Certification

- UK led the way with FAPI adoption and FAPI certification under the direction of the Open Banking Implementation Entity
  - Currently 15 UK banks have 31 FAPI certifications of 16 deployments
  - Most of the CMA9 have certified
  - OBIE require the largest 9 banks to recertify annually

- Additional jurisdictions adopting FAPI and FAPI certification
  - US – OIDF anticipates the Financial Data Exchange formally adopting FAPI and requiring FAPI certification
  - AU – OIDF coordinating with AU DSB team who has adopted FAPI as a normative standard and will be encouraging AU banks to FAPI certify
  - Brazil – Security Work Group in Brazil has adopted FAPI as part of Brazil’s open banking stack and will require banks to be FAPI certified. OIDF collaborating with Security WG on Brazil-specific conformance tests
  - Other jurisdictions – OIDF working with regulators and coordinators in Europe, Bahrain and other locals to encourage and support the adoption of FAPI and FAPI conformance
Why use the OIDF’s conformance program?

- OIDF tests are developed with close support of relevant working group
  - Tests are updated based on requests from working group

- Testers get direct support from the OIDF certification team
  - Domain experts familiar with all the specs
  - Team have access to OIDF/OAuth2 spec authors when necessary

- Internationally recognized, award winning

- Tests are maintained and updated by OIDF when:
  - new versions of underlying specs published
  - new potential security vulnerabilities are found
  - new interoperability problems are found
  - testers find failures difficult to interpret

- Issues found by testers are raised back to the relevant OIDF working groups
  - Specs can be improved / clarified / disambiguated as necessary
OIDF FAPI Certification Program

- FAPI-RW ID1 OP testing (OBUK specific) started December 2017
- FAPI-RW ID2 OP testing launched April 2019
- FAPI-RW ID2 RP testing launched in June 2019
- FAPI-CIBA ID1 OP testing launched September 2019

Optionally supports:

- OpenBanking UK intent lodging
- Australian Consumer Data Rights for OPs – launched January 2021
- FAPI-RW ID2 OP using PAR (Pushed Authentication Requests – launched January 2021
- App2app authentication/authorization

Visit https://openid.net/certification/instructions/ for details
FAPI1 - Advanced Final

- Final FAPI 1.0 parts 1 and 2 published March 12, 2021

- Relatively few normative changes

- New names
  - FAPI-R -> FAPI Baseline
  - FAPI-RW -> FAPI Advanced

- Launch of tests for the new spec planned for May 2021
  - OP & RP
    - Implementers Draft 2 versions of the tests will be retained
PAR (Pushed Authentication Requests)

- IETF Standard from OAuth2 Working Group


- An evolution of FAPI-RW’s request object endpoint

- Avoids passing authorization request details via the front channel
  - Better for privacy
  - Better for security (client authenticates before authentication begins)
  - Avoids any size limits on URLs

- Working Group Last Call was August 2020

- Australian CDR planning to go live with PAR from July 2021, wide vendor support

- Certification program for FAPI-RW with PAR launched January 2021
Australian CDR

- Based on FAPI-RW

- 4 or 5 banks(OPs) live, 3 RPs live
  - Many of banks are now going through FAPI conformance testing

- Some extra restrictions compared to base FAPI-RW spec
  - private_key_jwt must be used
  - x-v header must be sent to resource server endpoint
  - Refresh tokens must be supported
  - Returned id_tokens must be encrypted
  - For ACR claims, a CDR specific value is used, “urn:cds.au:cdr:2”

- Development of CDR version of FAPI RP tests under discussion
Brazil OpenBanking

- Based on FAPI1-Advanced

- 40 banks due to certify by July, more in September

- Some extra restrictions compared to FAPI Advanced spec
  - Encrypted request objects required
  - PS256 for signing
  - Intent pre-lodging (similar to UK OpenBanking)
  - Intent id passed in a structured scope
  - Brazil specific ACR claim values

- Development of Brazil version of FAPI OP/RP tests under discussion
FAPI-RW Certification: Core goals

- Interoperability
- Security
- Correct deployment of certified software

However:

- FAPI tests do not test all of OpenID Connect Core or OAuth
  - ‘Pretty good’ coverage of relevant parts though
  - Vendors should run OpenID Connect Core tests as well (if they support non-FAPI)
FAPI-RW Certification: Reasons to Test

- Reduced support costs
  - If your implementation is interoperable it will “just work” for third parties

- Evidence of compliance to show government regulators

- Evidence of compliance may reduce insurance costs, chances of security breach, etc.

- It can be embarrassing if other people test your server & you fail
  - Anyone can test a server
FAPI Certification: First, FAPI compliance

- First, become FAPI compliant

- Ideally upgrade to a FAPI certified version of your vendor’s product

- Software that is not FAPI certified is likely to be missing:
  - Important configuration controls
  - “Recent” required standards like MTLS sender constrained access tokens
  - Well established but higher security OAuth2 options
    - e.g. client authentication using replay-proof asymmetric cryptography
  - Tamper proof (JWT Secured) OAuth2 authorization requests

- Check any HSMs (Hardware Security Modules) in use
  - Older ones may only support RSASSA-PKCS1-v1_5, which has known weaknesses
FAPI Certification: Pre-testing steps

- Two registered OAuth2 clients are required

- Tester needs to be able to create & register client credentials
  - Or be provided with them in the correct format

- Recommended that tester has existing domain knowledge
  - TLS certificates, JWKS manipulation, OAuth2, FAPI
  - For first run, a developer or highly-technical tester is desirable
Wrap up

- Conformance Suite source code etc publicly available on gitlab:  
  https://gitlab.com/openid/conformance-suite

- Instructions for testing/certifying:  
  https://openid.net/certification/instructions/

- Production deployment:  
  https://www.certification.openid.net/  
  (Login with any google/gitlab/openid account)

- Contact me if you’d like some help:  
  o joseph.heenan@oidf.org or certification@oidf.org  
  o https://twitter.com/josephheenan  
  o https://www.linkedin.com/in/josephheenan
Additional slides
Who Am I?

- OpenID Certification Team lead developer
- Software engineer & architect with over 25 years’ experience
- Active contributor to the OpenID Connect FAPI/CIBA/FAPI-CIBA/eKYC specifications
- 20+ years of mobile app experience
- Assisted 30+ UK banks with achieving compliance to the OpenID/FAPI specifications

https://www.linkedin.com/in/josephheenan/
Conformance Suite Architecture

- Multi-party protocol testing
- Structured configuration
- Structured logging and results
- Deterministic, modular execution units
  - Small pieces of java code
  - Easily unit testable
- Protect sensitive configuration and results data
- Transparent process
- Usable as part of CI
Architecture - continued

- Loosely bound backend, frontend and test modules
  - Clear interfaces
  - Heavy use of JSON

- Consistent logging of all inputs and outputs

- Easily extensible to new protocols
  - E.g. CIBA added without requiring any changes to frontend/backend

- Does not use existing OAuth2/OpenID Connect libraries
  - Easier to introduce negative tests
  - Easier to show the user exactly what happened and why
3.3. Authorization Server Metadata Validation

The "issuer" value returned MUST be identical to the authorization server's issuer identifier value into which the well-known URI string was inserted to create the URL used to retrieve the metadata. If these values are not identical, the data contained in the response MUST NOT be used.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Time</th>
<th>Status</th>
<th>Check</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>15:05:56</td>
<td>SUCCESS</td>
<td>CheckDisc Endpoint Discovery Url</td>
<td><a href="https://fapidev-as.authlete.net/.well-known/openid-configuration">https://fapidev-as.authlete.net/.well-known/openid-configuration</a></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>discoveryUrl</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>actual</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15:05:56</td>
<td>SUCCESS</td>
<td>CheckDisc Endpoint Issuer</td>
<td>issuer is consistent with the discovery endpoint</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
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<td>OIDCD-4.3</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>OIDCD-7.2</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Security Checks - Keys

EnsureServerJwksDoesNotContainPrivateOrSymmetricKeys

Jwks contains private and/or symmetric keys

```
private_keys:

  - "p": "uKADG9hlfV0aWcd9ArKb1MwlsWta_3vWMGymW0MIFrm0Y10_MNQAqos3hKEu1Tlp2BxBoDlJe2qquetD4456GonxDK3oDawc5yHIT0mTgePlfFyYn7u8",
    "kt": "RSA",
    "q": "uFhnh8gTX9p-u_Upv6ii17T-YHk_jJ2eP09Rxf74gfkhP035N6KORVELZgaACOq3xR6Tlk7yRL_-3B3VY4KwXl3w3UcYrV3yNGOFzCPn0hlyb36rTPxGec192uM",
    "d": "F5d7Am9rKWh4abvsVQr-aAXHORr22AaQwJgR9aBA1TYC8bJ5XKICj2Hz3Q85-U5htldDNCvEprY_LFpNQEsxnQqL88LWFCaFUczA8AKP55NHZ_rYwX1wxwa5y1KeINXR_dYMGniNp6_mBKTWmFqyVwvSMT8Ufd-Ew8PkJd6yR0icub-1F9h8Anqqa7FovHIQDa5MuKwB",
    "e": "AQAB",
    "use": "sig",
    "kid": "sig-2020-07-21T11:27:04Z",
    "alg": "jkwzNCOyZ2kW9qyk8330CNAPkXjc4Phd5J98bAqZzLP3o3smbLWqvdv192acP0a-PxSuKt6M01iPcqe1N69L6326kkmm_em_T00rRNM0gZembd4r3KgI6k",
    "dp": "lvJMWGhbtp3VA34DSv9Y8 estrogenEn86RtW3t_rKRD0d6zolJhLPEKCOHezwQ21sFnhFDK6rZ_9AAJLeMDWk0hhA0Zsgkg97110T_MXLV130JFkvwg2GoU",
    "alg": "PS256",
    "dp": "Dm99TPlsEaqXlR3jiiLQb10n8b-b_RlpHQV0e-G6UdrrspRqpowWvzRIFwMyEwSdzxTkN5VEd4F3xyrbDjNakG7k0N8-d00Pbux1Chb012hPMTYAHvIZDE",
    "n": "hPK_vcKsW3j7tFaCRPB8lnj7yRspna9m1CZHVjS3IIPbSnrgu5Hc2jF6gLgYzexHtvRI-CDGtAFCWCE_U_g02w_7MqH4zKbw_RIL1G8P1401WmZ-zrEHS-53Yroc8F80hx2rWF89BnhLeeDIPdaxHzZ7YknhaP7cc03w7EzkUud9y64TEMxGY_AeMDCdDr-maycRh54AgZk
```
Security Checks – JWS Request Objects Processing
Security Checks – objects ‘signed’ with alg ‘none’

08:45:40  SUCCESS  SerializeRequestObjectWithNullAlgorithm

Serialized the request object

```
request_object eylhgb6ci0iub25i1n0.eylhdbWQj0jodHRwczpcL1wvcmvV2aWV3LWFzLmF1dGhsZXRI[Lm5ldFwvliwic2NvcGU1OjvcGVuaWQgcGF5bWVudHMlLC[6FpbXMlOmsiaWRfFg9rZW4iO
slmVz2VudGlhbcI6di1Zx19fSwiaXnzlJoimi100DA3NTQwNTMlLC[6XNwb25zZV90eXBlUojY29kZSBpZF90b2tbiilsINZGlyZWNOX5yS6[6Imh0dHByO1wXc93dSuvYydG
ZXdcL2NhboYWNrliwic3RhdGVmiOii3Rj5WV4zTTNmlwiwZxhwjoxNTkzNzYyNjQwLC[6u25jZS[6ijPV3Vmh[6p7mQiLCIj6IlbRfawQcIoi1MJQ4MDc1NDA1MyJ9.
```
Further Security Checks – Request Object

- 'exp’ already expired
- Incorrect ‘aud’
- Correctly signed, but with non-permitted alg
- With a syntactically valid, but incorrect, signature
- Valid signature but from a different client
- With nonce only outside request object
- With non-registered redirect uri
Security Checks – Token Endpoint

- Calling token endpoint
  - Without client authentication
  - With expired client authentication assertion
  - With client authentication assertion intended for different server (‘aud’)
  - Valid client authentication, but passing client_id for target client
  - With already-used authorization code
  - With authorization code issued to another client
  - No MTLS client cert supplied for binding access token to
Security Checks – continued

- **JWKS**
  - Keys too short

- **Authorization code**
  - Too short
  - Not enough entropy

- **Calling resource server**
  - With valid mtls client cert, but not the one bound to access token

- **TLS 1.0/1.1 not allowed**

- **Insecure ciphers not allowed**

- And many more…
Interoperability Checks – Time Stamps

“Seconds since 1\textsuperscript{st} Jan 1970” has been a well-known standard for years... but:
Interoperability checks - continued

- The standard ‘happy’ flow
- Variants on Accept: headers
  - With/without charset
  - With q parameters
  - With multiple options
- With optional fields
  - All present
  - All missing
- Where case insensitive, testing both cases
- With allowed variants
  - ‘aud’ is an array
- Discovery document
  - Reflects what’s supported
  - Syntactically valid