TOC 
DraftN. Sakimura
 NRI
 J. Bradley
 Ping Identity
 M. Jones
 Microsoft
 B. de Medeiros
 Google
 E. Jay
 Illumila
 December 6, 2012


OpenID Connect Standard 1.0 - draft 14

Abstract

OpenID Connect 1.0 is a simple identity layer on top of the OAuth 2.0 protocol. It allows Clients to verify the identity of the End-User based on the authentication performed by an Authorization Server, as well as to obtain basic profile information about the End-User in an interoperable and RESTful manner.

OpenID Connect Standard 1.0 is an HTTP protocol binding for OpenID Connect Messages 1.0 request and response messages.



Table of Contents

1.  Introduction
    1.1.  Requirements Notation and Conventions
    1.2.  Terminology
2.  Authorization Endpoint
    2.1.  OpenID Connect Scopes
    2.2.  Protocol Flows
        2.2.1.  How to Get an Authorization Code, Access Token, and ID Token
        2.2.2.  Authorization Code Flow
        2.2.3.  Implicit Flow
    2.3.  Authorization Request
        2.3.1.  Client Prepares an Authorization Request
            2.3.1.1.  Simple Request Method
            2.3.1.2.  Request Parameter Method
            2.3.1.3.  Request File Method
        2.3.2.  Authorization Server Validates Request Object
        2.3.3.  Authorization Server Authenticates the End-User
        2.3.4.  Authorization Server Obtains the End-User Consent/Authorization
        2.3.5.  Authorization Server Sends the End-User Back to the Client
            2.3.5.1.  End-User Grants Authorization
            2.3.5.2.  End-User Denies Authorization or Invalid Request
3.  Token Endpoint
    3.1.  Requesting an Access Token
        3.1.1.  Access Token Request
        3.1.2.  Access Token Response
        3.1.3.  Access Token Error Response
    3.2.  Refreshing an Access Token
        3.2.1.  Refresh Token Response
        3.2.2.  Refresh Token Error Response
4.  UserInfo Endpoint
    4.1.  UserInfo Request
    4.2.  UserInfo Response
    4.3.  UserInfo Error Response
5.  Self-Issued Identity Provider
    5.1.  Self-Issued Identity Provider Discovery
    5.2.  Client Registration to Self-Issued Identity Provider
    5.3.  Self-Issued Identity Provider Request
    5.4.  Self-Issued Identity Provider Response
    5.5.  Self-Issued Identity ID Token Validation
6.  Discovery and Registration
7.  Serializations
    7.1.  Query String Serialization
    7.2.  Form Serialization
8.  Security Considerations
    8.1.  Implicit Grant Flow Threats
9.  Privacy Considerations
10.  IANA Considerations
    10.1.  OAuth Parameters Registry
        10.1.1.  Authorization Request Parameter (display)
        10.1.2.  Authorization Request Parameter (prompt)
        10.1.3.  Authorization Request Parameter (nonce)
        10.1.4.  Authorization Request Parameter (request)
        10.1.5.  Authorization Request Parameter (request_uri)
        10.1.6.  ID Token Response Parameters
    10.2.  OAuth Extensions Error Registry
        10.2.1.  Authorization Endpoint Error (invalid_redirect_uri)
        10.2.2.  Authorization Endpoint Error (interaction_required)
        10.2.3.  Authorization Endpoint Error (login_required)
        10.2.4.  Authorization Endpoint Error (session_selection_required)
        10.2.5.  Authorization Endpoint Error (consent_required)
        10.2.6.  Authorization Endpoint Error (invalid_request_uri)
        10.2.7.  Authorization Endpoint Error (invalid_openid_request_object)
        10.2.8.  UserInfo Endpoint Error (invalid_schema)
11.  References
    11.1.  Normative References
    11.2.  Informative References
Appendix A.  Footnotes
    A.1.  Example JWT Values
Appendix B.  Acknowledgements
Appendix C.  Notices
Appendix D.  Document History
§  Authors' Addresses




 TOC 

1.  Introduction

This specification describes the binding of the HTTP protocol with the endpoints described in OpenID Connect Messages 1.0 (Sakimura, N., Bradley, J., Jones, M., de Medeiros, B., Mortimore, C., and E. Jay, “OpenID Connect Messages 1.0,” December 2012.) [OpenID.Messages].



 TOC 

1.1.  Requirements Notation and Conventions

The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT", "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in [RFC2119] (Bradner, S., “Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate Requirement Levels,” March 1997.) .

Throughout this document, values are quoted to indicate that they are to be taken literally. When using these values in protocol messages, the quotes MUST NOT be used as part of the value.



 TOC 

1.2.  Terminology

This specification uses the terms "Access Token", "Refresh Token", "Authorization Code", "Authorization Grant", "Authorization Server", "Authorization Endpoint", "Client", "Client Identifier", "Client Secret", "Protected Resource", "Resource Owner", "Resource Server", and "Token Endpoint" defined by OAuth 2.0 (Hardt, D., “The OAuth 2.0 Authorization Framework,” October 2012.) [RFC6749], and the terms defined by OpenID Connect Messages (Sakimura, N., Bradley, J., Jones, M., de Medeiros, B., Mortimore, C., and E. Jay, “OpenID Connect Messages 1.0,” December 2012.) [OpenID.Messages]. This specification also defines the following terms:

Request File
A document whose contents is an OpenID Request Object representing a set of Authorization Request parameters.
Request File URI
A URL that references a Request File. The Request File contents MUST be retrievable by the Authorization Server.


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2.  Authorization Endpoint

The Authorization Endpoint performs authentication services for the End-User and requests authorization from the End-User to release information to OpenID Connect Relying Party Clients. When an End-User accesses a Relying Party Client application that requires the End-User's identifier and other information, it sends the End-User to the Authorization Server's Authorization Endpoint for authentication and authorization. The Authorization Server then issues an ID Token that asserts the End-User's identifier and an Access Token that allows the Client to access the End-User's information at Protected Resource endpoints. Protected Resource endpoints MAY perform different actions or return different information based on the scopes associated with the presented Access Token. Clients MUST specify how the Access Token and ID Token are to be returned using the response_type parameter in the Authorization Request.



 TOC 

2.1.  OpenID Connect Scopes

Clients MUST specify the desired scopes in an Authorization Request to obtain an Access Token with the proper permissions. The scope names used by OpenID Connect are defined in Section 2.1.2 of OpenID Connect Messages (Sakimura, N., Bradley, J., Jones, M., de Medeiros, B., Mortimore, C., and E. Jay, “OpenID Connect Messages 1.0,” December 2012.) [OpenID.Messages].

The Authorization Server MAY fully or partially ignore the scope values requested by the Client based on the Authorization Server policy or the End-User's instructions. A Client may elect to only request a subset of the information available from the UserInfo Endpoint.

The following is a non-normative example of a scope parameter in an Authorization Request:

scope=openid profile email phone


 TOC 

2.2.  Protocol Flows

Authorization Requests follow two main paths to obtain Access Tokens and ID Tokens, the Implicit Flow and the Authorization Code Flow. The flows determine how the Access Token and ID Token are returned to the Client. Access Tokens are credentials used to access Protected Resources, as defined in Section 1.4 of OAuth 2.0 (Hardt, D., “The OAuth 2.0 Authorization Framework,” October 2012.) [RFC6749]. Access Tokens represent a Resource Owner's authorization and MUST NOT be exposed to unauthorized parties.

The Implicit Flow is mainly used by Clients implemented in a browser using a scripting language. The Access Token and ID Token are returned directly to the Client, which MAY expose them to the Resource Owner and other applications that have access to the Resource Owner's User-Agent. The Authorization Server does not perform Client authentication before issuing the Access Token.

The Authorization Code Flow returns an Authorization Code to the Client, which can then exchange it for an Access Token directly. This provides the added benefit of not exposing the Access Token to the Resource Owner and possibly other malicious applications with access to the Resource Owner's User-Agent. The Authorization Server can also authenticate the Client before exchanging the Authorization Code for an Access Token. The Authorization Code flow is suitable for Clients that can securely maintain a Client Secret between themselves and the Authorization Server whereas the Implicit flow is suitable for Clients that cannot.



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2.2.1.  How to Get an Authorization Code, Access Token, and ID Token

In OpenID Connect Standard, the Client sends authorization request to the Authorization Endpoint through the User Agent to obtain the Access Token and ID Token. It MAY obtain them from the Authorization Endpoint or from Token Endpoint utilizing the code that it obtained from the Authorization Endpoint. The latter is called Code Flow (Authorization Code Flow) and the former is called Implicit Flow (Implicit Flow).



 TOC 

2.2.2.  Authorization Code Flow

The Authorization Code Flow goes through the following steps.

  1. Client prepares an Authorization Request containing the desired request parameters.
  2. Client sends a request to the Authorization Server.
  3. Authorization Server Authenticates the End-User.
  4. Authorization Server Obtains the End-User Consent/Authorization.
  5. Authorization Server Sends the End-User back to the Client with an Authorization Code.
  6. Client requests a response using the Authorization Code at the Token Endpoint (Token Endpoint).
  7. Client receives a response that contains an Access Token and ID Token in the response body.
  8. Client validates the ID Token and retrieves the End-User's user identifier.
  9. (OPTIONAL) Client accesses the UserInfo Endpoint (UserInfo Endpoint) with the Access Token.
  10. (OPTIONAL) Client receives UserInfo Response.

Note that in each step, the party that receives a message MUST validate it according to the validation rules in OpenID Connect Messages (Sakimura, N., Bradley, J., Jones, M., de Medeiros, B., Mortimore, C., and E. Jay, “OpenID Connect Messages 1.0,” December 2012.) [OpenID.Messages].



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2.2.3.  Implicit Flow

The Implicit Flow follows the following steps:

  1. Client prepares an Authorization Request containing the desired request parameters.
  2. Client sends a request to the Authorization Server.
  3. Authorization Server Authenticates the End-User.
  4. Authorization Server Obtains the End-User Consent/Authorization.
  5. Authorization Server Sends the End-User back to the Client with an Access Token and an ID Token if requested.
  6. Client validates the ID Token and retrieves the End-User's user identifier.
  7. (OPTIONAL) Client accesses the UserInfo Endpoint (UserInfo Endpoint) with the Access Token.
  8. (OPTIONAL) Client receives UserInfo Response.

Note that in each step, the party that receives a message MUST validate it according to the validation rules in OpenID Connect Messages (Sakimura, N., Bradley, J., Jones, M., de Medeiros, B., Mortimore, C., and E. Jay, “OpenID Connect Messages 1.0,” December 2012.) [OpenID.Messages].



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2.3.  Authorization Request

When the End-User wishes to access a Protected Resource and the End-User Authorization has not yet been obtained, the Client prepares an Authorization Request to the Authorization Endpoint.

Authorization Servers MUST require the use of a transport-layer security mechanism at the Authorization Endpoint. The Authorization Server MUST support TLS 1.2 RFC 5246 (Dierks, T. and E. Rescorla, “The Transport Layer Security (TLS) Protocol Version 1.2,” August 2008.) [RFC5246] and/or TLS 1.0 [RFC2246] (Dierks, T. and C. Allen, “The TLS Protocol Version 1.0,” January 1999.) and MAY support other transport-layer mechanisms with equivalent security.

Authorization Servers MUST support the use of the HTTP "GET" and "POST" methods defined in RFC 2616 (Fielding, R., Gettys, J., Mogul, J., Frystyk, H., Masinter, L., Leach, P., and T. Berners-Lee, “Hypertext Transfer Protocol -- HTTP/1.1,” June 1999.) [RFC2616] at the Authorization Endpoint.

Clients MAY use the HTTP "GET" or "POST" method to send the Authorization Request to the Authorization Server. If using the HTTP "GET" method, the request parameters are serialized using URI query string serialization (Query String Serialization). If using the HTTP "POST" method, the request parameters are serialized using form serialization (Form Serialization).



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2.3.1.  Client Prepares an Authorization Request

The Client prepares an Authorization Request to the Authorization Endpoint with the request parameters using the HTTP "GET" or "POST" method. The scheme used in the Authorization URL MUST be HTTPS. The Client MUST perform a TLS/SSL server certificate check, per RFC 6125 (Saint-Andre, P. and J. Hodges, “Representation and Verification of Domain-Based Application Service Identity within Internet Public Key Infrastructure Using X.509 (PKIX) Certificates in the Context of Transport Layer Security (TLS),” March 2011.) [RFC6125].

The required Authorization Request parameters are as follows:

response_type
An OAuth 2.0 registered response type that determines how the Authorization Response is returned to the Client. As described in OAuth 2.0 Multiple Response Type Encoding Practices (de Medeiros, B., Scurtescu, M., and P. Tarjan, “OAuth 2.0 Multiple Response Type Encoding Practices,” November 2012.) [OAuth.Responses], the following registered values are supported:
  • code
  • code id_token
  • id_token
  • token
  • token id_token
  • code token
  • code token id_token
client_id
The Client identifier.
scope
It MUST include openid as one of the space delimited ASCII strings. Other values that MAY be included are profile, email, address, and phone. The values specify an additive list of Claims that are returned by the UserInfo Endpoint.
redirect_uri
A redirection URI where the response will be sent. The Scheme, Host, Path, and Query Parameter segments of this URI MUST match one of the redirect_uris registered for the client_id in the OpenID Connect Dynamic Client Registration 1.0 (Sakimura, N., Bradley, J., and M. Jones, “OpenID Connect Dynamic Client Registration 1.0,” December 2012.) [OpenID.Registration] specification.

The request MAY contain the following OPTIONAL and sometimes REQUIRED parameters:

nonce
A string value used to associate a Client session with an ID Token, and to mitigate replay attacks. The value is passed through unmodified from the Authorization Request to the ID Token. Use of the nonce is REQUIRED when using the implicit flow and OPTIONAL when using the code flow.
state
An opaque value used to maintain state between the request and the callback.
request
An OpenID Request Object value.
request_uri
A URL that points to an OpenID Request Object.
display
An ASCII string value that specifies how the Authorization Server displays the authentication page to the End-User. Refer to Section 2.1.2 of OpenID Connect Messages (Sakimura, N., Bradley, J., Jones, M., de Medeiros, B., Mortimore, C., and E. Jay, “OpenID Connect Messages 1.0,” December 2012.) [OpenID.Messages] for more information.
prompt
A space delimited list of ASCII strings that can contain the values login, consent, select_account, and none. Refer to OpenID Connect Messages (Sakimura, N., Bradley, J., Jones, M., de Medeiros, B., Mortimore, C., and E. Jay, “OpenID Connect Messages 1.0,” December 2012.) [OpenID.Messages] for more information.
id_token
An ID Token passed to the Authorization server as a hint. Refer to OpenID Connect Messages (Sakimura, N., Bradley, J., Jones, M., de Medeiros, B., Mortimore, C., and E. Jay, “OpenID Connect Messages 1.0,” December 2012.) [OpenID.Messages] for more information.

There are three methods to construct and send the request to the Authorization Endpoint:

a.
Simple Request Method
b.
Request Parameter Method
c.
Request File Method

The Simple Request Method is used in simple cases when default UserInfo and ID Token Claims are desired.

The Request Parameter Method is used by sending an OpenID Request Object when the Client desires to retrieve a different set of UserInfo and ID Token Claims. The request parameter method also allows requests to be signed or encrypted.

The Request File Method works similarly to the Request Parameter Method but differs in that it sends an URL as a reference to the OpenID Request Object. It enables large requests to be sent securely and compactly even on user agents with limited capabilities. Clients MAY use the Request File Method to minimize the request size.



 TOC 

2.3.1.1.  Simple Request Method

The Client prepares an Authorization Request to the Authorization Endpoint using the appropriate parameters. If using the HTTP "GET" method, the request parameters are serialized using URI query string serialization (Query String Serialization). If using the HTTP "POST" method, the request parameters are serialized using form serialization (Form Serialization).

The following is a non-normative example of an Authorization Request URL (with line wraps for display purposes only):

https://server.example.com/op/authorize?
response_type=code%20id_token
&client_id=s6BhdRkqt3
&redirect_uri=https%3A%2F%2Fclient.example.org%2Fcb
&scope=openid
&nonce=n-0S6_WzA2Mj
&state=af0ifjsldkj


 TOC 

2.3.1.1.1.  Client sends a request to the Authorization Server

Having constructed the Authorization Request, the Client sends it to the HTTPS End-User Authorization Endpoint. This MAY happen via HTTPS redirect, hyperlinking, or any other means of directing the User-Agent to the Authorization Endpoint URL.

Following is a non-normative example using HTTP redirect (with line wraps for display purposes only):

HTTP/1.1 302 Found
Location: https://server.example.com/authorize?
response_type=code%20id_token
&client_id=s6BhdRkqt3
&redirect_uri=https%3A%2F%2Fclient.example.org%2Fcb
&scope=openid
&nonce=n-0S6_WzA2Mj
&state=af0ifjsldkj


 TOC 

2.3.1.2.  Request Parameter Method

The Client prepares an Authorization Request to the Authorization Endpoint using the appropriate HTTP parameter serialization. The Client SHOULD construct the request using the HTTP "POST" method, but MAY use the HTTP "GET" method.

The Authorization Request MUST include the request parameter defined in Section 2.3.1 (Client Prepares an Authorization Request). The Authorization Request MUST NOT include the request_uri parameter.

The request parameter is an OpenID Request Object that contains the Authorization Request and also specifies the contents of the responses to be returned from the UserInfo Endpoint. The OpenID Request Object MAY be signed or signed and encrypted via JWS (Jones, M., Bradley, J., and N. Sakimura, “JSON Web Signature,” November 2012.) [JWS] and JWE (Jones, M., Rescorla, E., and J. Hildebrand, “JSON Web Encryption (JWE),” November 2012.) [JWE] respectively, thereby providing authentication, integrity, non-repudiation and/or confidentiality.

The following is a non-normative example of an OpenID Request Object before base64url encoding and signing:

{
  "response_type": "code id_token",
  "client_id": "s6BhdRkqt3",
  "redirect_uri": "https://client.example.org/cb",
  "scope": "openid profile",
  "state": "af0ifjsldkj",
  "nonce": "n-0S6_WzA2Mj",
  "userinfo":
    {
      "claims":
        {
          "name": {"essential": true},
          "nickname": null,
          "email": {"essential": true},
          "email_verified": {"essential": true},
          "picture": null
        }
    },
    "id_token":
      {
        "max_age": 86400,
        "claims":
          {
            "gender": null,
            "birthdate": {"essential": true},
            "acr": {"values": ["2"]}
          }
      }
}

The following is a non-normative example of an OpenID Request Object before base64url encoding and signing (with line wraps within the values for display purposes only):

algorithm = RS256

JSON Encoded Header =  {"alg":"RS256"}
JSON Encoded Payload =
    {
      "response_type": "code id_token",
      "client_id": "s6BhdRkqt3",
      "redirect_uri": "https://client.example.org/cb",
      "scope": "openid profile",
      "state": "af0ifjsldkj",
      "nonce": "n-0S6_WzA2Mj",
      "userinfo":
        {
          "claims":
            {
              "name": {"essential": true},
              "nickname": null,
              "email": {"essential": true},
              "email_verified": {"essential": true},
              "picture": null
            }
        },
        "id_token":
          {
            "max_age": 86400,
            "claims":
              {
                "gender": null,
                "birthdate": {"essential": true},
                "acr": {"values": ["2"]}
              }
          }
    }

OpenID Request Object =
    eyJhbGciOiJSUzI1NiJ9.ew0KICAicmVzcG9uc2VfdHlwZSI6ICJjb2RlIGlkX3Rv
    a2VuIiwNCiAgImNsaWVudF9pZCI6ICJzNkJoZFJrcXQzIiwNCiAgInJlZGlyZWN0X
    3VyaSI6ICJodHRwczovL2NsaWVudC5leGFtcGxlLm9yZy9jYiIsDQogICJzY29wZS
    I6ICJvcGVuaWQgcHJvZmlsZSIsDQogICJzdGF0ZSI6ICJhZjBpZmpzbGRraiIsDQo
    gICJub25jZSI6ICJuLTBTNl9XekEyTWoiLA0KICAidXNlcmluZm8iOiANCiAgICB7
    DQogICAgICAiY2xhaW1zIjogDQogICAgICAgIHsNCiAgICAgICAgICAibmFtZSI6I
    HsiZXNzZW50aWFsIjogdHJ1ZX0sDQogICAgICAgICAgIm5pY2tuYW1lIjogbnVsbC
    wNCiAgICAgICAgICAiZW1haWwiOiB7ImVzc2VudGlhbCI6IHRydWV9LA0KICAgICA
    gICAgICJlbWFpbF92ZXJpZmllZCI6IHsiZXNzZW50aWFsIjogdHJ1ZX0sDQogICAg
    ICAgICAgInBpY3R1cmUiOiBudWxsDQogICAgICAgIH0NCiAgICB9LA0KICAgICJpZ
    F90b2tlbiI6IA0KICAgICAgew0KICAgICAgICAibWF4X2FnZSI6IDg2NDAwLA0KIC
    AgICAgICAiY2xhaW1zIjogDQogICAgICAgICAgew0KICAgICAgICAgICAgImdlbmR
    lciI6IG51bGwsDQogICAgICAgICAgICAiYmlydGhkYXRlIjogeyJlc3NlbnRpYWwi
    OiB0cnVlfSwNCiAgICAgICAgICAgICJhY3IiOiB7InZhbHVlcyI6IFsiMiJdfQ0KI
    CAgICAgICAgIH0NCiAgICAgIH0NCn0.QO_PD7FOnOaDULViVR-a4RmgyZA-wz1p4a
    KiD8ucktrF2o62PmntJC6vR1Ne_rWXZaybM4ZFN_HzFmakwYMqrp-HBfcegj5-ifv
    wSOAo-EfQrr88Jd40rrnH-KdkjQQiu5BiE513o4XK-1p7lG8RmbQc3EJwJTimNC4E
    ijk1wp2D99IndyH9CrOp_M5X15iQjGGF65IWb-9ly1waEiJMFrO2BuDTKpImcjKe9
    odgtWRyZWs8KhfVwLVkrazhf8E08TEqK8Vuohg8FoCLLaw66IN4EVBMcEnncNyHId
    77ZeVOB-KGHJdIo75W7pc68GUc5dg1NXpBF2UqtHmoXVGisQ

The following is the RSA public key information that can be used
to validate the OpenID Request Object signature in the above example.
The values are an array of hexadecimal digits in big endian format.

modulus:
[
  cb,d2,ea,bf,87,c2,a7,a1,22,fa,ed,be,64,22,aa,f3,
  76,2f,6c,51,24,e8,93,2c,fe,94,a3,ef,a7,8c,91,d7,
  56,46,e5,97,d9,a0,4a,18,70,2d,2a,51,39,3f,bf,ef,
  9f,ff,cf,08,a6,56,78,fb,77,bc,69,01,e9,e3,e0,cc,
  01,6e,d3,c3,66,29,e9,b0,13,96,d0,23,47,ba,90,80,
  a1,b6,df,fa,2b,34,f9,39,a6,97,0c,52,3a,a8,22,c9,
  9a,4e,75,09,ce,15,60,56,b1,82,a7,af,32,77,18,af,
  36,96,ff,9d,26,67,5c,86,48,52,10,cc,b6,0f,f1,b8,
  a3,00,71,95,8d,d1,05,81,96,99,10,df,65,b2,7f,c6,
  75,62,da,26,91,eb,07,74,4e,95,2e,74,13,8e,70,c6,
  b9,60,f7,13,27,71,56,fc,a8,33,ee,5d,96,ab,be,08,
  4b,2f,41,f3,3a,e6,11,69,d0,49,56,85,99,a3,00,cd,
  4e,92,a9,93,64,64,95,9e,d0,68,13,bb,5c,3b,f7,b9,
  1e,ec,fe,c7,f6,83,e6,c0,8d,26,31,61,41,ac,aa,43,
  40,f5,bd,f1,55,6e,77,6a,6f,d4,65,9d,ed,65,b1,53,
  22,1e,79,ec,92,02,58,a1,e5,5a,3e,6e,cd,e2,57,6b
]

exponent: [01,00,01]

The following is a non-normative example of an Authorization Request with the OpenID Request Method (with line wraps within the values for display purposes only):

https://server.example.com/authorize?
response_type=code%02id_token
&client_id=s6BhdRkqt3
&redirect_uri=https%3A%2F%2Fclient.example.org%2Fcb
&scope=openid
&state=af0ifjsldkj
&nonce=n-0S6_WzA2Mj
&request=eyJhbGciOiJSUzI1NiJ9.ew0KICAicmVzcG9uc2VfdHlwZSI6ICJjb2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.QO_PD7FOnO
aDULViVR-a4RmgyZA-wz1p4aKiD8ucktrF2o62PmntJC6vR1Ne_rWXZaybM4ZFN_
HzFmakwYMqrp-HBfcegj5-ifvwSOAo-EfQrr88Jd40rrnH-KdkjQQiu5BiE513o4
XK-1p7lG8RmbQc3EJwJTimNC4Eijk1wp2D99IndyH9CrOp_M5X15iQjGGF65IWb-
9ly1waEiJMFrO2BuDTKpImcjKe9odgtWRyZWs8KhfVwLVkrazhf8E08TEqK8Vuoh
g8FoCLLaw66IN4EVBMcEnncNyHId77ZeVOB-KGHJdIo75W7pc68GUc5dg1NXpBF2
UqtHmoXVGisQ


 TOC 

2.3.1.2.1.  Client Sends a Request to the Authorization Server

Having constructed the Authorization Request, the Client sends it to the HTTPS Authorization Endpoint. This MAY happen via HTTPS redirect, hyperlinking, or any other means of directing the User-Agent to the Authorization Endpoint.

Following is a non-normative example using HTTP redirect (with line wraps for display purposes only):

HTTP/1.1 302 Found
Location: https://server.example.com/authorize?
response_type=code%20id_token
&client_id=s6BhdRkqt3
&redirect_uri=https%3A%2F%2Fclient.example.org%2Fcb
&scope=openid
&state=af0ifjsldkj
&nonce=n-0S6_WzA2Mj
&request=eyJhbGciOiJSUzI1NiJ9.ew0KICAicmVzcG9uc2VfdHlwZSI6ICJjb2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.QO_PD7FOnO
aDULViVR-a4RmgyZA-wz1p4aKiD8ucktrF2o62PmntJC6vR1Ne_rWXZaybM4ZFN_
HzFmakwYMqrp-HBfcegj5-ifvwSOAo-EfQrr88Jd40rrnH-KdkjQQiu5BiE513o4
XK-1p7lG8RmbQc3EJwJTimNC4Eijk1wp2D99IndyH9CrOp_M5X15iQjGGF65IWb-
9ly1waEiJMFrO2BuDTKpImcjKe9odgtWRyZWs8KhfVwLVkrazhf8E08TEqK8Vuoh
g8FoCLLaw66IN4EVBMcEnncNyHId77ZeVOB-KGHJdIo75W7pc68GUc5dg1NXpBF2
UqtHmoXVGisQ


 TOC 

2.3.1.3.  Request File Method

The Request File Method differs from the other methods in that it uses a Request File that contains an OpenID Request Object. It then sends the Request File URL as part of the Authorization Request.

The Client prepares an Authorization Request using the desired HTTP "GET" or "POST" method. The Client SHOULD use the HTTP "GET" method, but MAY use the HTTP "POST" method. The scheme used in the Authorization URL MUST be HTTPS. The Client MUST perform a TLS/SSL server certificate check, per RFC 6125 (Saint-Andre, P. and J. Hodges, “Representation and Verification of Domain-Based Application Service Identity within Internet Public Key Infrastructure Using X.509 (PKIX) Certificates in the Context of Transport Layer Security (TLS),” March 2011.) [RFC6125].

The Authorization Request MUST NOT include the request parameter. The Authorization Request MUST include the request_uri parameter. The contents of the target of the URL must be an OpenID Request Object. The scheme used in the request_uri value MUST be HTTPS, unless the target OpenID Request Object is signed in a way that is verifiable by the Authorization Server. The request_uri value MUST be reachable by the Authorization Server, and SHOULD be reachable by the Client.

Following is a non-normative example of a Request File (with line wraps for display purposes only):

eyJhbGciOiJSUzI1NiJ9.ew0KICAicmVzcG9uc2VfdHlwZSI6ICJjb2RlIGlkX3R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.QO_PD7FOnOaDULViVR-
a4RmgyZA-wz1p4aKiD8ucktrF2o62PmntJC6vR1Ne_rWXZaybM4ZFN_HzFmakwYM
qrp-HBfcegj5-ifvwSOAo-EfQrr88Jd40rrnH-KdkjQQiu5BiE513o4XK-1p7lG8
RmbQc3EJwJTimNC4Eijk1wp2D99IndyH9CrOp_M5X15iQjGGF65IWb-9ly1waEiJ
MFrO2BuDTKpImcjKe9odgtWRyZWs8KhfVwLVkrazhf8E08TEqK8Vuohg8FoCLLaw
66IN4EVBMcEnncNyHId77ZeVOB-KGHJdIo75W7pc68GUc5dg1NXpBF2UqtHmoXVG
isQ


 TOC 

2.3.1.3.1.  Client Generates the URL of the Request File

The Client then stores the Request File either locally or remotely. This is the Request URI, "request_uri". The URI MAY be appended with the base64url encoded SHA-256 [FIPS180-2] hash of the file after "#" so that the Authorization Server can detect whether the file has changed.

It should be noted that if the Request File includes user's attribute values, it MUST NOT be revealed to anybody but the Authorization Server. As such, the "request_uri" MUST have appropriate entropy for its lifetime, and must be removed after successful authentication or a reasonable timeout.

The Client then records the Request File either locally or remotely and obtains the Request File URI, "request_uri".

Following is a non-normative example (with line wraps for display purposes only):

https://client.example.org/rf.txt
#V4pDyha4i12w7CrRxcSh9_GK562EW2y8MzxEGhXfdpk


 TOC 

2.3.1.3.2.  Client Sends a Request to Authorization Server via HTTPS Redirect

The Client sends the Authorization Request to the Authorization Endpoint.

The entire URL MUST NOT exceed 512 bytes.

Following is a non-normative example (with line wraps for display purposes only):

HTTP/1.1 302 Found
Location: https://server.example.com/authorize
?response_type=code%20id_token
&client_id=s6BhdRkqt3
&request_uri=https%3A%2F%2Fclient.example.org%2Frf.txt
%23V4pDyha4i12w7CrRxcSh9_GK562EW2y8MzxEGhXfdpk
&state=af0ifjsldkj&nonce=n-0S6_WzA2Mj&scope=openid


 TOC 

2.3.1.3.3.  Authorization Server Fetches the Request File

Upon receipt of the Request, the Authorization Server MUST send a GET request to the request_uri to retrieve the content unless it is already cached and parse it to recreate the Authorization Request parameters.

Note that the RP SHOULD use a unique URI for each request utilizing distinct parameters, or otherwise prevent the Authorization Server from caching the request_uri.

Following is a non-normative example of this fetch process:

GET /rf.txt HTTP/1.1
Host: client.example.org


 TOC 

2.3.2.  Authorization Server Validates Request Object

The Authorization Server validates the request according to Section 5.1 of OpenID Connect Messages (Sakimura, N., Bradley, J., Jones, M., de Medeiros, B., Mortimore, C., and E. Jay, “OpenID Connect Messages 1.0,” December 2012.) [OpenID.Messages].



 TOC 

2.3.3.  Authorization Server Authenticates the End-User

The Authorization Server validates the request to ensure all required parameters are present and valid. If the request is valid, the Authorization Server MUST authenticate the End-User. The way in which the Authorization Server authenticates the End-User (e.g. username and password login, session cookies) is beyond the scope of this specification. An authentication user interface MAY be displayed by the Authorization Server depending on the authentication method used.

The Authorization Server MUST attempt to authenticate the End-User in the following cases:

The Authorization Server MUST NOT attempt authentication in the following cases:



 TOC 

2.3.4.  Authorization Server Obtains the End-User Consent/Authorization

Once the End-User is authenticated, the Authorization Server MUST obtain an authorization decision. This MAY be done by presenting the End-User with a dialogue that allows the End-User to recognize what he is consenting to and obtain his consent or by establishing consent via other means (for example, via previous administrative consent).

The Authorization Server MUST attempt to request authorization from the End-User in the following cases:

The Authorization Server MUST NOT request End-User authorization in the following cases:



 TOC 

2.3.5.  Authorization Server Sends the End-User Back to the Client

Once the authorization is determined, the Authorization Server returns a successful or error response.



 TOC 

2.3.5.1.  End-User Grants Authorization

If the Resource Owner grants the access request, the Authorization Server issues an Authorization Response as described in Section 2.1.3 of OpenID Connect Messages (Sakimura, N., Bradley, J., Jones, M., de Medeiros, B., Mortimore, C., and E. Jay, “OpenID Connect Messages 1.0,” December 2012.) [OpenID.Messages] to the Client by adding the response parameters to redirect_uri specified in the Authorization Request using the "application/x-www-form-urlencoded" format.

Note that if the response_type parameter in the Authorization Request includes the string value token or id_token, all response parameters SHOULD be added to the fragment component of the redirection URI. Otherwise, the response parameters are added to the query component of the redirection URI.

The following are non-normative examples of requests with differing response_type values and their responses (with line wraps for display purposes only):

Case 1: response_type=code

https://server.example.com/op/authorize?
response_type=code
&client_id=s6BhdRkqt3
&redirect_uri=https%3A%2F%2Fclient.example.org%2Fcb
&scope=openid
&nonce=n-0S6_WzA2Mj
&state=af0ifjsldkj


HTTP/1.1 302 Found
Location: https://client.example.org/cb?
code=Qcb0Orv1zh30vL1MPRsbm-diHiMwcLyZvn1arpZv-Jxf_11jnpEX3Tgfvk
&state=af0ifjsldkj

Case 2: response_type=token id_token

https://server.example.com/op/authorize?
response_type=token%20id_token
&client_id=s6BhdRkqt3
&redirect_uri=https%3A%2F%2Fclient.example.org%2Fcb
&scope=openid
&nonce=n-0S6_WzA2Mj
&state=af0ifjsldkj


HTTP/1.1 302 Found
Location: https://client.example.org/cb#
access_token=jHkWEdUXMU1BwAsC4vtUsZwnNvTIxEl0z9K3vx5KF0Y
&token_type=Bearer
&id_token=eyJhbGciOiJSUzI1NiJ9.ew0KICAgICJpc3MiOiAiaHR0cDovL3Nlc
nZlci5leGFtcGxlLmNvbSIsDQogICAgInVzZXJfaWQiOiAiMjQ4Mjg5NzYxMDAxI
iwNCiAgICAiYXVkIjogInM2QmhkUmtxdDMiLA0KICAgICJub25jZSI6ICJuLTBTN
l9XekEyTWoiLA0KICAgICJleHAiOiAxMzExMjgxOTcwLA0KICAgICJpYXQiOiAxM
zExMjgwOTcwLA0KICAgICJhdF9oYXNoIjogIjc3UW1VUHRqUGZ6V3RGMkFucEs5U
ldwWHJXbHJlY2RiTFV5SkRJYjdTNlEiDQp9.ZP0kFjn7ZOYwga5dbfvvYLlu7DAa
RRhgE7u88OEfRqmfWCB35mwSso1A255fbvdOPryGda3xy0t2P1gjNxc2cKA8T9Rm
w0ae6UyLSaA9zROXfpdyRX6wEs_RMdnftBY60B_DCeFJkWQxUG6taXomiVH7Ozyk
765VX3gRzSoxaJKbD1xo582s0dGmMvkUL4dg7-46eOrOLkQTujUAOnjqCfiqzL1C
rchYsNZjwNBE8pySRhJTmedm882k0NRZPU1QMLJIVpB9e0Hiuwz1htHm3-XxZ63b
bzRLG6jsWknphWIFraFrf59Kgmct7jfzBF5IOvfpcdFe9kHVkKX_acts-w

Verifying and decoding the ID Token will yield the following
ID Token JSON object:

{
  "iss": "http://server.example.com",
  "user_id": "248289761001",
  "aud": "s6BhdRkqt3",
  "nonce": "n-0S6_WzA2Mj",
  "exp": 1311281970,
  "iat": 1311280970,
  "at_hash": "77QmUPtjPfzWtF2AnpK9RWpXrWlrecdbLUyJDIb7S6Q"
}

Case 3: response_type=code id_token

https://server.example.com/op/authorize?
response_type=code%20id_token
&client_id=s6BhdRkqt3
&redirect_uri=https%3A%2F%2Fclient.example.org%2Fcb
&scope=openid
&nonce=n-0S6_WzA2Mj
&state=af0ifjsldkj


HTTP/1.1 302 Found
Location: https://client.example.org/cb#
code=Qcb0Orv1zh30vL1MPRsbm-diHiMwcLyZvn1arpZv-Jxf_11jnpEX3Tgfvk
&id_token=eyJhbGciOiJSUzI1NiJ9.ew0KICAgICJpc3MiOiAiaHR0cDovL3Nlc
nZlci5leGFtcGxlLmNvbSIsDQogICAgInVzZXJfaWQiOiAiMjQ4Mjg5NzYxMDAxI
iwNCiAgICAiYXVkIjogInM2QmhkUmtxdDMiLA0KICAgICJub25jZSI6ICJuLTBTN
l9XekEyTWoiLA0KICAgICJleHAiOiAxMzExMjgxOTcwLA0KICAgICJpYXQiOiAxM
zExMjgwOTcwLA0KICAgICJjX2hhc2giOiAiTERrdEtkb1FhazNQazBjblh4Q2x0Q
mdfckNfM1RLVWI5T0xrNWZLTzl1QSINCn0.D6JxCgpOwlyuK7DPRu5hFOIJRSRDT
B7TQNRbOw9Vg9WroDi_XNzaqXCFSDH_YqcE-CBhoxD-Iq4eQL4E2jIjil47u7i68
Nheev7d8AJk4wfRimgpDhQX5K8YyGDWrTs7bhsMTPAPVa9bLIBndDZ2mEdmPcmR9
mXcwJI3IGF9JOaStYXJXMYWUMCmQARZEKG9JxIYPZNhFsqKe4TYQEmrq2s_HHQwk
XCGAmLBdptHY-Zx277qtidojQQFXzbD2Ak1ONT5sFjy3yxPnE87pNVtOEST5GJac
O1O88gmvmjNayu1-f5mr5Uc70QC6DjlKem3cUN5kudAQ4sLvFkUr8gkIQ

Verifying and decoding the ID Token will yield the following
ID Token JSON object:

{
  "iss": "http://server.example.com",
  "user_id": "248289761001",
  "aud": "s6BhdRkqt3",
  "nonce": "n-0S6_WzA2Mj",
  "exp": 1311281970,
  "iat": 1311280970,
  "c_hash": "LDktKdoQak3Pk0cnXxCltBg_rC_3TKUb9OLk5fKO9uA"
}

Case 4: response_type=token code

https://server.example.com/op/authorize?
response_type=token%20code
&client_id=s6BhdRkqt3
&redirect_uri=https%3A%2F%2Fclient.example.org%2Fcb
&scope=openid
&nonce=n-0S6_WzA2Mj
&state=af0ifjsldkj


HTTP/1.1 302 Found
Location: https://client.example.org/cb#
code=Qcb0Orv1zh30vL1MPRsbm-diHiMwcLyZvn1arpZv-Jxf_11jnpEX3Tgfvk
&access_token=jHkWEdUXMU1BwAsC4vtUsZwnNvTIxEl0z9K3vx5KF0Y
&token_type=Bearer
&state=af0ifjsldkj

Case 5: response_type=token code id_token

https://server.example.com/op/authorize?
response_type=token%20code%20id_token
&client_id=s6BhdRkqt3
&redirect_uri=https%3A%2F%2Fclient.example.org%2Fcb
&scope=openid
&nonce=n-0S6_WzA2Mj
&state=af0ifjsldkj


HTTP/1.1 302 Found
Location: https://client.example.org/cb#
code=Qcb0Orv1zh30vL1MPRsbm-diHiMwcLyZvn1arpZv-Jxf_11jnpEX3Tgfvk
&access_token=jHkWEdUXMU1BwAsC4vtUsZwnNvTIxEl0z9K3vx5KF0Y
&token_type=Bearer
&id_token=eyJhbGciOiJSUzI1NiJ9.ew0KICAgICJpc3MiOiAiaHR0cDovL3Nlc
nZlci5leGFtcGxlLmNvbSIsDQogICAgInVzZXJfaWQiOiAiMjQ4Mjg5NzYxMDAxI
iwNCiAgICAiYXVkIjogInM2QmhkUmtxdDMiLA0KICAgICJub25jZSI6ICJuLTBTN
l9XekEyTWoiLA0KICAgICJleHAiOiAxMzExMjgxOTcwLA0KICAgICJpYXQiOiAxM
zExMjgwOTcwLA0KICAgICJhdF9oYXNoIjogIjc3UW1VUHRqUGZ6V3RGMkFucEs5U
ldwWHJXbHJlY2RiTFV5SkRJYjdTNlEiDQogICAgImNfaGFzaCI6ICJMRGt0S2RvU
WFrM1BrMGNuWHhDbHRCZ19yQ18zVEtVYjlPTGs1ZktPOXVBIg0KfQ.Jw-8W1LKps
Go17BltEpLlq1AMhSw3IRBeZrS-P3cXrDebBn09G4DWnjhD2PPze_M3ldkqng3Xk
0me_xWlg3VoJlveJ64lQ2oPe_8_0rT1sLM6UOy8-gPtwifxUfvrkpNX9KwqTju6W
MfSlDWWxW8Y8GQBMWsG7xqjYANIr84bpQ-5KyHnDdYSEDf9Si7xa3uYsJVrv1M1o
jF2tz_sNirH8aCmU1KpJ6nXPLw2uEo5slKp-b0-1AWoBcl0PSJpDJJCdTaXF_e_g
Ovd5ko9ymTZ336ZQj630QjtGZ9E4b9C_HOnI15zXQ5mh6cb2VO2r5ckDtqBy0UL-
QklkW8BfO9qg
&state=af0ifjsldkj

Verifying and decoding the ID Token will yield the following
ID Token JSON object:

{
  "iss": "http://server.example.com",
  "user_id": "248289761001",
  "aud": "s6BhdRkqt3",
  "nonce": "n-0S6_WzA2Mj",
  "exp": 1311281970,
  "iat": 1311280970,
  "at_hash": "77QmUPtjPfzWtF2AnpK9RWpXrWlrecdbLUyJDIb7S6Q",
  "c_hash": "LDktKdoQak3Pk0cnXxCltBg_rC_3TKUb9OLk5fKO9uA"
}

This following example makes a request with an OpenID Request Object containing custom ID Token return Claims. The sample OpenID Request Object is described in the Request Parameter Section (Request Parameter Method)

Case 6: response_type=code id_token

https://server.example.com/op/authorize?
response_type=code%20id_token
&client_id=s6BhdRkqt3
&redirect_uri=https%3A%2F%2Fclient.example.org%2Fcb
&scope=openid
&request=eyJhbGciOiJSUzI1NiJ9.ew0KICAicmVzcG9uc2VfdHlwZSI6ICJjb2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.QO_PD7FOnO
aDULViVR-a4RmgyZA-wz1p4aKiD8ucktrF2o62PmntJC6vR1Ne_rWXZaybM4ZFN_
HzFmakwYMqrp-HBfcegj5-ifvwSOAo-EfQrr88Jd40rrnH-KdkjQQiu5BiE513o4
XK-1p7lG8RmbQc3EJwJTimNC4Eijk1wp2D99IndyH9CrOp_M5X15iQjGGF65IWb-
9ly1waEiJMFrO2BuDTKpImcjKe9odgtWRyZWs8KhfVwLVkrazhf8E08TEqK8Vuoh
g8FoCLLaw66IN4EVBMcEnncNyHId77ZeVOB-KGHJdIo75W7pc68GUc5dg1NXpBF2
UqtHmoXVGisQ
&nonce=n-0S6_WzA2Mj
&state=af0ifjsldkj


HTTP/1.1 302 Found
Location: https://client.example.org/cb#
code=Qcb0Orv1zh30vL1MPRsbm-diHiMwcLyZvn1arpZv-Jxf_11jnpEX3Tgfvk
&token_type=Bearer
&id_token=eyJhbGciOiJSUzI1NiJ9.ew0KICAgICJpc3MiOiAiaHR0cDovL3Nlc
nZlci5leGFtcGxlLmNvbSIsDQogICAgInVzZXJfaWQiOiAiMjQ4Mjg5NzYxMDAxI
iwNCiAgICAiYXVkIjogInM2QmhkUmtxdDMiLA0KICAgICJub25jZSI6ICJuLTBTN
l9XekEyTWoiLA0KICAgICJleHAiOiAxMzExMjgxOTcwLA0KICAgICJpYXQiOiAxM
zExMjgwOTcwLA0KICAgICJnZW5kZXIiOiAiZmVtYWxlIiwNCiAgICAiYmlydGhkY
XRlIjogIjE5ODctMDEtMDEiLA0KICAgICJhY3IiOiAiMiIsDQogICAgImNfaGFza
CI6ICJMRGt0S2RvUWFrM1BrMGNuWHhDbHRCZ19yQ18zVEtVYjlPTGs1ZktPOXVBI
g0KfQ.zMHXQpGOkWyzZexs490gN4bx16lzSJcL_F_hRq1afrtwgEUX4X976wHv6T
WmoYBEsO14DLxNqsuMi-FCISbzCbOOQwyh9OjbojZlHuwc9lZhRUREiBTT00vIYF
AT7g4caDuSlWvUZL-K0pCpAtSdqFF7TeOmv1UFcGXSXrw6g9v-WjY6WlkDF8pl37
ubHIGNnOJnxwq-zOTic1KTpqRHWnLdrEoaEA4eIMTotBg7HfcoooeCqMVdrDVvwu
1hFLxpWtztRiAynT4M8Q4BZeMlFyyFV0sf3nu8ShB7617CtJHSSPryfrm1IvLpFC
28V9c5LcaVekf9sQLcDUmdfxJ4DA
&state=af0ifjsldkj

Verifying and decoding the ID Token will yield the following
ID Token JSON object:

{
  "iss": "http://server.example.com",
  "user_id": "248289761001",
  "aud": "s6BhdRkqt3",
  "nonce": "n-0S6_WzA2Mj",
  "exp": 1311281970,
  "iat": 1311280970,
  "gender": "female",
  "birthdate": "1987-01-01",
  "acr": "2",
  "c_hash": "LDktKdoQak3Pk0cnXxCltBg_rC_3TKUb9OLk5fKO9uA"
}

Public Key Information used to verify the ID Token

The following is the RSA public key information that can be used
to verify the ID Token signatures in the above examples.
The values are an array of hexadecimal digits in big endian format.

modulus:
[
 ce,11,16,4c,12,55,4d,f7,14,7a,a9,cc,cc,e4,05,30,
 21,15,41,63,b2,39,46,70,3f,c2,eb,05,68,7c,f2,d2,
 ab,67,23,c6,0a,f0,64,4c,3a,7e,13,60,73,c8,73,10,
 57,8a,4a,e7,55,32,b3,66,0e,c3,32,fd,b1,ee,53,1c,
 35,8c,75,af,6b,b6,c0,89,55,c8,f5,57,b5,9a,13,bc,
 0f,82,5f,a4,20,87,56,59,fe,28,da,0e,99,b3,33,b2,
 fc,5a,78,ab,49,c6,dc,e4,ed,0d,10,a4,06,ed,a2,10,
 fd,b5,8f,cd,a9,45,24,6b,90,20,71,9f,36,82,85,f9,
 40,ec,a6,5b,23,59,ff,ca,12,ad,c7,20,3b,15,d0,38,
 f3,42,da,49,56,72,28,0a,6f,ac,a8,98,86,87,00,09,
 2c,1f,d3,2e,82,43,ec,24,12,2e,a6,55,74,49,b7,56,
 81,4b,2c,25,2d,80,34,f2,88,e9,e6,19,19,43,7f,5e,
 08,cd,a4,d4,47,57,76,16,da,af,df,7c,43,d3,d9,4f,
 05,c0,d5,c7,ef,b8,64,d9,6c,35,b1,10,a2,e3,30,a5,
 6e,2a,b4,f5,62,fb,3e,d8,d4,d7,85,90,16,d4,a8,c5,
 4b,fd,d4,c0,b9,03,93,ec,38,75,53,7e,c7,9b,43,9f
]

exponent: [01,00,01]


 TOC 

2.3.5.2.  End-User Denies Authorization or Invalid Request

If the End-User denies the authorization or the user authentication fails, the Authorization Server MUST return the error authorization response as defined in Section 2.1.4 of OpenID Connect Messages (Sakimura, N., Bradley, J., Jones, M., de Medeiros, B., Mortimore, C., and E. Jay, “OpenID Connect Messages 1.0,” December 2012.) [OpenID.Messages]. The Authorization Server returns the Client to the redirection URI specified in the Authorization Request with the appropriate error parameters. No other parameters SHOULD be returned.

The error response parameters are the following:

error
REQUIRED. The error code.
error_description
OPTIONAL. A human-readable UTF-8 encoded text description of the error.
error_uri
OPTIONAL. A URI to a web page that includes additional information about the error.
state
REQUIRED if the Authorization Request included the state parameter. Set to the exact value received from the Client.

If the response_type parameter in the Authorization Request includes the string value token or id_token, all error response parameters SHOULD be added to the fragment component of the redirection URI. Otherwise, the response parameters are added to the query component of the redirection URI.

The following is a non-normative example (with line wraps after the second line for the display purposes only):

HTTP/1.1 302 Found
Location: https://client.example.org/cb?
error=invalid_request
&error_description=the%20request%20is%20not%20valid%20or%20malformed
&state=af0ifjsldkj


 TOC 

3.  Token Endpoint

The Token Endpoint handles requests for retrieving and refreshing Access Tokens as well as ID Token and other variables.

Clients MUST use the HTTP "POST" method to make requests to the Token Endpoint. Request parameters are added using form serialization (Form Serialization).

Clients MAY provide authentication parameters in the request to the Token Endpoint as described in Section 2.2.1 of OpenID Connect Messages (Sakimura, N., Bradley, J., Jones, M., de Medeiros, B., Mortimore, C., and E. Jay, “OpenID Connect Messages 1.0,” December 2012.) [OpenID.Messages].

Authorization Servers MUST support the use of the HTTP "POST" method defined in RFC 2616 (Fielding, R., Gettys, J., Mogul, J., Frystyk, H., Masinter, L., Leach, P., and T. Berners-Lee, “Hypertext Transfer Protocol -- HTTP/1.1,” June 1999.) [RFC2616] at the Token Endpoint.

Authorization Servers MUST require the use of a transport-layer security mechanism. The Authorization Server MUST support TLS 1.2 RFC 5246 (Dierks, T. and E. Rescorla, “The Transport Layer Security (TLS) Protocol Version 1.2,” August 2008.) [RFC5246] and/or TLS 1.0 [RFC2246] (Dierks, T. and C. Allen, “The TLS Protocol Version 1.0,” January 1999.) and MAY support other transport-layer mechanisms with equivalent security.

All Token Endpoint responses that contain tokens, secrets, or other sensitive information MUST include the following HTTP response header fields and values:



Header NameHeader Value
Cache-Control no-store
Pragma no-cache

 HTTP Response Headers and Values 



 TOC 

3.1.  Requesting an Access Token

To retrieve an Access Token, a Client MUST have an Authorization Code obtained via the method as described in Authorization Code Flow (Authorization Code Flow).



 TOC 

3.1.1.  Access Token Request

To obtain an Access Token, Refresh Token or ID Token, the Client MUST authenticate to the Token Endpoint using the authentication method registered for its client_id, as documented in Section 2.2.1 of OpenID Connect Messages (Sakimura, N., Bradley, J., Jones, M., de Medeiros, B., Mortimore, C., and E. Jay, “OpenID Connect Messages 1.0,” December 2012.) [OpenID.Messages]. The Client sends the parameters via HTTPS POST to the Token Endpoint using form serialization (Form Serialization) as specified in Section 4.1.3 of OAuth 2.0 (Hardt, D., “The OAuth 2.0 Authorization Framework,” October 2012.) [RFC6749].

The following is a non-normative example of an Access Token request:

POST /token HTTP/1.1
Host: server.example.com
Content-Type: application/x-www-form-urlencoded
Authorization: Basic czZCaGRSa3F0MzpnWDFmQmF0M2JW

grant_type=authorization_code&code=SplxlOBeZQQYbYS6WxSbIA
&redirect_uri=https%3A%2F%2Fclient.example.org%2Fcb

The Authorization Server MUST:



 TOC 

3.1.2.  Access Token Response

Upon receipt of the Token Request, the Authorization Server MUST return either a successful response or an error response that corresponds to the received Authorization Code.

A successful response returns the "application/json" media type and the response body is the Access Token Response documented in Section 2.2.3 of OpenID Connect Messages (Sakimura, N., Bradley, J., Jones, M., de Medeiros, B., Mortimore, C., and E. Jay, “OpenID Connect Messages 1.0,” December 2012.) [OpenID.Messages].

Following is a non-normative example of a successful response:

HTTP/1.1 200 OK
Content-Type: application/json
Cache-Control: no-store
Pragma: no-cache

{
 "access_token": "SlAV32hkKG",
 "token_type": "Bearer",
 "refresh_token": "8xLOxBtZp8",
 "expires_in": 3600,
 "id_token": "eyJhbGciOiJSUzI1NiJ9.ew0KICAgICJpc3MiOiAiaHR0cDovL
3NlcnZlci5leGFtcGxlLmNvbSIsDQogICAgInVzZXJfaWQiOiAiMjQ4Mjg5NzYxM
DAxIiwNCiAgICAiYXVkIjogInM2QmhkUmtxdDMiLA0KICAgICJub25jZSI6ICJuL
TBTNl9XekEyTWoiLA0KICAgICJleHAiOiAxMzExMjgxOTcwLA0KICAgICJpYXQiO
iAxMzExMjgwOTcwDQp9.lsQI_KNHpl58YY24G9tUHXr3Yp7OKYnEaVpRL0KI4szT
D6GXpZcgxIpkOCcajyDiIv62R9rBWASV191Akk1BM36gUMm8H5s8xyxNdRfBViCa
xTqHA7X_vV3U-tSWl6McR5qaSJaNQBpg1oGPjZdPG7zWCG-yEJC4-Fbx2FPOS7-h
5V0k33O5Okd-OoDUKoFPMd6ur5cIwsNyBazcsHdFHqWlCby5nl_HZdW-PHq0gjzy
JydB5eYIvOfOHYBRVML9fKwdOLM2xVxJsPwvy3BqlVKc593p2WwItIg52ILWrc6A
tqkqHxKsAXLVyAoVInYkl_NDBkCqYe2KgNJFzfEC8g"
}


 TOC 

3.1.3.  Access Token Error Response

If the Token Request is invalid or unauthorized, the Authorization Server constructs the response by returning the Token Error Response defined in OpenID Connect Messages (Sakimura, N., Bradley, J., Jones, M., de Medeiros, B., Mortimore, C., and E. Jay, “OpenID Connect Messages 1.0,” December 2012.) [OpenID.Messages] in the entity body of the HTTP response using the application/json media type with HTTP response code 400.

Following is a non-normative example:

HTTP/1.1 400 Bad Request
Content-Type: application/json
Cache-Control: no-store
Pragma: no-cache

{
 "error": "invalid_request"
}


 TOC 

3.2.  Refreshing an Access Token

To refresh an Access Token, the Client MUST authenticate to the Token Endpoint using the authentication method registered for its client_id, as documented in Section 2.2.1 of OpenID Connect Messages (Sakimura, N., Bradley, J., Jones, M., de Medeiros, B., Mortimore, C., and E. Jay, “OpenID Connect Messages 1.0,” December 2012.) [OpenID.Messages]. The Client sends the parameters via HTTPS POST to the Token Endpoint using form serialization (Form Serialization) as specified in Section 6 of OAuth 2.0 (Hardt, D., “The OAuth 2.0 Authorization Framework,” October 2012.) [RFC6749]:

The Authorization Server MUST validate the Refresh Token.



 TOC 

3.2.1.  Refresh Token Response

Upon receipt of the Refresh Token Request, the Authorization Server MUST return either a successful response or an error response that corresponds to the received Refresh Token.

Upon successful validation of the Refresh Token, a successful response returns the "application/json" media type and the response body is the Access Token Response of Section 2.2.3 of OpenID Connect Messages (Sakimura, N., Bradley, J., Jones, M., de Medeiros, B., Mortimore, C., and E. Jay, “OpenID Connect Messages 1.0,” December 2012.) [OpenID.Messages] except that it MUST NOT return an id_token.

Following is a non-normative example of a Refresh Token request and response:

POST /token HTTP/1.1
Host: server.example.com
Content-Type: application/x-www-form-urlencoded

client_id=s6BhdRkqt3
&client_secret=some_secret12345
&grant_type=refresh_token
&refresh_token=8xLOxBtZp8
&scope=openid%20profile


HTTP/1.1 200 OK
Content-Type: application/json
Cache-Control: no-store
Pragma: no-cache

{
 "access_token": "TlBN45jURg",
 "token_type": "Bearer",
 "refresh_token": "9yNOxJtZa5",
 "expires_in": 3600
}


 TOC 

3.2.2.  Refresh Token Error Response

If the Refresh Token Request is invalid or unauthorized, the Authorization Server returns the Token Error Response as defined in Section 5.2 of OAuth 2.0 (Hardt, D., “The OAuth 2.0 Authorization Framework,” October 2012.) [RFC6749].



 TOC 

4.  UserInfo Endpoint

To obtain the requested Claims about the End-User, the Client makes a GET or POST request to the UserInfo Endpoint as in OpenID Connect Messages (Sakimura, N., Bradley, J., Jones, M., de Medeiros, B., Mortimore, C., and E. Jay, “OpenID Connect Messages 1.0,” December 2012.) [OpenID.Messages].

Authorization Servers MUST require the use of a transport-layer security mechanism. The Authorization Server MUST support TLS 1.2 RFC 5246 (Dierks, T. and E. Rescorla, “The Transport Layer Security (TLS) Protocol Version 1.2,” August 2008.) [RFC5246] and/or TLS 1.0 [RFC2246] (Dierks, T. and C. Allen, “The TLS Protocol Version 1.0,” January 1999.) and MAY support other transport-layer mechanisms with equivalent security.

Authorization Servers MUST support the use of the HTTP "GET" and HTTP "POST" methods defined in RFC 2616 (Fielding, R., Gettys, J., Mogul, J., Frystyk, H., Masinter, L., Leach, P., and T. Berners-Lee, “Hypertext Transfer Protocol -- HTTP/1.1,” June 1999.) [RFC2616] at the UserInfo Endpoint.

Authorization Servers MUST accept Access Tokens as OAuth 2.0 Bearer Token Usage (Jones, M. and D. Hardt, “The OAuth 2.0 Authorization Framework: Bearer Token Usage,” October 2012.) [RFC6750].

Authorization Servers SHOULD support the use of Cross Origin Resource Sharing (CORS) (van Kestern, “Cross-Origin Resource Sharing,” July 2010.) [CORS] and or other methods as appropriate to enable Java Script Clients to access the endpoint.



 TOC 

4.1.  UserInfo Request

Client SHOULD send the UserInfo Request defined in Section 2.3.1 of OpenID Connect Messages (Sakimura, N., Bradley, J., Jones, M., de Medeiros, B., Mortimore, C., and E. Jay, “OpenID Connect Messages 1.0,” December 2012.) [OpenID.Messages] either in HTTP GET or POST request.

The Access Token obtained from an OpenID Connect Authorization Request MUST be sent as a Bearer Token. Section 2 of the OAuth 2.0 Bearer Token Usage (Jones, M. and D. Hardt, “The OAuth 2.0 Authorization Framework: Bearer Token Usage,” October 2012.) [RFC6750] specification documents the permissible methods of sending the Access Token.

It is RECOMMENDED that the Client use the authorization header method for all requests using GET.

The following is a non-normative example:

GET /userinfo?schema=openid HTTP/1.1
Host: server.example.com
Authorization: Bearer eyJhbGciOiJSUzI1NiJ9.eyJ ... fQ.8Gj_-sj ... _X


 TOC 

4.2.  UserInfo Response

The user_id Claim in the UserInfo Endpoint response MUST exactly match the user_id Claim in the ID Token, before using additional UserInfo Endpoint Claims.

Upon receipt of the UserInfo request, the UserInfo Endpoint MUST return the JSON Serialization of the UserInfo response as in OpenID Messages (Sakimura, N., Bradley, J., Jones, M., de Medeiros, B., Mortimore, C., and E. Jay, “OpenID Connect Messages 1.0,” December 2012.) [OpenID.Messages] in the HTTP response body. The content-type of the HTTP response MUST be set to application/json if the response body is a text JSON structure. If the JSON response is signed or encrypted, then the content-type MUST be set to application/jwt.

Upon receipt of the UserInfo Response, the Client MUST verify the response in accordance with Section 5.3 (UserInfo Response Validation) of OpenID Connect Messages (Sakimura, N., Bradley, J., Jones, M., de Medeiros, B., Mortimore, C., and E. Jay, “OpenID Connect Messages 1.0,” December 2012.) [OpenID.Messages].

Following is a non-normative example of such response:

HTTP/1.1 200 OK
Content-Type: application/json

{
 "user_id": "248289761001",
 "name": "Jane Doe"
 "given_name": "Jane",
 "family_name": "Doe",
 "email": "janedoe@example.com",
 "picture": "http://example.com/janedoe/me.jpg"
}


 TOC 

4.3.  UserInfo Error Response

When an error condition occurs, the UserInfo Endpoint returns an Error Response as defined in Section 3 of the OAuth 2.0 Bearer Token Usage (Jones, M. and D. Hardt, “The OAuth 2.0 Authorization Framework: Bearer Token Usage,” October 2012.) [RFC6750] specification utilizing an error code as specified in Section 2.3.3 of OpenID Connect Messages (Sakimura, N., Bradley, J., Jones, M., de Medeiros, B., Mortimore, C., and E. Jay, “OpenID Connect Messages 1.0,” December 2012.) [OpenID.Messages].

The HTTP 400 (Bad Request) status code SHOULD be returned for the OAuth 2.0 Bearer Token Usage (Jones, M. and D. Hardt, “The OAuth 2.0 Authorization Framework: Bearer Token Usage,” October 2012.) [RFC6750] response when the invalid_schema error occurs.

Following is a non-normative example of an error response:

HTTP/1.1 401 Unauthorized
WWW-Authenticate: Bearer realm="example.com",
                     error="invalid_token",
                     error_description="The access token expired"


 TOC 

5.  Self-Issued Identity Provider

There is a special issuer "https://self-issued.me" that indicates a user is using a personal OP that issues self-signed ID Tokens.



 TOC 

5.1.  Self-Issued Identity Provider Discovery

If the input identifier contains the domain self-issued.me, dynamic discovery is not performed. The following static configuration values are used.

{
 "authorization_endpoint":
   "openid:",
 "issuer":
   "https://self-issued.me",
 "scopes_supported":
   ["openid", "profile", "email", "address", "phone"],
 "response_types_supported":
   ["id_token"],
 "user_id_types_supported":
   ["pairwise"],
 "id_token_signing_alg_values_supported":
   ["RS256"],
 "request_object_signing_alg_values_supported":
   ["none", "RS256"]
 }

Note: The OpenID Foundation may consider hosting a site https://self-issued.me/ that returns the above static configuration file so that the client would not need any special treatment for discovery of the self-issued OP.



 TOC 

5.2.  Client Registration to Self-Issued Identity Provider

When using a Self-Issued OP, the Client is deemed to have registered with the OP and obtained following Client Registration Response.

client_id
The redirect_uri of the Client.
expires_at
0.

Note: The OpenID Foundation may consider hosting the (stateless) endpoint https://self-issued.me/registration/1.0/ that returns the response above so that the Client would not need to perform any special processing for registration of a Self-Issued OP.



 TOC 

5.3.  Self-Issued Identity Provider Request

The Client sends the Authorization Request to the Authorization Endpoint with the following REQUIRED parameters.

response_type
REQUIRED. The value id_token.
client_id
REQUIRED. The redirect_uri of the client. Note that since it is same as the redirect_uri, redirect_uri is not required to be sent in the request.
scope
REQUIRED. The scope parameter, as defined in Section 2.1 (OpenID Connect Scopes).
policy_url
REQUIRED. A URL of a page that the Client provides to the End-User to read describing the how the attributes received will be used. The OP SHOULD display this URL to the End-User. Unlike the standard OP case, a self-issued OP cannot receive this value at the registration time, so it has to be provided as a part of the authorization request.

Other parameters MAY be sent. Note that all claims are returned in the id_token.

The entire URL MUST NOT exceed 2048 bytes.

Following is a non-normative example (with line wraps for display purposes only):

HTTP/1.1 302 Found
Location: openid://
?response_type=id_token
&client_id=https%3A%2F%2Fclient.example.org%2Fcb
&scope=openid%20profile
&policy_url=https%3A%2F%2Fclient.example.org%2Fusage%2F
&state=af0ifjsldkj&nonce=n-0S6_WzA2Mj


 TOC 

5.4.  Self-Issued Identity Provider Response

Self-Issued Identity Provider Response is the same as the normal implicit flow response apart from the fact that the iss claim value is https://self-issued.me and all claims are returned in id_token. Since it is an implicit flow response, the response parameters will be returned in a fragment.



 TOC 

5.5.  Self-Issued Identity ID Token Validation

To validate the ID Token in the Authorization or Token Endpoint Response, the Client MUST do the following:

  1. The Client MUST validate that the value of the iss (issuer) Claim is https://self-isued.me. If iss contains a different value, the ID Token is not self-issued, and instead it MUST be validated according to Section 5.2 of OpenID Connect Messages (Sakimura, N., Bradley, J., Jones, M., de Medeiros, B., Mortimore, C., and E. Jay, “OpenID Connect Messages 1.0,” December 2012.) [OpenID.Messages].
  2. The Client MUST validate that the value of the aud (audience) Claim is the value of the redirect_uri that the client sent in the authentication request.
  3. The Client MUST verify the signature of the ID Token according to JWS (Jones, M., Bradley, J., and N. Sakimura, “JSON Web Signature,” November 2012.) [JWS] using the algorithm specified in the alg parameter of the JWT header, using the key in the user_jwk claim. The key is in JWK format.
  4. The alg value SHOULD be the default of RS256. It may also be ES256.
  5. The Client MUST validate that the user_id value is the base64url encoded SHA-256 hash of the concatenation of the key values in the user_jwk claim. When the alg value is RS256, the key values mod and exp are concatenated in that order. When the alg value is ES256, the key values crv, x and y are concatenated in that order.
  6. The current time MUST be less than the value of the exp Claim (possibly allowing for some small leeway to account for clock skew).
  7. The iat Claim can be used to reject tokens that were issued too far away from the current time, limiting the amount of time that nonces must be stored to prevent attacks. The acceptable range is Client specific.
  8. If a nonce value was sent in the Authorization Request, a nonce Claim MUST be present and its value of the checked to verify that it is the same value as the one that was sent in the Authorization Request. The Client SHOULD check the nonce value for replay attacks. The precise method for detecting replay attacks is Client specific.

The following is a non-normative example of a base64url decoded self-issued ID Token (with line wraps for display purposes only):

{
 "iss": "https://self-issued.me",
 "user_id": "wBy8QvHbPzUnL0x63h13QqvUYcOur1X0cbQpPVRqX5k",
 "aud": "https://client.example.org/cb",
 "nonce": "n-0S6_WzA2Mj",
 "exp": 1311281970,
 "iat": 1311280970,
 "user_jwk": {"alg":"RSA",
        "n": "0vx7agoebGcQSuuPiLJXZptN9nndrQmbXEps2aiAFbWhM78LhWx
   4cbbfAAtVT86zwu1RK7aPFFxuhDR1L6tSoc_BJECPebWKRXjBZCiFV4n3oknjhMs
   tn64tZ_2W-5JsGY4Hc5n9yBXArwl93lqt7_RN5w6Cf0h4QyQ5v-65YGjQR0_FDW2
   QvzqY368QQMicAtaSqzs8KJZgnYb9c7d0zgdAZHzu6qMQvRL5hajrn1n91CbOpbI
   SD08qNLyrdkt-bFTWhAI4vMQFh6WeZu0fM4lFd2NcRwr3XPksINHaQ-G_xBniIqb
   w0Ls1jF44-csFCur-kEgU8awapJzKnqDKgw",
        "e":"AQAB"
        }
}


 TOC 

6.  Discovery and Registration

Some OpenID Connect installations can use a pre-configured set of OpenID Providers and/or Relying Parties. In those cases, it may not be necessary to support dynamic discovery of information about identities or services or dynamic registration of Clients.

However, if installations choose to support unanticipated interactions between Relying Parties and OpenID Providers that do not have pre-configured relationships, they SHOULD accomplish this by implementing the facilities defined in the OpenID Connect Discovery 1.0 (Sakimura, N., Bradley, J., Jones, M., and E. Jay, “OpenID Connect Discovery 1.0,” December 2012.) [OpenID.Discovery] and OpenID Connect Dynamic Client Registration 1.0 (Sakimura, N., Bradley, J., and M. Jones, “OpenID Connect Dynamic Client Registration 1.0,” December 2012.) [OpenID.Registration] specifications.



 TOC 

7.  Serializations

A request message MAY be serialized using one of the following methods:

  1. Query String Serialization
  2. Form Serialization



 TOC 

7.1.  Query String Serialization

In order to serialize the parameters using the query string serialization, the Client constructs the string by adding the parameters and values to the query component of a URL using the application/x-www-form-urlencoded format as defined by [W3C.REC‑html401‑19991224] (Hors, A., Raggett, D., and I. Jacobs, “HTML 4.01 Specification,” December 1999.). Query string serialization is typically used in HTTP GET requests.

Following is a non-normative example of such serialization:

GET /authorize?scope=openid&response_type=code
&client_id=s6BhdRkqt3
&redirect_uri=https%3A%2F%2Fclient.example.org%2Fcb HTTP/1.1
Host: server.example.com


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7.2.  Form Serialization

Parameters and their values are form serialized by adding the parameter names and values to the entity body of the HTTP request using the application/x-www-form-urlencoded format as defined by [W3C.REC‑html401‑19991224] (Hors, A., Raggett, D., and I. Jacobs, “HTML 4.01 Specification,” December 1999.). Form serialization is typically used in HTTP POST requests.

Following is a non-normative example of such serialization:

POST /authorize HTTP/1.1
Host: server.example.com
Content-Type: application/x-www-form-urlencoded

scope=openid&response_type=code
&client_id=s6BhdRkqt3
&redirect_uri=https%3A%2F%2Fclient.example.org%2Fcb


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8.  Security Considerations

This specification references the security considerations defined in OpenID Connect Messages (Sakimura, N., Bradley, J., Jones, M., de Medeiros, B., Mortimore, C., and E. Jay, “OpenID Connect Messages 1.0,” December 2012.) [OpenID.Messages].

In addition, the following list of attack vectors and remedies are also considered.



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8.1.  Implicit Grant Flow Threats

In the implicit grant flow, the Access Token is returned in the fragment part of the Client's redirect_uri through HTTPS, thus it is protected between the OP and the User-Agent, and User-Agent and the RP. The only the place it can be captured is the User-Agent where the TLS session is terminated, and is possible if the User-Agent is infested by malware.



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9.  Privacy Considerations

The UserInfo response typically contains Personally Identifiable Information. As such, End-User consent for the release of the information for the specified purpose SHOULD be obtained at or prior to the authorization time in accordance with relevant regulations. The purpose of use is typically registered in association with the redirect_uri.

Only necessary UserInfo data should be stored at the Client and the Client SHOULD associate the received data with the purpose of use statement.

The Resource Server SHOULD make the UserInfo access log available to the End-User so that the End-User can monitor who accessed his data.

To protect the End-User from a possible correlation among Clients, the use of a Pairwise Pseudonymous Identifier (PPID) as the user_id SHOULD be considered.



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10.  IANA Considerations



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10.1.  OAuth Parameters Registry



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10.1.1.  Authorization Request Parameter (display)

The following is a parameter registration request for the Authorization Request in this specification:



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10.1.2.  Authorization Request Parameter (prompt)

The following is a parameter registration request for the Authorization Request in this specification:



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10.1.3.  Authorization Request Parameter (nonce)

The following is a parameter registration request for the Authorization Request in this specification:



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10.1.4.  Authorization Request Parameter (request)

The following is a parameter registration request for the Authorization Request in this specification:



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10.1.5.  Authorization Request Parameter (request_uri)

The following is a parameter registration request for the Authorization Request in this specification:



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10.1.6.  ID Token Response Parameters

The following is a parameter registration request for the ID Token Response in this specification:



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10.2.  OAuth Extensions Error Registry



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10.2.1.  Authorization Endpoint Error (invalid_redirect_uri)

The following is an error registration request for the Authorization Error Response in this specification:



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10.2.2.  Authorization Endpoint Error (interaction_required)

The following is an error registration request for the Authorization Error Response in this specification:



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10.2.3.  Authorization Endpoint Error (login_required)

The following is an error registration request for the Authorization Error Response in this specification:



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10.2.4.  Authorization Endpoint Error (session_selection_required)

The following is an error registration request for the Authorization Error Response in this specification:



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10.2.5.  Authorization Endpoint Error (consent_required)

The following is an error registration request for the Authorization Error Response in this specification:



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10.2.6.  Authorization Endpoint Error (invalid_request_uri)

The following is an error registration request for the Authorization Error Response in this specification:



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10.2.7.  Authorization Endpoint Error (invalid_openid_request_object)

The following is an error registration request for the Authorization Error Response in this specification:



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10.2.8.  UserInfo Endpoint Error (invalid_schema)

The following is an error registration request for the Authorization Error Response in this specification:



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11.  References



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11.1. Normative References

[JWE] Jones, M., Rescorla, E., and J. Hildebrand, “JSON Web Encryption (JWE),” November 2012.
[JWS] Jones, M., Bradley, J., and N. Sakimura, “JSON Web Signature,” November 2012.
[JWT] Jones, M., Bradley, J., and N. Sakimura, “JSON Web Token,” November 2012.
[OAuth.Responses] de Medeiros, B., Scurtescu, M., and P. Tarjan, “OAuth 2.0 Multiple Response Type Encoding Practices,” November 2012.
[OpenID.Discovery] Sakimura, N., Bradley, J., Jones, M., and E. Jay, “OpenID Connect Discovery 1.0,” December 2012.
[OpenID.Messages] Sakimura, N., Bradley, J., Jones, M., de Medeiros, B., Mortimore, C., and E. Jay, “OpenID Connect Messages 1.0,” December 2012.
[OpenID.Registration] Sakimura, N., Bradley, J., and M. Jones, “OpenID Connect Dynamic Client Registration 1.0,” December 2012.
[RFC2119] Bradner, S., “Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate Requirement Levels,” BCP 14, RFC 2119, March 1997 (TXT, HTML, XML).
[RFC2246] Dierks, T. and C. Allen, “The TLS Protocol Version 1.0,” RFC 2246, January 1999 (TXT).
[RFC2616] Fielding, R., Gettys, J., Mogul, J., Frystyk, H., Masinter, L., Leach, P., and T. Berners-Lee, “Hypertext Transfer Protocol -- HTTP/1.1,” RFC 2616, June 1999 (TXT, PS, PDF, HTML, XML).
[RFC5246] Dierks, T. and E. Rescorla, “The Transport Layer Security (TLS) Protocol Version 1.2,” RFC 5246, August 2008 (TXT).
[RFC6125] Saint-Andre, P. and J. Hodges, “Representation and Verification of Domain-Based Application Service Identity within Internet Public Key Infrastructure Using X.509 (PKIX) Certificates in the Context of Transport Layer Security (TLS),” RFC 6125, March 2011 (TXT).
[RFC6749] Hardt, D., “The OAuth 2.0 Authorization Framework,” RFC 6749, October 2012 (TXT).
[RFC6750] Jones, M. and D. Hardt, “The OAuth 2.0 Authorization Framework: Bearer Token Usage,” RFC 6750, October 2012 (TXT).
[W3C.REC-html401-19991224] Hors, A., Raggett, D., and I. Jacobs, “HTML 4.01 Specification,” World Wide Web Consortium Recommendation REC-html401-19991224, December 1999 (HTML).


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11.2. Informative References

[CORS] van Kestern, “Cross-Origin Resource Sharing,” July 2010.


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Appendix A.  Footnotes



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A.1.  Example JWT Values

The JWT values used in the non-normative examples of this specification are only place holders for actual JWT values. The examples use "jwt_header.jwt_part2.jwt_part3" as the place holder value. For an example of an actual JWT, refer to the JWT (Jones, M., Bradley, J., and N. Sakimura, “JSON Web Token,” November 2012.) [JWT] specification.



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Appendix B.  Acknowledgements

The OpenID Community would like to thank the following people for the work they've done in the drafting and editing of this specification.

Axel Nennker (axel.nennker@telekom.de), Deutsche Telekom

Breno de Medeiros (breno@gmail.com), Google

George Fletcher (gffletch@aol.com), AOL

Hideki Nara (hideki.nara@gmail.com), Takt Communications

John Bradley (ve7jtb@ve7jtb.com), Ping Identity

Nat Sakimura (n-sakimura@nri.co.jp), Nomura Research Institute, Ltd.

Michael B. Jones (mbj@microsoft.com), Microsoft

Ryo Ito (ryo.ito@mixi.co.jp), mixi, Inc.



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Appendix C.  Notices

Copyright (c) 2012 The OpenID Foundation.

The OpenID Foundation (OIDF) grants to any Contributor, developer, implementer, or other interested party a non-exclusive, royalty free, worldwide copyright license to reproduce, prepare derivative works from, distribute, perform and display, this Implementers Draft or Final Specification solely for the purposes of (i) developing specifications, and (ii) implementing Implementers Drafts and Final Specifications based on such documents, provided that attribution be made to the OIDF as the source of the material, but that such attribution does not indicate an endorsement by the OIDF.

The technology described in this specification was made available from contributions from various sources, including members of the OpenID Foundation and others. Although the OpenID Foundation has taken steps to help ensure that the technology is available for distribution, it takes no position regarding the validity or scope of any intellectual property or other rights that might be claimed to pertain to the implementation or use of the technology described in this specification or the extent to which any license under such rights might or might not be available; neither does it represent that it has made any independent effort to identify any such rights. The OpenID Foundation and the contributors to this specification make no (and hereby expressly disclaim any) warranties (express, implied, or otherwise), including implied warranties of merchantability, non-infringement, fitness for a particular purpose, or title, related to this specification, and the entire risk as to implementing this specification is assumed by the implementer. The OpenID Intellectual Property Rights policy requires contributors to offer a patent promise not to assert certain patent claims against other contributors and against implementers. The OpenID Foundation invites any interested party to bring to its attention any copyrights, patents, patent applications, or other proprietary rights that may cover technology that may be required to practice this specification.



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Appendix D.  Document History

[[ To be removed from the final specification ]]

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-12

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-10

-09

-08

-07

-06

-05

-04

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-02

-01



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Authors' Addresses

  Nat Sakimura
  Nomura Research Institute, Ltd.
Email:  n-sakimura@nri.co.jp
  
  John Bradley
  Ping Identity
Email:  ve7jtb@ve7jtb.com
  
  Michael B. Jones
  Microsoft
Email:  mbj@microsoft.com
  
  Breno de Medeiros
  Google
Email:  breno@google.com
  
  Edmund Jay
  Illumila
Email:  ejay@mgi1.com