OpenID Enhanced Authentication Profile (EAP) Working Group

October 28, 2020

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What is the EAP WG?

• Working group description at https://openid.net/wg/eap/

• Chartered to:
  – “Develop a security and privacy profile of the OpenID Connect specifications that enable users to authenticate to OpenID Providers using strong authentication specifications. The resulting profile will enable
    • use of IETF Token Binding specifications with OpenID Connect and
    • integration with FIDO relying parties and/or other strong authentication technologies.”
Two EAP Specifications

• Token Bound Authentication
  – Defines how to apply Token Binding to OpenID Connect ID Tokens
  – [https://openid.net/specs/openid-connect-token-bound-authentication-1_0.html](https://openid.net/specs/openid-connect-token-bound-authentication-1_0.html)

• EAP ACR Values
  – Defines “acr” values strong authentication profiles
  – [https://openid.net/specs/openid-connect-eap-acr-values-1_0.html](https://openid.net/specs/openid-connect-eap-acr-values-1_0.html)

• Both now Implementer’s Drafts
Token Binding Update

• IETF Token Binding specs became RFCs in October 2018
  – Token Binding adoption stalled due to Chrome’s removal
• OAuth Token Binding spec
  – Defines Token Binding of OAuth 2.0 access tokens, refresh tokens, authorization codes, JWT authorization grants, and JWT client authentication
• OpenID Connect Token Binding spec
  – https://openid.net/specs/openid-connect-token-bound-authentication-1_0.html
  – Defines Binding of OpenID Connect ID Tokens
• Spec work currently on hold, pending adoption progress
Two ACR Values Defined

- “phr” – Phishing-Resistant
  - An authentication mechanism where a party potentially under the control of the Relying Party cannot gain sufficient information to be able to successfully authenticate to the End User's OpenID Provider as if that party were the End User

- “phrh” – Phishing-Resistant Hardware Protected
  - An authentication mechanism meeting the requirements for phishing-resistant authentication above in which additionally information needed to be able to successfully authenticate to the End User's OpenID Provider as if that party were the End User is held in a hardware-protected device or component

- Phishing-Resistant definition based on 2008 OpenID Provider Authentication Policy Extension (PAPE) specification
Request to Define “\textit{pop}” AMR Value

- RFC 8176 defines Authentication Method Reference (AMR) values
- New value requested for WebAuthn & FIDO use
  - “\textit{pop}” – Authentication using Proof-of-Possession Key
- Complements these existing RFC AMR values
  - “\textit{hwk}” – hardware-backed PoP key
  - “\textit{swk}” – software-backed PoP key
Status

• Both became Implementer’s Drafts in August 2019
• Working group chairs are Brian Campbell and Mike Jones
• Calls scheduled every two weeks on Thursdays
  – (Following the Thursday OpenID Connect working group call)
• For more information, see the working group page
  – https://openid.net/wg/eap/