Nomura Research Institute, Ltd.

n-sakimura@nri.co.jp

Ping Identity

ve7jtb@ve7jtb.com

Microsoft

mbj@microsoft.com

Google Inc.

breno@google.com

Salesforce

cmortimore@salesforce.com

Illumila

ejay@mgi1.com

OpenID Connect 1.0 is a simple identity layer on top of the OAuth 2.0 protocol. It allows Clients to verify the identity of the End-User based on the authentication performed by an Authorization Server, as well as to obtain basic profile information about the End-User in an interoperable and REST-like manner. This specification only defines the endpoints and the associated message formats. The actual use MUST be based on one of the companion protocol bindings specifications such as OpenID Connect Standard 1.0.

The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT", "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in RFC 2119. Throughout this document, values are quoted to indicate that they are to be taken literally. When using these values in protocol messages, the quotes MUST NOT be used as part of the value.

This specification uses the terms "Access Token", "Refresh Token", "Authorization Code", "Authorization Grant", "Authorization Server", "Authorization Endpoint", "Client", "Client Identifier", "Client Secret", "Protected Resource", "Resource Owner", "Resource Server", and "Token Endpoint" defined by OAuth 2.0, and the terms "Claim Names" and "Claim Values" defined by JSON Web Token (JWT). This specification also defines the following terms: Act of verifying End-User's possession of previously provisioned credentials. Information that the Relying Party may require before it makes an entitlement decision with respect to an authentication response. Such context may include, but is not limited to, the actual authentication method used or level of assurance such as ISO/IEC 29115 entity authentication assurance level. A set of authentication methods or procedures that are considered to be equivalent to each other in a particular context. Identifier for an Authentication Context Class. Piece of information about an Entity that a Claims Provider asserts about that Entity. Syntax used for representing a Claim value. This specification defines Normal, Aggregated, and Distributed Claim Types. Server that can return Claims about an Entity. Human Resource Owner. Something that has a separate and distinct existence and that can be identified in context. An End-User is one example of an Entity. Claim specified by the Client as being necessary to ensure a smooth authorization experience for the specific task requested by the End-User. Token that contains Claims about the authentication event. It may contain other Claims. Entity that issues a set of Claims. Verifiable identifier for an Issuer. An Issuer Identifier is a URL using the https scheme that contains scheme, host, and OPTIONALLY, port number and path components. (No query or fragment components may be present.) Request or a response between an OpenID Relying Party and an OpenID Provider. OAuth 2.0 Authorization Server that is capable of returning Claims to a Relying Party about the authentication event and the End-User in an ID Token and/or a UserInfo Endpoint response. Authorization Endpoint, Token Endpoint, and UserInfo Endpoint. JWT that contains a set of request parameters as its Claims. Any information that (a) can be used to identify the natural person to whom such information relates, or (b) is or might be directly or indirectly linked to a natural person to whom such information relates. Identifier that identifies the Entity to a Relying Party. An Entity's PPID at one Relying Party cannot be correlated with the Entity's PPID at another Relying Party. Application requiring Claims from an OpenID Provider. It is an extended OAuth 2.0 Client. Personal OpenID Provider that issues self-signed ID Tokens. Protected Resource that, when presented with an Access Token by the Client, returns Claims about the End-User represented by that Access Token. Claim specified by the Client as being useful but not Essential for the specific task requested by the End-User.

The OpenID Connect protocol, in abstract, follows the following steps. The RP (Client) sends a request to the OP's (Authorization Server's) End-User Authorization Endpoint. The OP authenticates the End-User and obtains appropriate authorization. The OP responds with an Access Token, an Id Token, and a few other variables. The RP sends a request with the Access Token to the UserInfo Endpoint. The UserInfo Endpoint returns the additional End-User information supported by the Resource Server. This specification only defines the abstract message flow and message formats. The actual use MUST be based on one of the companion protocol bindings specifications such as OpenID Connect Standard 1.0, OpenID Connect Basic Client Profile 1.0, or OpenID Connect Implicit Client Profile 1.0.

In OpenID Connect, the RP interacts with these endpoints at the OP: Authorization Endpoint: The RP sends a request to the OP at the Authorization Endpoint. The OP then authenticates the End-User to determine whether he is eligible to be authenticated. Then, after potential authorization actions by the End-User, the Authorization Server returns an Authorization Response, which can include an Authorization Code value. For some Clients, the Implicit Grant will be used to obtain an Access Token without using an Authorization Code. In this case, the response_type parameter value MUST include token and id_token. Token Endpoint: The Client sends an Access Token Request containing the Authorization Code to the Token Endpoint to obtain an Access Token Response that includes an Access Token and an ID Token. UserInfo Endpoint: The Client sends the Access Token to the UserInfo Endpoint to obtain Claims about the End-User.

The RP sends an Authorization Request to the Authorization Endpoint of the OP to obtain an Authorization Response, which may contain an ID Token and Access Token, depending on the response_type value used.

An Authorization Request is a message sent from an RP to the OP's Authorization Endpoint. It is an extended OAuth 2.0 Authorization Request. Section 4.1.1 and 4.2.1 of OAuth 2.0 define the OAuth 2.0 Authorization Request parameters.

OpenID Connect uses the following OAuth 2.0 request parameters: REQUIRED. Value that controls the parameters returned in the response from the Authorization Endpoint. The OAuth 2.0 specification defines two response types: When supplied as the value for the response_type parameter, a successful response MUST include an Authorization Code as defined in the OAuth 2.0 specification. Both successful and error responses MUST be added as parameters to the query component of the response. All tokens are returned from the Token Endpoint. When used by OpenID Connect, an ID Token is also returned from the Token Endpoint. OpenID Providers that are not Self-Issued OPs MUST support this response_type. When supplied as the value for the response_type parameter, a successful response MUST include an Access Token as defined in the OAuth 2.0 specification. Both successful and error responses MUST be fragment-encoded. No ID Token is provided to the Client; therefore, this response_type is not used by OpenID Connect. OpenID Connect supports these additional response types, which have been registered with IANA: When supplied as the value for the response_type parameter, a successful response MUST include an ID Token. Both successful and error responses SHOULD be fragment-encoded. OpenID Providers MUST support this response_type. When supplied as the value for the response_type parameter, a successful response MUST include both an Access Token and an ID Token. Both successful and error responses SHOULD be fragment-encoded. OpenID Providers MUST support this response_type. When supplied as the value for the response_type parameter, a successful response MUST include both an Access Token and an Authorization Code as defined in the OAuth 2.0 specification. When used by OpenID Connect, an ID Token is also returned from the Token Endpoint. Both successful and error responses SHOULD be fragment-encoded. When supplied as the value for the response_type parameter, a successful response MUST include both an Authorization Code and an ID Token. Both successful and error responses SHOULD be fragment-encoded. When supplied as the value for the response_type parameter, a successful response MUST include an Authorization Code, an ID Token, and an Access Token. Both successful and error responses SHOULD be fragment-encoded. All OpenID Providers MUST support the id_token and token id_token response types and all OpenID Providers that are not Self-Issued OPs MUST also support the code response type. The Client may use any OAuth 2.0 registered response type supported by the OpenID Provider other than token (which provides no ID Token). REQUIRED. OAuth 2.0 Client Identifier. REQUIRED. Space delimited, case sensitive list of ASCII OAuth 2.0 scope values. OpenID Connect requests MUST contain the openid scope value. OPTIONAL scope values of profile, email, address, phone, and offline_access are also defined. See for more about the scope values defined by this specification. REQUIRED. Redirection URI to which the response will be sent. This MUST be pre-registered with the OpenID Provider. If the Client uses the OAuth implicit grant type, the redirection URI MUST NOT use the http scheme unless the Client is a native application, in which case it MAY use the http: scheme with localhost as the hostname. If the Client only uses the OAuth authorization_code grant type, the redirection URI MAY use the http scheme, provided that the Client Type is confidential, as defined in Section 2.1 of OAuth 2.0. RECOMMENDED. Opaque value used to maintain state between the request and the callback; it can serve as a protection against XSRF attacks, among other uses. This specification also defines the following request parameters: REQUIRED or OPTIONAL. Random, unique string value used to mitigate replay attacks. Use of the nonce is REQUIRED for all requests where an ID Token is returned directly from the Authorization Endpoint. It is OPTIONAL when the ID Token is returned from the Token Endpoint. OPTIONAL. ASCII string value that specifies how the Authorization Server displays the authentication and consent user interface pages to the End-User. The defined values are: The Authorization Server SHOULD display authentication and consent UI consistent with a full User-Agent page view. If the display parameter is not specified this is the default display mode. The Authorization Server SHOULD display authentication and consent UI consistent with a popup User-Agent window. The popup User-Agent window SHOULD be 450 pixels wide and 500 pixels tall. The Authorization Server SHOULD display authentication and consent UI consistent with a device that leverages a touch interface. The Authorization Server MAY attempt to detect the touch device and further customize the interface. The Authorization Server SHOULD display authentication and consent UI consistent with a "feature phone" type display. OPTIONAL. Space delimited, case sensitive list of ASCII string values that specifies whether the Authorization Server prompts the End-User for reauthentication and consent. The defined values are: The Authorization Server MUST NOT display any authentication or consent user interface pages. An error is returned if the End-User is not already authenticated or the Client does not have pre-configured consent for the requested Claims. This can be used as a method to check for existing authentication and/or consent. The Authorization Server MUST prompt the End-User for reauthentication. The Authorization Server MUST prompt the End-User for consent before returning information to the Client. The Authorization Server MUST prompt the End-User to select a user account. This allows a user who has multiple accounts at the Authorization Server to select amongst the multiple accounts that they may have current sessions for. The prompt parameter can be used by the Client to make sure that the End-User is still present for the current session or to bring attention to the request. If this parameter contains none with any other value, an error is returned. OPTIONAL. Maximum Authentication Age. Specifies that the End-User must be actively authenticated if the End-User was authenticated longer ago than the specified number of seconds. (The max_age request parameter corresponds to the OpenID 2.0 PAPE max_auth_age request parameter.) When max_age is used, the ID Token returned MUST include an auth_time Claim value. OPTIONAL. End-User's preferred languages and scripts for the user interface, represented as a space-separated list of BCP47 language tag values, ordered by preference. For instance, the value "fr-CA fr-FR en-CA" represents a preference for French as spoken in Canada, then French as spoken in France, followed by English as spoken in Canada. An error SHOULD NOT result if some or all of the requested locales are not supported by the OpenID Provider. OPTIONAL. End-User's preferred languages and scripts for Claims being returned, represented as a space-separated list of BCP47 language tag values, ordered by preference. An error SHOULD NOT result if some or all of the requested locales are not supported by the OpenID Provider. OPTIONAL. Previously issued ID Token passed to the Authorization Server as a hint about the End-User's current or past authenticated session with the Client. This SHOULD be present when prompt=none is used. If the End-User identified by the ID Token is logged in or is logged in by the request, then the Authorization Server returns a positive response; otherwise, it SHOULD return a negative response. If the ID Token received by the RP is encrypted, the Client MUST decrypt the signed ID Token contained within the encrypted ID Token. The Client MAY re-encrypt the signed ID token to the Authentication Server using a key that enables the server to decrypt the ID Token. For a Self-Issued ID Token, the sub (subject) of the signed ID Token MUST be sent as the kid (Key ID) of the JWE. OPTIONAL. Hint to the Authorization Server about the login identifier the End-User may use to log in (if necessary). This hint can be used by an RP if it first asks the End-User for their e-mail address (or other identifier) and then wants to pass that value as a hint to the discovered authorization service. It is RECOMMENDED that the hint value match the value used for discovery. The use of this parameter is left to the OP's discretion. OPTIONAL. Requested Authentication Context Class Reference values. Space-separated string that specifies the acr values that the Authorization Server MUST use for processing requests from this Client. The Authentication Context Class satisfied by the authentication performed is returned as the acr Claim value, as specified in . OPTIONAL. This parameter is used to request that specific Claims be returned. The value is a JSON object, as specified in . OPTIONAL. This parameter is used by the Client to provide information about itself to a Self-Issued OP that would normally be provided to an OP during Dynamic Client Registration, as specified in . The registration parameter SHOULD NOT be used when the OP is not a Self-Issued OP. OPTIONAL. This parameter enables OpenID Connect requests to be passed in a single, self-contained parameter and to be signed and optionally encrypted. The parameter value is a Request Object. It represents the request as JWT whose Claims are the request parameters above, as specified in . When the request parameter is used, the OpenID Connect request parameter values contained in the JWT supersede those passed using the OAuth 2.0 request syntax. Even if a scope parameter is present in the Request Object, a scope parameter MUST always be passed using the OAuth 2.0 request syntax containing the openid scope value to indicate to the underlying OAuth 2.0 logic that this is an OpenID Connect request. OPTIONAL. This parameter enables OpenID Connect requests to be passed by reference, rather than by value. The request_uri value is a URL using the https scheme referencing a resource containing a Request Object value, which is a JWT containing the request parameters. This parameter is used identically to the request parameter, other than that the Request Object is retrieved from the specified URL, rather than passed by value. See for more information on using the request_uri parameter.

An Authorization Response is a message returned from the OP's Authorization Endpoint in response to the Authorization Request by the RP. This specification only describes OAuth 2.0 Bearer Token Usage. The OAuth 2.0 response parameter token_type MUST be set to Bearer unless another Token Type has been negotiated with the Client. When the response_type in the request is code, the Authorization Response MUST return the parameters defined in Section 4.1.2 of OAuth 2.0. When the response_type includes other values, they must be returned as defined by their registration. The id_token and token id_token response types are defined in OAuth 2.0 Multiple Response Type Encoding Practices.

The ID Token is a security token that contains Claims about the authentication event and other requested Claims. The ID Token is represented as a JSON Web Token (JWT). The ID Token is used to manage the authentication event and user identifier and is scoped to a particular Client via the aud (audience) and nonce Claims. The following Claims are used within the ID Token: REQUIRED. Issuer Identifier for the Issuer of the response. REQUIRED. Subject identifier. A locally unique and never reassigned identifier within the Issuer for the End-User, which is intended to be consumed by the Client. e.g. 24400320 or AItOawmwtWwcT0k51BayewNvutrJUqsvl6qs7A4. It MUST NOT exceed 255 ASCII characters in length. REQUIRED. Audience that this ID Token is intended for. It MUST contain the OAuth 2.0 client_id of the Client. OPTIONAL. Authorized Presenter. This member identifies an OAuth 2.0 Client authorized to use this ID Token as an OAuth Access Token. It MUST contain the client_id of the Authorized Presenter. This Claim is only needed when the party requesting the ID Token is not the same as the audience of the ID Token. It MAY be included even when the Authorized Presenter is the same as the audience. REQUIRED. Expiration time on or after which the ID Token MUST NOT be accepted for processing. The processing of this parameter requires that the current date/time MUST be before the expiration date/time listed in the value. Implementers MAY provide for some small leeway, usually no more than a few minutes, to account for clock skew. The value is the number of seconds from 1970-01-01T0:0:0Z as measured in UTC until the desired date/time. See RFC 3339 for details regarding date/times in general and UTC in particular. REQUIRED. Time at which the JWT was issued. The value is the number of seconds from 1970-01-01T0:0:0Z as measured in UTC until the desired date/time. See RFC 3339 for details regarding date/times in general and UTC in particular. OPTIONAL or REQUIRED. Time when the End-User authentication occurred, specified as the number of seconds since 1970-01-01T0:0:0Z as measured in UTC. When a max_age request is made or when auth_time is requested as an Essential Claim, then this Claim is REQUIRED. (The auth_time Claim semantically corresponds to the OpenID 2.0 PAPE auth_time response parameter.) OPTIONAL or REQUIRED. String value used to associate a Client session with an ID Token, and to mitigate replay attacks. The value is passed through unmodified from the Authorization Request to the ID Token. If present in the ID Token, Clients MUST verify that the nonce Claim value is equal to the value of the nonce parameter sent in the Authorization Request. If present in the Authorization Request, Authorization Servers MUST include a nonce Claim in the ID Token with the Claim value being the nonce value sent in the Authorization Request. Use of the nonce is REQUIRED for all requests where an ID Token is returned directly from the Authorization Endpoint. It is OPTIONAL when the ID Token is returned from the Token Endpoint. OPTIONAL or REQUIRED. Access Token hash value. If the ID Token is issued from the Authorization Endpoint with an access_token, this is REQUIRED. This is OPTIONAL when the ID Token is issued from the Token Endpoint. The value is produced by base64url encoding the left-most half of the hash created by hashing the access_token with the hash algorithm specified in JWS for the alg parameter in the JWS header. For instance, if the alg is RS256, hash access_token with SHA-256, then take the left-most 128 bits and base64url encode them. OPTIONAL or REQUIRED. Code hash value. If the ID Token is issued from the Authorization Endpoint with a code, this is REQUIRED. This is OPTIONAL when the ID Token is issued from the Token Endpoint. The value is produced by base64url encoding the left-most half of the hash created by hashing the code with the hash algorithm specified in JWS for the alg parameter in the JWS header. For instance, if the alg is HS512, hash code with SHA-512, then take the left-most 256 bits and base64url encode them. OPTIONAL. Authentication Context Class Reference. String specifying an Authentication Context Class Reference value that identifies the Authentication Context Class that the authentication performed satisfied. The value "0" indicates the End-User authentication did not meet the requirements of ISO/IEC 29115 level 1. Authentication using a long-lived browser cookie, for instance, is one example where the use of "level 0" is appropriate. Authentications with level 0 should never be used to authorize access to any resource of any monetary value. (This corresponds to the OpenID 2.0 PAPE nist_auth_level 0.) An absolute URI or a registered name MAY be used as an acr value. OPTIONAL. Authentication Methods References. JSON array of strings that are identifiers for authentication methods used in the authentication. For instance, values might indicate that both password and OTP authentication methods were used. The definition of particular values to be used in the amr Claim is beyond the scope of this specification. NOT RECOMMENDED or REQUIRED. Public key value used to check the signature of an ID Token issued by a Self-Issued OpenID Provider, as specified in . The key is a bare key in JWK format (not an X.509 certificate value). Use of the sub_jwk Claim is REQUIRED when the OP is a Self-Issued OP and is NOT RECOMMENDED when the OP is not Self-Issued. The JWT MAY contain other Claims that are understood by all parties using it. ID Tokens MUST be signed using JWS and OPTIONALLY both signed and encrypted using JWS and JWE respectively, thereby providing authentication, integrity, non-repudiation, and optionally, confidentiality. Clients MUST directly validate the ID Token per ID Token Validation.

The following is a non-normative example of a base64url decoded ID Token (with line wraps for display purposes only):

If the End-User denies the access request or if the request fails, the OP (Authorization Server) informs the RP (Client) by using the Error Response parameters defined in Sections 4.1.2.1 or 4.2.2.1 of OAuth 2.0, according to the response_type used. In addition to the error codes defined in Sections 4.1.2.1 and 4.2.2.1 of OAuth 2.0, this specification also defines the following error codes: The Authorization Server requires End-User interaction of some form to proceed. This error MAY be returned when the prompt parameter in the Authorization Request is set to none to request that the Authorization Server should not display any user interfaces to the End-User, but the Authorization Request cannot be completed without displaying a user interface for End-User interaction. The Authorization Server requires End-User authentication. This error MAY be returned when the prompt parameter in the Authorization Request is set to none to request that the Authorization Server should not display any user interfaces to the End-User, but the Authorization Request cannot be completed without displaying a user interface for user authentication. The End-User is required to select a session at the Authorization Server. The End-User MAY be authenticated at the Authorization Server with different associated accounts, but the End-User did not select a session. This error MAY be returned when the prompt parameter in the Authorization Request is set to none to request that the Authorization Server should not display any user interfaces to the End-User, but the Authorization Request cannot be completed without displaying a user interface to prompt for a session to use. The Authorization Server requires End-User consent. This error MAY be returned when the prompt parameter in the Authorization Request is set to none to request that the Authorization Server should not display any user interfaces to the End-User, but the Authorization Request cannot be completed without displaying a user interface for End-User consent. The request_uri in the Authorization Request returns an error or contains invalid data. The request parameter contains an invalid Request Object. The OP does not support use of the registration parameter. The OP does not support use of the request parameter.

The RP (Client) sends an Access Token Request to the Token Endpoint to obtain an Access Token Response, which MAY include an Access Token, a Refresh Token, an ID Token, and other results.

During Client Registration, the RP (Client) MAY register an authentication method. If no method is registered, the default method of client_secret_basic MUST be used. The Supported options are: Clients that have received a client_secret value from the Authorization Server, authenticate with the Authorization Server in accordance with Section 3.2.1 of OAuth 2.0 using HTTP Basic authentication scheme. Clients that have received a client_secret value from the Authorization Server, authenticate with the Authorization Server in accordance with Section 3.2.1 of OAuth 2.0 by including the Client Credentials in the request body. Clients that have received a client_secret value from the Authorization Server create a JWT using an HMAC SHA algorithm, such as HMAC SHA-256. The HMAC (Hash-based Message Authentication Code) is calculated using the bytes of the UTF-8 representation of the client_secret as the shared key. The Client authenticates in accordance with Section 2.2 of OAuth JWT Bearer Token Profiles and OAuth 2.0 Assertion Profile. The JWT MUST contain the following REQUIRED Claim values and MAY contain the following OPTIONAL Claim values: REQUIRED. Issuer. This MUST contain the client_id of the OAuth Client. REQUIRED. Subject. This MUST contain the client_id of the OAuth Client. REQUIRED. Audience. The aud (audience) Claim. Value that identifies the Authorization Server as an intended audience. The Authorization Server MUST verify that it is an intended audience for the token. The Audience SHOULD be the URL of the Authorization Server's Token Endpoint. REQUIRED. JWT ID. A unique identifier for the token. The JWT ID MAY be used by implementations requiring message de-duplication for one-time use assertions. REQUIRED. Expiration time on or after which the ID Token MUST NOT be accepted for processing. OPTIONAL. Time at which the JWT was issued. The value is the number of seconds from 1970-01-01T0:0:0Z as measured in UTC until the desired date/time. The JWT MAY contain other Claims that are understood by all parties using it. The authentication token MUST be sent as the value of the client_assertion parameter. The value of the client_assertion_type parameter MUST be "urn:ietf:params:oauth:client-assertion-type:jwt-bearer", per . Clients that have registered a public key sign a JWT using the RSA algorithm if a RSA key was registered or the ECDSA algorithm if an Elliptic Curve key was registered (see JWA for the algorithm identifiers). The Client authenticates in accordance with Section 2.2 of OAuth JWT Bearer Token Profiles and OAuth 2.0 Assertion Profile. The JWT MUST contain the following REQUIRED Claim values and MAY contain the following OPTIONAL Claim values: REQUIRED. Issuer. This MUST contain the client_id of the OAuth Client. REQUIRED. Subject. This MUST contain the client_id of the OAuth Client. REQUIRED. Audience. The aud (audience) Claim. Value that identifies the Authorization Server as an intended audience. The Authorization Server MUST verify that it is an intended audience for the token. The Audience SHOULD be the URL of the Authorization Server's Token Endpoint. REQUIRED. JWT ID. A unique identifier for the token. The JWT ID MAY be used by implementations requiring message de-duplication for one-time use assertions. REQUIRED. Expiration time on or after which the ID Token MUST NOT be accepted for processing. OPTIONAL. Time at which the JWT was issued. The value is the number of seconds from 1970-01-01T0:0:0Z as measured in UTC until the desired date/time. The JWT MAY contain other Claims that are understood by all parties using it. The authentication token MUST be sent as the value of the client_assertion parameter. The value of the client_assertion_type parameter MUST be "urn:ietf:params:oauth:client-assertion-type:jwt-bearer", per .

For example (with line wraps for display purposes only):

The Client obtains an Access Token by authenticating with the Authorization Server and presenting its Authorization Grant (in the form of an Authorization Code or Refresh Token). In addition to the Client authentication parameters, if this is a Refresh Token Request, the Client MUST send the additional parameters specified in Section 6 of OAuth 2.0. Otherwise the Client MUST send the request parameters as specified in Section 4.1.3 of OAuth 2.0.

After receiving and validating a valid and authorized Access Token Request from the Client, the Authorization Server returns a successful response that includes an Access Token and an ID Token. The parameters in the successful response are defined in Section 4.1.4 of OAuth 2.0. This specification only describes OAuth 2.0 Bearer Token Usage. The OAuth 2.0 response parameter token_type MUST be set to Bearer unless another Token Type has been negotiated with the Client. Servers SHOULD support OAuth 2.0 Bearer Token Usage for interoperability. For security reasons Servers may only allow Clients to register specific token_type. Clients MUST support OAuth 2.0 Bearer Token Usage and MAY support other token_type. In addition to the OAuth 2.0 response parameters, the following parameters MUST be included in the response if the grant_type value is authorization_code and the Authorization Request scope parameter contained openid: ID Token value associated with the authenticated session. An id_token MUST be returned when the grant_type value is authorization_code and MAY be returned when other grant types are used. If an ID Token is returned as a result of a token refresh request, the following requirements apply: its iat Claim MUST represent the time that the new ID Token is issued; if the ID Token contains an auth_time Claim, its value MUST represent the time of the original authentication - not the time that the new ID token is issued; if the ID Token contains an azp Claim, its value MUST be the same as the azp Claim in the ID Token issued when the original authentication occurred; otherwise, the same rules apply as apply when issuing an ID Token at the time of the original authentication.

Following is a non-normative example:

As in the OAuth 2.0, Clients SHOULD ignore unrecognized response parameters.

If the Token Request is invalid or unauthorized, the Authorization Server constructs the error response. The parameters of the Token Error Response are defined as in Section 5.2 of OAuth 2.0.

The UserInfo Endpoint is an OAuth 2.0 Protected Resource that returns Claims about the authenticated End-User. Claims are represented by a JSON object that contains a collection of name and value pairs for the Claims.

Clients send requests to the UserInfo Endpoint to obtain Claims about the End-User. The UserInfo Endpoint is an OAuth 2.0 Protected Resource that complies with the OAuth 2.0 Bearer Token Usage specification. The Access Token SHOULD be sent using the Authorization header field. The following parameters are defined for use in UserInfo Requests: REQUIRED. Access Token obtained from an OpenID Connect Authorization Request. REQUIRED. Schema in which the data is to be returned. The only defined schema value is openid. This identifier is reserved. It MUST be ignored by the endpoint when the openid schema is used.

If the requested schema is openid, the UserInfo Claims MUST be returned as the members of a JSON object. The Claims defined in can be returned, as can additional Claims not specified there. If a Claim is not returned, that Claim Name SHOULD be omitted from the JSON object representing the Claims; it SHOULD NOT be present with a null or empty string value. The sub (subject) Claim MUST always be returned in the UserInfo Response. NOTE: The UserInfo Endpoint response is not guaranteed to be about the End-User identified by the sub (subject) element of the ID Token. The sub Claim in the UserInfo Endpoint response MUST be verified to exactly match the sub Claim in the ID Token before using additional UserInfo Endpoint Claims.

When an error condition occurs, the UserInfo Endpoint returns an Error Response as defined in Section 3 of OAuth 2.0 Bearer Token Usage. In addition to the error codes defined in Section 3.1 of OAuth 2.0 Bearer Token Usage, this specification defines the following error codes: The requested schema is invalid or unsupported.

OpenID Connect Clients use scope values as defined in 3.3 of OAuth 2.0 to specify what access privileges are being requested for Access Tokens. The scopes associated with Access Tokens determine what resources will be available when they are used to access OAuth 2.0 protected endpoints. For OpenID Connect, scopes can be used to request that specific sets of information be made available as Claim values. OAuth 2.0 allows additional scope values to be specified, as extensions. This specification describes only the scope values used by OpenID Connect. Claims requested by the following scopes are treated by Authorization Servers as Voluntary Claims. OpenID Connect defines the following scope values: REQUIRED. Informs the Authorization Server that the Client is making an OpenID Connect request. If the openid scope value is not present, the behavior is entirely unspecified. OPTIONAL. This scope value requests access to the End-User's default profile Claims. These Claims are: name, family_name, given_name, middle_name, nickname, preferred_username, profile, picture, website, gender, birthdate, zoneinfo, locale, and updated_time. OPTIONAL. This scope value requests access to the email and email_verified Claims. OPTIONAL. This scope value requests access to the address Claim. OPTIONAL. This scope value requests access to the phone_number Claim. OPTIONAL. This scope value requests that an OAuth 2.0 Refresh Token be issued that can be used to obtain an Access Token that grants access to the End-User's UserInfo Endpoint even when the user is not present (not logged in). Multiple scope values MAY be used by creating a space delimited, case sensitive list of ASCII scope values. The Claims requested by the profile, email, address, and phone scope values are returned from the UserInfo Endpoint, as described in , when a response_type value is used that results in an Access Token being issued. However, when the response_type value used is id_token (which issues no Access Token), the resulting Claims are returned in the ID Token. In some cases, the End-User will be given the option to have the OpenID Provider decline to provide some or all information requested by Clients. To minimize the amount of information that the user is being asked to disclose, a Client may elect to only request a subset of the information available from the UserInfo Endpoint.

The following is a non-normative example of a scope Request.

This specification defines a set of standard Claims. They can be requested to be returned either in the UserInfo Response or in the ID Token. Member Type Description sub string Subject - Identifier for the End-User at the Issuer. name string End-User's full name in displayable form including all name parts, ordered according to End-User's locale and preferences. given_name string Given name or first name of the End-User. family_name string Surname or last name of the End-User. middle_name string Middle name of the End-User. nickname string Casual name of the End-User that MAY or MAY not be the same as the given_name. For instance, a nickname value of Mike might be returned alongside a given_name value of Michael. preferred_username string Shorthand name that the End-User wishes to be referred to at the RP, such as janedoe or j.doe. This value MAY be any valid JSON string including special characters such as @, /, or whitespace. This value MUST NOT be relied upon to be unique by the RP. (See .) profile string URL of the End-User's profile page. picture string URL of the End-User's profile picture. website string URL of the End-User's web page or blog. email string End-User's preferred e-mail address. This value MUST NOT be relied upon to be unique by the RP. (See .) email_verified boolean True if the End-User's e-mail address has been verified; otherwise false. gender string End-User's gender. Values defined by this specification are female and male. Other values MAY be used when neither of the defined values are applicable. birthdate string End-User's birthday, represented as an ISO 8601:2004 YYYY-MM-DD format. The year MAY be 0000, indicating that it is omitted. To represent only the year, YYYY format is allowed. Note that depending on the underlying platform's date related function, providing just year may result in varying month and day, so the implementers should take this factor into account to correctly process the dates. zoneinfo string String from zoneinfo time zone database representing the End-User's time zone. For example, Europe/Paris or America/Los_Angeles. locale string End-User's locale, represented as a BCP47 language tag. This is typically an ISO 639-1 Alpha-2 language code in lowercase and an ISO 3166-1 Alpha-2 country code in uppercase, separated by a dash. For example, en-US or fr-CA. As a compatibility note, some implementations have used an underscore as the separator rather than a dash, for example, en_US; Implementations MAY choose to accept this locale syntax as well. phone_number string End-User's preferred telephone number. E.164 is RECOMMENDED as the format of this Claim. For example, +1 (425) 555-1212 or +56 (2) 687 2400. address JSON object End-User's preferred address. The value of the address member is a JSON structure containing some or all of the members defined in . updated_time string Time the End-User's information was last updated, represented as a RFC 3339 datetime. For example, 2011-01-03T23:58:42+0000. For privacy reasons, OpenID Providers MAY elect to not return values for some requested Claims. The sub (subject) Claim in the UserInfo Endpoint response MUST exactly match the sub Claim in the ID Token, before using additional UserInfo Endpoint Claims. The UserInfo Endpoint MUST return Claims in JSON format unless a different format was specified during Registration . The UserInfo Endpoint MAY return Claims in JWT format, which can be signed and/or encrypted. The UserInfo Endpoint MUST return a content-type header to indicate the format that is being returned. The following are accepted content types: Content-Type Format Returned application/json plain text JSON object application/jwt JSON Web Token (JWT)

The following is a non-normative example of such a response:

The components of a physical mailing address. Implementations MAY return only a subset of the fields of an address, depending upon the information available and the End-User's privacy preferences. For example, the country and region might be returned without returning more fine-grained address information. Implementations MAY return just the full address as a single string in the formatted sub-field, or they MAY return just the individual component fields using the other sub-fields, or they MAY return both. If both variants are returned, they SHOULD be describing the same address, with the formatted address indicating how the component fields should be combined. Full mailing address, formatted for display or use with a mailing label. This field MAY contain newlines. This is the Primary Sub-Field for this field, for the purposes of sorting and filtering. Full street address component, which may include house number, street name, PO BOX, and multi-line extended street address information. This field MAY contain newlines. City or locality component. State, province, prefecture or region component. Zip code or postal code component. Country name component.

Claims MAY be represented in multiple languages and scripts. To specify the languages and scripts, BCP47 language tags are added to member names, delimited by a # character. For example, family_name#ja-Kana-JP expresses the Family Name in Katakana in Japanese, which is commonly used to index and represent the phonetics of the Kanji representation of the same represented as family_name#ja-Hani-JP. A claims_locales request can be used to specify the preferred languages and scripts to use for the returned Claims. describes how to request that specific Claims use particular languages and scripts.

The sub (subject) Claim is the only Claim that a Client can rely upon to be stable, since the sub Claim MUST be locally unique and never reassigned within the Issuer for a particular End-User, as described in . Therefore, the only guaranteed unique identifier for a given End-User is a combination of the Issuer's identifier and the sub Claim; other fields such as preferred_username and email MUST NOT be used as unique identifiers for a given End-User. All other Claims carry no such guarantees across different issuers in terms of stability over time or uniqueness across users, and Issuers are permitted to apply local restrictions and policies. For instance, an Issuer MAY re-use a given preferred_username or email address Claim across different End-Users at different points in time, and the claimed preferred_username or email address for a given End-User MAY change over time.

The claims parameter requests that specific Claims be returned from the UserInfo Endpoint and/or in the ID Token. It is represented as a JSON object containing lists of Claims being requested from these locations. Properties of the Claims being requested may also be specified. Support for the claims parameter is OPTIONAL. Should an OP not support this parameter and an RP uses it, the OP SHOULD return a set of Claims to the RP that it believes would be useful to the RP and the End-User using whatever heuristics it believes are appropriate. The claims_parameter_supported Discovery result indicates whether the OP supports this parameter. The claims parameter value is represented in an OAuth 2.0 request as UTF-8 encoded JSON (which ends up being form-urlencoded when passed as an OAuth parameter). When used in a Request Object, per , the JSON is used as the value of the claims member. The top-level members of the Claims request JSON object are: OPTIONAL. Requests that the listed individual Claims be returned from the UserInfo Endpoint. If present, the listed Claims are being requested to be added to any Claims that may have also been requested using scope values. If not present, the Claims being requested from the UserInfo Endpoint are only those requested using scope values. When the userinfo member is used, the request MUST also use a response_type value that results in an Access Token being issued to use at the UserInfo Endpoint. OPTIONAL. Requests that the listed individual Claims be returned in the ID Token. If present, the listed Claims are being requested to be added to the default Claims in the ID Token. If not present, the default ID Token Claims are requested. Other members MAY be present and if so, SHOULD understood by both parties.

An example Claims request is as follows:

Note that a Claim that is not in the standard set defined in , the (example) http://example.info/claims/groups Claim, is being requested. Using the claims parameter is the only way to request Claims outside the standard set. It is also the only way to request specific combinations of the standard Claims that can not be specified using scope values.

The userinfo and id_token members of the claims request both are JSON objects with the names of the individual Claims being requested as the member names. The member values MUST be one of the following: Indicates that this Claim is being requested in the default manner. In particular, this is a Voluntary Claim. For instance, the Claim request:

requests the given_name Claim in the default manner. Used to provide additional information about the Claim being requested. This specification defines the following members: OPTIONAL. Indicates whether the Claim being requested is an Essential Claim. If the value is true, this indicates that the Claim is an Essential Claim. For instance, the Claim request:

can be used to specify that it is Essential to return an auth_time Claim value. If the value is false, it indicates that it is a Voluntary Claim. The default is false. By requesting Claims as Essential Claims the Client indicates to the End-User that releasing these Claims will ensure a smooth authorization for the specific task requested by the End-User. Note that even if the Claims are not available because the End-User did not authorize their release or they are not present, the Authorization Server MUST NOT generate an error when Claims are not returned, whether they are Essential or Voluntary. OPTIONAL. Requests that the Claim be returned with a particular value. For instance the Claim request:

can be used to specify that the request apply to the End-User with subject identifier 248289761001. OPTIONAL. Requests that the Claim be returned with one of a set of values, with the values appearing in order of preference. For instance the Claim request:

specifies that it is Essential that the acr Claim be returned with either the value urn:mace:incommon:iap:silver or urn:mace:incommon:iap:bronze. Other members MAY be defined to provide additional information about the requested Claims, and if so, SHOULD be understood by both parties. Note that when the claims request parameter is supported, the scope values that request Claims, as defined in , are effectively shorthand methods for requesting sets of individual Claims. For example, using the scope value openid email and a response_type that returns an Access Token is equivalent to using the scope value openid and the following request for individual Claims.

Equivalent of using the email scope value:

As described in , Claims MAY be represented in multiple languages and scripts. Within a request for individual Claims, requested languages and scripts for particular Claims may be requested by including Claim Names that contain #-separated BCP47 language tags in the Claims request, using the Claim Name syntax specified in . For example, a Family Name in Katakana in Japanese can be requested using the Claim Name family_name#ja-Kana-JP and a Kanji representation of the Family Name in Japanese can be requested using the Claim Name family_name#ja-Hani-JP.

The UserInfo Endpoint MAY return the following three types of Claims: Claims that are directly asserted by the OpenID Provider. Claims that are asserted by a Claims Provider other than the OpenID Provider but are returned by OpenID Provider. Claims that are asserted by a Claims Provider other than the OpenID Provider but are returned as references by the OpenID Provider. The UserInfo Endpoint MUST support Normal Claims. Aggregated and Distributed Claims support is OPTIONAL.

Normal Claims are represented as members in a JSON object. The Claim Name is the member name and the Claim Value is the member value. The following is a non-normative response containing Normal Claims:

Aggregated and distributed Claims are represented by using special _claim_names and _claim_sources members of the JSON object containing the Claims. JSON object whose member names are the Claim Names for the Aggregated and Distributed Claims. The member values are references to the member names in the _claim_sources member from which the actual Claim Values can be retrieved. JSON object whose member names are referenced by the member values of the _claim_names member. The member values contain sets of Aggregated Claims or reference locations for Distributed Claims. The member values can have one of the following formats depending on whether it is providing Aggregated or Distributed Claims: JSON object that MUST contain the JWT member whose value is a JWT that MUST contain all the Claims in the _claim_names object that references the corresponding _claim_sources member. Other members MAY be present if they are understood by both parties. REQUIRED. JWT containing Claim values. JSON object that contains the following members and values: REQUIRED. OAuth 2.0 resource endpoint from which the associated Claim can be retrieved. The endpoint URL MUST return the Claim as a JWT. OPTIONAL. Access Token enabling retrieval of the Claims from the endpoint URL by using the OAuth 2.0 Bearer Token Usage protocol. Claims SHOULD be requested using the Authorization Request header field and Claims Sources MUST support this method. If the Access Token is not available, Clients MAY need to retrieve the Access Token out of band or use an a priori Access Token that was negotiated between the Claim Source and Client, or the Claim Source MAY reauthenticate the End-User and/or reauthorize the Client.

In this non-normative example, Claims from Claims Provider A are combined with other Claims held by the OpenID provider, with the Claims from Claims Provider A being returned as Aggregated Claims.

In this example, these Claims about Jane Doe have been issued by Claims Provider A:

Claims Provider A signs the JSON Claims, representing them in a signed JWT: jwt_header.jwt_part2.jwt_part3. It is this JWT that is used by the OpenID Provider.

In this example, this JWT containing Jane Doe's Aggregated Claims from Claims Provider A is combined with other Normal Claims, and returned as the following set of Claims:

In this non-normative example, the OpenID Provider combines Normal Claims that it holds with references to Claims held by two different Claims Providers, B and C, incorporating references to some of the Claims held by B and C as Distributed Claims.

In this example, these Claims about Jane Doe are held by Claims Provider B (Jane Doe's bank):

Also in this example, this Claim about Jane Doe is held by Claims Provider C (a credit agency):

The OpenID Provider returns Jane Doe's Claims along with references to the Distributed Claims from Claims Provider B and Claims Provider C by sending the Access Tokens and URLs of locations from which the Distributed Claims can be retrieved:

Provider's Discovery documents SHOULD list their supported identifier types in the subject_types_supported element. If there is more than one type listed in the array, the Client MAY elect to provide its preferred identifier type using the subject_type parameter during Registration. The types supported by this specification are: This provides the same sub (subject) value to all Clients. It is the default if the provider has no subject_types_supported element in its discovery document. This provides a different sub value to each Client, to prevent correlation of the user's activities by Clients without the user's permission.

The OpenID Provider MUST calculate a unique sub (subject) value for each Sector Identifier. The subject value MUST NOT be reversible by any party other than the OpenID Provider. Providers who use pairwise sub values SHOULD support the sector_identifier_uri in Dynamic Client Registration. It provides a way for a group of websites under common administrative control to have consistent pairwise sub values independent of the individual domain names. It also provides a way for Clients to change redirect_uri domains without having to reregister all of their users. If the Client has not provided a value for sector_identifier_uri in Dynamic Client Registration, the Sector Identifier used for pairwise identifier calculation is the host component of the registered redirect_uri. If there are multiple hostnames in the registered redirect_uris, the Client MUST register a sector_identifier_uri. When a sector_identifier_uri is provided, the host component of that URL is used as the Sector Identifier for the pairwise identifier calculation. The value of the sector_identifier_uri must be a URL using the https scheme that points to a JSON file containing an array of redirect_uri values. The values of the registered redirect_uris must be included in the elements of the array, or the registration MUST fail. A number of algorithms can be used by OpenID Providers to calculate pairwise identifiers. Three example methods are: The Sector Identifier can be concatenated with a local account ID and a salt value that is kept secret by the Provider. The concatenated string is then hashed using an appropriate algorithm. Calculate sub = SHA-256 ( sector_identifier | local_account_id | salt ). The Sector Identifier can be concatenated with a local account ID and a salt value that is kept secret by the Provider. The concatenated string is then encrypted using an appropriate algorithm. Calculate sub = AES-128 ( sector_identifier | local_account_id | salt ). The Issuer creates a Globally Unique Identifier (GUID) for the pair of Sector Identifier and local account ID and stores this value.

The request parameter enables OpenID Connect requests to be passed in a single, self-contained parameter and to be signed and optionally encrypted. It represents the request as JWT whose Claims are the request parameters specified in . This JWT is called a Request Object. Support for the request parameter is OPTIONAL. The request_parameter_supported Discovery result indicates whether the OP supports this parameter. Should an OP not support this parameter and an RP uses it, the OP MUST return the request_not_supported error. When the request parameter is used, the OpenID Connect request parameter values contained in the JWT supersede those passed using the OAuth 2.0 request syntax. However, some parameters MAY be passed using the OAuth 2.0 request syntax even when a Request Object is used; this would typically be done to enable a cached, pre-signed (and possibly pre-encrypted) Request Object value to be used containing the fixed request parameters, while parameters that may vary with each request, such as state and nonce, are passed as OAuth 2.0 parameters. Even if a scope parameter is present in the Request Object, a scope parameter MUST always be passed using the OAuth 2.0 request syntax containing the openid scope value to indicate to the underlying OAuth 2.0 logic that this is an OpenID Connect request. The Request Object MAY be signed or unsigned (plaintext). When it is plaintext, this is indicated by use of the none algorithm in the JWS header. If signed, the Request Object SHOULD contain the Claims iss (issuer) and aud (audience) as members, with their semantics being as defined in the JWT specification. The Request Object MAY also be encrypted using JWE, with nested signing and encryption performed as described in the JWT specification. request and request_uri parameters MUST NOT be included in Request Objects.

An example set of Request Object Claims before base64url encoding and JWS signing is as follows:

The request_uri parameter enables OpenID Connect requests to be passed by reference, rather than by value. This parameter is used identically to the request parameter, other than that the Request Object is retrieved from the resource at the specified URL, rather than passed by value. The request_uri_parameter_supported Discovery result indicates whether the OP supports this parameter. When the request_uri parameter is used, the OpenID Connect request parameter values contained in the referenced JWT supersede those passed using the OAuth 2.0 request syntax. However, some parameters MAY be passed using the OAuth 2.0 request syntax even when a request_uri is used; this would typically be done to enable a cached, pre-signed (and possibly pre-encrypted) Request Object value to be used containing the fixed request parameters, while parameters that may vary with each request, such as state and nonce, are passed as OAuth 2.0 parameters. Even if a scope parameter is present in the referenced Request Object, a scope parameter MUST always be passed using the OAuth 2.0 request syntax containing the openid scope value to indicate to the underlying OAuth 2.0 logic that this is an OpenID Connect request. Servers MAY cache the contents of the resources referenced by request URIs. If the contents of the referenced resource could ever change, the URI SHOULD include the base64url encoded SHA-256 hash of the referenced resource contents as the fragment component of the URI. If the fragment value used for a URI changes, that signals the server that any cached value for that URI with the old fragment value is no longer valid. Note that Clients MAY pre-register request_uri values using the request_uris parameter defined in Section 2 of the OpenID Connect Dynamic Client Registration 1.0 specification.

There are several reasons that one might choose to use the request_uri parameter: The set of request parameters can become large, and may exceed browser URI size limitations. Passing the request parameters by reference can solve this problem. Passing a request_uri value, rather than a complete request by value, may reduce request latency. Most requests for Claims from an RP are constant. The request_uri is a way of creating and sometimes also signing and encrypting a constant set of request parameters in advance. (The request_uri value becomes an "artifact" representing a particular fixed set of request parameters.) Pre-registering a fixed set of request parameters at registration time enables OPs to cache and pre-validate the request parameters at registration time, meaning they need not be retrieved at request time.

Parameter names and values MAY be JSON serialized into a JSON structure.

The parameters are serialized into a JSON structure by adding each parameter at the highest structure level. Parameter names and string values are included as JSON strings. Numerical values are included as JSON numbers. Each parameter MAY have a JSON structure as its value.

Following is a non-normative example of such serialization:

Depending on the transport through which the messages are sent, the integrity of the message may not be guaranteed and the originator of the message may not be authenticated. To mitigate these risks, the Request Object, Token Request, ID Token, and UserInfo Response MAY utilize JSON Web Signature (JWS) to sign the contents. To achieve message confidentiality, the Request Object, Token Request, ID Token, and UserInfo Response MAY use JSON Web Encryption (JWE) to encrypt the content. When the message is both signed and encrypted, it MUST be signed first and then encrypted, with nesting performed in the same manner as specified for JWTs . Note that all JWE encryption methods perform integrity checking.

The server advertises its supported signing and encryption algorithms in its discovery document. The algorithm identifiers are specified in JWA. The related elements are: JSON array containing a list of the JWS signing algorithms (alg values) supported by the UserInfo Endpoint to encode the Claims in a JWT . JSON array containing a list of the JWE encryption algorithms (alg values) supported by the UserInfo Endpoint to encode the Claims in a JWT . JSON array containing a list of the JWE encryption algorithms (enc values) supported by the UserInfo Endpoint to encode the Claims in a JWT . JSON array containing a list of the JWS signing algorithms (alg values) supported by the Authorization Server for the ID Token to encode the Claims in a JWT . JSON array containing a list of the JWE encryption algorithms (alg values) supported by the Authorization Server for the ID Token to encode the Claims in a JWT . JSON array containing a list of the JWE encryption algorithms (enc values) supported by the Authorization Server for the ID Token to encode the Claims in a JWT . JSON array containing a list of the JWS signing algorithms (alg values) supported by the Authorization Server for the Request Object. Servers SHOULD support none and RS256. JSON array containing a list of the JWE encryption algorithms (alg values) supported by the Authorization Server for the Request Object. JSON array containing a list of the JWE encryption algorithms (enc values) supported by the Authorization Server for the Request Object. JSON array containing a list of the JWS signing algorithms (alg values) supported by the Token Endpoint for the private_key_jwt and client_secret_jwt methods to encode the JWT . Servers SHOULD support RS256. The Client registers its required algorithms for Signing and Encryption using the following Registration parameters: OPTIONAL. JWS signature algorithm required for Request Objects by the Authorization Server. All Request Objects from this client_id MUST be rejected if not signed by this algorithm. Servers SHOULD support RS256. OPTIONAL. JWS signature algorithm required for UserInfo Responses. If this is specified the response will be JWT serialized. OPTIONAL. JWE alg algorithm required for UserInfo Responses. If this is requested in combination with signing, the response MUST be signed first then encrypted. If this is specified, the response will be JWT serialized. OPTIONAL. JWE enc algorithm required for UserInfo Responses. If userinfo_encrypted_response_alg is specified the default for this value is A128CBC+HS256. OPTIONAL. JWS signature algorithm required for ID Tokens issued to this client_id. The default if not specified is RS256. The public key for validating the signature is provided by retrieving the document from the jwks_uri element from discovery. OPTIONAL. JWE alg algorithm required for ID Tokens issued to this client_id. If this is requested, the response MUST be signed then encrypted. The default if not specified is no encryption. OPTIONAL. JWE enc algorithm required for ID Tokens issued to this client_id. If id_token_encrypted_response_alg is specified the default for this value is A128CBC+HS256.

The OpenID Provider provides its public keys during Discovery using the following element: REQUIRED. URL of the OP's JSON Web Key Set document that contains the Server's signing key(s) that are used for signing responses to the Client. The JWK Set MAY also contain the Server's encryption key(s) that are used by the Client to encrypt requests to the Server. When both signing and encryption keys are made available, the use (Key Use) parameter value is REQUIRED for all keys in the document to indicate each key's intended usage. Likewise, the Client can provide its public keys during Registration using the following element: OPTIONAL. URL for the Client's JSON Web Key Set document containing key(s) that are used for signing requests to the OP. The JWK Set MAY also contain the Client's encryption keys(s) that are used by the OP to encrypt the responses to the Client. When both signing and encryption keys are made available, the use (Key Use) parameter value is REQUIRED for all keys in the document to indicate each key's intended usage.

In addition to the Key Types defined in JSON Web Algorithms the jwks_uri JWK Set can also contain a PKIX Key Type, which is a key type used to enable a JWK to contain a chain of PKIX certificates. [[ Note: The PKIX Key Type is derived from the JSON Web Key (JWK) for PKIX Certificates specification, which is an early work in progress. In the future, should this functionality be incorporated into a JOSE working group specification, it would then no longer be replicated in this document. ]] The PKIX Key Type defines the following JWK parameters: REQUIRED. The value of the kty parameter MUST be PKIX. REQUIRED. Contains a chain of one or more PKIX certificates . The certificate chain is represented as a JSON array of certificate value strings. Each string in the array is a DER PKIX certificate encoded as base64 (note: not base64url). The array MUST have at least one value, which MUST be the PKIX certificate of the actor (e.g., the singer of a , or a recipient of a ). Each additional value of the array (if any) MUST be the PKIX certificate that certifies the previous certificate. The PKIX key type enables the same key to be represented as an X.509 certificate as well as a simple JWK formatted bare key in the same document. When the same key is published in both formats, the values of the kid (Key ID), use (Key Use) and alg (Algorithm) parameters MUST be the same for both. When both signing and encryption keys are made available, the use (Key Use) parameter value is REQUIRED for all keys in the JWK Set at the jwks_uri to indicate each key's intended usage. Although some algorithms allow the same key pair to be used for both signatures and encryption, doing so is NOT RECOMMENDED, as it is less secure.

The following is a non-normative example of a jwks_uri document with one RSA signing key represented using both the RSA and PKIX key types:

The signing party MUST select a signature algorithm based on the supported algorithms of the recipient in . When using RSA or ECDSA Signatures, the alg Claim of the JWS header MUST be set to the appropriate algorithm as defined in JSON Web Algorithms. The private key MUST be the one associated with the Public Signing Key provided in . If there are multiple keys in the referenced JWK document, a kid value MUST be provided in the JWS header. The key usage of the respective keys MUST support signature. When using MAC-based signatures, the alg Claim of the JWS header MUST be set to a MAC algorithm, as defined in JSON Web Algorithms. The MAC key used is the bytes of the UTF-8 representation of the client_secret value. See for a discussion of entropy requirements for client_secret values. See for Security Considerations about the need for signed requests.

Rotation of signing keys can be accomplished with the following approach. The signer publishes its keys in a JWK Set at the jwks_uri location and includes the kid of the signing key in the JWS header of each message to indicate to the verifier which key is to be used to validate the signature. Keys can be rolled over by periodically adding new keys to the JWK Set at jwks_uri. The signer can begin using a new key at its discretion and signals the change to the verifier using the kid value. The verifier knows to go back to the jwks_uri to re-retrieve the keys when it sees an unfamiliar kid value. The JWK Set document at the jwks_uri should retain recently decommissioned signing keys for a reasonable period of time to facilitate a smooth transition.

The encrypting party MUST select an encryption algorithm based on the supported algorithms of the recipient in . All JWTs MUST be signed before encryption to enable verification of the Issuer. Use the link registered/discovered in to retrieve the relevant key. If there are multiple keys in the referenced JWK document, a kid value MUST be provided in the JWE header. Use the supported RSA KeyWrap algorithm to KeyWrap a random Content Master Key to be used for encrypting the signed JWT. The key usage of the respective keys MUST include encryption. Create an ephemeral Elliptic Curve public key for the epk element of the JWE header. Use the link registered/discovered in to retrieve the relevant key. If there are multiple keys in the referenced JWK document, a kid value MUST be provided in the JWE header. Use the ECDH-ES algorithm to KeyWrap a random Content Master Key to be used for encrypting the signed JWT. The key usage of the respective keys MUST support encryption. The symmetric encryption key is derived from the client_secret value by using a left truncated SHA-256 hash of the bytes of the UTF-8 representation of the client_secret. The SHA-256 value MUST be left truncated to the appropriate bit length for the AES KeyWrap algorithm used, for instance, to 128 bits for A128KW. See for Security Considerations about the need for encrypted requests.

Rotating encryption keys is necessarily a different process than for signing keys because the encrypting party starts the process and thus cannot rely on a change in kid as a signal to know that keys need to change. The encrypting party still uses the kid header in the JWE to tell the decrypting party which private key to use to decrypt, however, the encrypting party needs to first select the most appropriate key from those provided in the JWK Set at jwks_uri. To rotate keys, the decrypting party can publish new keys at jwks_uri and remove from the JWK Set those that are being decommissioned. The jwks_uri should include a Cache-Control header in the response that contains a max-age directive, as defined in RFC 2616, which allows the encrypting party to safely cache the JWK Set and not have to re-retrieve the document for every encryption event. The decrypting party should remove decommissioned keys from the JWK Set at jwks_uri but retain them internally for some reasonable period of time, coordinated with the cache duration, to facilitate a smooth transition between keys by allowing the encrypting party some time to obtain the new keys. The cache duration should also be coordinated with the issuance of new signing keys as described in .

If any of the validation procedures defined in this specification fail, any operations requiring the information that failed to correctly validate MUST be aborted and the information that failed to validate MUST NOT be used.

Authorization Request Validation consists of two main steps: (1) decryption and signature validation of the value of request or the content of request_uri, and (2) parameter validation. If a Request Object was sent in the request parameter or by reference in the request_uri parameter, the Request Object MUST validate as JWS or JWE encoded objects, for which nested encryption and signing may have been performed in the manner described in the JWT specification.

If the Authorization Server has advertised JWE encryption algorithms in the request_object_encryption_alg_values_supported and request_object_encryption_enc_values_supported elements of its Discovery Document, these are used by the Client to encrypt the JWT. The Authorization Server MUST decode the JWT in accordance with the JSON Web Encryption specification. The result MAY be either a signed or unsigned (plaintext) Request Object. In the former case, signature validation MUST be performed as defined in . The Authorization Server MUST return the error if there is a decryption error.

To perform Signature Validation, the alg parameter in the JWS header MUST match the value of the request_object_signing_alg set during Client Registration or a value that was pre-registered by other means. The signature must be validated against the key registered for that client_id and algorithm, in accordance with the JSON Web Signature specification. The Authorization Server MUST return the Authorization Error Response if there is a signature validation error.

The Authorization Server MUST construct the Authorization Request Message from the Request Object and the OAuth 2.0 Authorization Request parameters. If the same parameter exists both in the Request Object and the OAuth Authorization Request parameters, the parameter in the Request Object is used. Using this Authorization Request Message, the Authorization Server performs the following steps of the request validation: The Authorization Server MUST validate all the OAuth 2.0 parameters according to the OAuth 2.0 specification. The Authorization Server MUST verify that all the required parameters are present. If the sub (subject) Claim as a member of id_token element is requested with a specific value, the Authorization Server MUST only send a positive response if that user has an active session with the Authorization Server. The Authorization Server MUST not reply with an ID Token or Access Token for a different user, even if they have an active session with the Authorization Server. If the acr Claim is requested as an Essential Claim for the ID Token with a values parameter requesting specific Authentication Context Class Reference values, then the Authorization Server MUST return an acr Claim value that matches one of the requested values. The Authorization Server MAY ask the user to re-authenticate with additional factors to meet this requirement. If this is an Essential Claim and the requirement cannot be met, then the Authorization Server MUST treat that outcome as a failed authentication attempt. The Client MAY request this Claim as an optional Claim by using the acr_values request parameter or by not including "essential": true in the individual acr Claim request. If the Claim is not Essential and the requested value for the user cannot be provided, the Authorization Server SHOULD return the session's current acr as the value of the acr Claim. If the Claim is not Essential, the Authorization Server is not required to provide this Claim in its response. If the Authorization Server encounters any error, it MUST return the error response.

To validate the ID Token in the Authorization or Token Endpoint Response, the Client MUST do the following: If the Client has provided an id_token_encrypted_response_alg parameter during Registration, decrypt the ID Token using the key pair specified during Registration. The Client MUST validate that the aud (audience) Claim contains its client_id value registered at the Issuer identified by the iss (issuer) Claim as an audience. The aud (audience) Claim may contain an array with more than one element. The ID Token MUST be rejected if the ID Token does not list the Client as a valid audience, or if it contains additional audiences not trusted by the Client. If the token contains multiple audiences or contains an azp (authorized presenter) Claim, the Client SHOULD verify the identity of the presenter. The authorized presenter of the token is identified by an azp Claim in the token. The OAuth 2.0 Assertion Profile, a direct connection to the Token Endpoint or other extension may be used to identify the presenter. If the id_token is received via direct communication between the Client and the Token Endpoint, the TLS server validation MAY be used to validate the issuer in place of checking the token signature. The Client MUST validate the signature of all other ID Tokens according to JWS using the algorithm specified in the alg parameter of the JWT header. The alg value SHOULD be the default of RS256 or the algorithm sent by the Client in the id_token_signed_response_alg parameter during Registration. If the alg parameter of the JWT header is a MAC based algorithm such as HS256, HS384, or HS512, the bytes of the UTF-8 representation of the client_secret corresponding to the client_id contained in the aud (audience) Claim are used as the key to validate the signature. Multiple audiences are not supported for MAC based algorithms. For other Signing algorithms, the Client must use the signing key provided in Discovery by the Issuer. The issuer must exactly match the value of the iss (issuer) Claim. The current time MUST be less than the value of the exp Claim. The iat Claim can be used to reject tokens that were issued too far away from the current time, limiting the amount of time that nonces must be stored to prevent attacks. The acceptable range is Client specific. If a nonce value was sent in the Authorization Request, a nonce Claim MUST be present and its value checked to verify that it is the same value as the one that was sent in the Authorization Request. The Client SHOULD check the nonce value for replay attacks. The precise method for detecting replay attacks is Client specific. If the acr Claim was requested, the Client SHOULD check that the asserted Claim Value is appropriate. The meaning and processing of acr Claim Values is out of scope for this specification. If the auth_time Claim was requested, either through a specific request for this Claim or by using the max_age parameter, the Client SHOULD check the auth_time Claim value and request re-authentication if it determines too much time has elapsed since the last End-User authentication.

To validate the UserInfo Response, the Client MUST do the following: If the Client has provided a userinfo_encrypted_response_alg parameter during Registration, decrypt the UserInfo Response using the key pair specified during Registration. If the response was signed, the Client SHOULD validate the signature according to JWS. Check that the OP that responded was the intended OP through a TLS server certificate check, per RFC 6125.

To validate an Access Token issued from the Authorization Endpoint with an ID Token in response to a request containing a response_type of token id_token or code token id_token, the Client SHOULD do the following: Hash the access_token with the hash algorithm specified in JWS for the alg parameter in the ID Token's JWS header. Take the left-most half of the hash and base64url encode it. The value of at_hash in the ID Token MUST match the value produced in the previous step if at_hash is present in the ID Token.

To validate a code issued from the Authorization Endpoint with an ID Token in response to a request containing a response_type of code id_token or code token id_token, the Client SHOULD do the following: Hash the code with the hash algorithm specified in JWS for the alg parameter in the ID Token's JWS header. Take the left-most half of the hash and base64url encode it. The value of c_hash in the ID Token MUST match the value produced in the previous step if c_hash is present in the ID Token.

The offline_access scope value requests that an OAuth 2.0 Refresh Token be issued that can be used to obtain an Access Token that grants access to the End-User's UserInfo Endpoint even when the user is not present (not logged in). When offline access is requested, a prompt parameter value of consent MUST be used. The user MUST always explicitly consent to the return of a Refresh Token that enables offline access. A previously saved user consent is not sufficient to grant offline access. Upon receipt of a scope parameter containing the offline_access value, the Authorization Server: MUST ensure that the prompt parameter contains consent; if the prompt parameter does not contain consent then it MUST ignore the offline_access request, MUST ignore the offline_access request if the Client is not requesting a response_type of code or code id_token. MUST explicitly receive user consent for all Clients when the registered application_type is web, SHOULD explicitly receive user consent for all Clients when the registered application_type is native. The use of Refresh Tokens is not exclusive to the offline_access use case. The Authorization Server MAY grant Refresh Tokens in other contexts that are beyond the scope of this specification.

OpenID Connect supports Self-Issued OpenID Providers - personal OPs that issue self-signed ID Tokens. Self-Issued OPs use the special Issuer Identifier https://self-issued.me.

If the input identifier for the discovery process contains the domain self-issued.me, dynamic discovery is not performed. Instead, then the following static configuration values are used:

Note: The OpenID Foundation may consider hosting a site https://self-issued.me/ that returns the above static configuration file so that the Client would not need any special treatment for discovery of the Self-Issued OP.

When using a Self-Issued OP, the Client is deemed to have registered with the OP and obtained following Client Registration Response. redirect_uri value of the Client. 0 Note: The OpenID Foundation may consider hosting the (stateless) endpoint https://self-issued.me/registration/1.0/ that returns the response above so that the Client would not need to perform any special processing for registration of a Self-Issued OP.

The registration request parameter is used by the Client to provide information about itself to a Self-Issued OP that would normally be provided to an OP during Dynamic Client Registration. The value is a JSON object containing name/value pairs defined in Section 2.1 of the OpenID Connect Dynamic Client Registration 1.0 specification. None of this information is required by Self-Issued OPs, so the use of this parameter is OPTIONAL. The registration parameter value is represented in an OAuth 2.0 request as UTF-8 encoded JSON (which ends up being form-urlencoded when passed as an OAuth parameter). When used in a Request Object, per , the JSON is used as the value of the registration member. The Registration parameters that would typically be used in requests to Self-Issued OPs are policy_uri, tos_uri, and logo_uri. If the Client uses more than one redirect URI, the redirect_uris parameter would be used to register them. Finally, if the Client is requesting encrypted responses, it would use the jwks_uri, id_token_encrypted_response_alg and id_token_encrypted_response_enc parameters.

The Client sends the Authorization Request to the Authorization Endpoint with the following parameters: REQUIRED. Constant string value id_token. REQUIRED. Client ID value for the Client, which in this case contains the redirect_uri value of the Client. Since the Client's redirect_uri URI value is communicated as the Client ID, a redirect_uri parameter is NOT REQUIRED to also be included in the request. REQUIRED. scope parameter value, as specified in . OPTIONAL. Previously issued ID Token passed to the Authorization Server as a hint about the End-User's current or past authenticated session with the Client. This SHOULD be present when prompt=none is used. If the End-User identified by the ID Token is logged in or is logged in by the request, then the Authorization Server returns a positive response; otherwise, it SHOULD return a negative response. If the ID Token received by the RP is encrypted, the Client MUST decrypt the signed ID Token contained within the encrypted ID Token. The Client MAY re-encrypt the signed ID token to the Authentication Server using a key that enables the server to decrypt the ID Token. In this case, the sub (subject) of the signed ID Token MUST be sent as the kid (Key ID) of the JWE. Encrypting content to Self-Issued OPs is currently only supported when the OP's JWK key type is RSA and the encryption algorithm used is RSA1_5. OPTIONAL. This parameter is used to request that specific Claims be returned. The value is a JSON object, as specified in . OPTIONAL. This parameter is used by the Client to provide information about itself to a Self-Issued OP that would normally be provided to an OP during Dynamic Client Registration, as specified in . OPTIONAL. Request Object value, as specified in . The Request Object may be encrypted in a JWE by the Client. In this case, the sub (subject) of a previously issued ID Token for this Client MUST be sent as the kid (Key ID) of the JWE. Encrypting content to Self-Issued OPs is currently only supported when the OP's JWK key type is RSA and the encryption algorithm used is RSA1_5. Other parameters MAY be sent. Note that all Claims are returned in the ID Token. The entire URL MUST NOT exceed 2048 bytes.

Following is a non-normative example (with line wraps for display purposes only):

The Self-Issued OpenID Provider response is the same as the normal implicit flow response with the following refinements. Since it is an implicit flow response, the response parameters will be returned in a fragment. The iss (issuer) Claim value is https://self-issued.me. A sub_jwk Claim is present, with its value being the public key value used to check the signature of the ID Token. The sub (subject) Claim value is the base64url encoded SHA-256 hash of the concatenation of the bytes of the UTF-8 representations of the base64url encoded key values in the sub_jwk Claim. When the kty value is RSA, the key values n and e are concatenated in that order. When the kty value is EC, the key values crv, x, and y are concatenated in that order. No Access Token is returned for accessing a UserInfo Endpoint, so all Claims returned must be in the ID Token.

If any of the validation procedures defined in this specification fail, any operations requiring the information that failed to correctly validate MUST be aborted and the information that failed to validate MUST NOT be used. To validate the ID Token in the Authorization or Token Endpoint Response, the Client MUST do the following: The Client MUST validate that the value of the iss (issuer) Claim is https://self-isued.me. If iss contains a different value, the ID Token is not Self-Issued, and instead it MUST be validated according to . The Client MUST validate that the aud (audience) Claim contains the value of the redirect_uri that the Client sent in the authentication request as an audience. The Client MUST validate the signature of the ID Token according to JWS using the algorithm specified in the alg parameter of the JWT header , using the key in the sub_jwk Claim; the key is a bare key in JWK format (not an X.509 certificate value). The alg value SHOULD be the default of RS256. It may also be ES256. The Client MUST validate that the sub (subject) Claim value is the base64url encoded SHA-256 hash of the concatenation of the bytes of the UTF-8 representations of the base64url encoded key values in the sub_jwk Claim. When the kty value is RSA, the key values n and e are concatenated in that order. When the kty value is EC, the key values crv, x, and y are concatenated in that order. The current time MUST be less than the value of the exp Claim (possibly allowing for some small leeway to account for clock skew). The iat Claim can be used to reject tokens that were issued too far away from the current time, limiting the amount of time that nonces must be stored to prevent attacks. The acceptable range is Client specific. If a nonce value was sent in the Authorization Request, a nonce Claim MUST be present and its value of the checked to verify that it is the same value as the one that was sent in the Authorization Request. The Client SHOULD check the nonce value for replay attacks. The precise method for detecting replay attacks is Client specific.

The following is a non-normative example of a base64url decoded Self-Issued ID Token (with line wraps for display purposes only):

Processing some OpenID Connect messages requires comparing values in the messages to known values. For example, the Claim Names returned by the UserInfo Endpoint might be compared to specific Claim Names such as sub. Comparing Unicode strings, however, has significant security implications. Therefore, comparisons between JSON strings and other Unicode strings MUST be performed as specified below: Remove any JSON applied escaping to produce an array of Unicode code points. Unicode Normalization MUST NOT be applied at any point to either the JSON string or to the string it is to be compared against. Comparisons between the two strings MUST be performed as a Unicode code point to code point equality comparison. In several places, this specification uses space delimited lists of strings. In all such cases, only the ASCII space character (0x20) MAY be used for this purpose.

This specification defines features used by both Relying Parties and OpenID Providers. Features that are mandatory to implement for Relying Parties are already described in the OpenID Connect Basic Client Profile 1.0 and OpenID Connect Implicit Client Profile 1.0 specifications, and so are not discussed again here. It is expected that some OpenID Providers will require static, out-of-band configuration of RPs using them, whereas others will support dynamic usage by RPs without a pre-established relationship between them. For that reason, the mandatory-to-implement features for OPs are listed below in two groups: the first for all OPs and the second for "Dynamic" OpenID Providers.

All OpenID Providers MUST implement the following features defined in this specification. This list augments the set of features that are already listed elsewhere as being "REQUIRED" or are described with a "MUST", and so is not, by itself, a comprehensive set of implementation requirements for OPs. OPs MUST support signing ID Tokens with the RSA SHA-256 algorithm (an alg value of RS256). All OPs that issue Access Tokens MUST support the UserInfo Endpoint, as defined in . (Self-Issued OPs do not issue Access Tokens.) OPs must support the prompt parameter, as defined in , including the specified user interface behaviors such as none and login. OPs must support the display parameter, as defined in . (Note that the minimum level of support required for this parameter is simply to have its use not result in an error.) OPs MUST support requests for preferred languages and scripts for the user interface and for Claims via the ui_locales and claims_locales request parameters, as defined in . (Note that the minimum level of support required for these parameters is simply to have their use not result in errors.) OPs MUST support returning the time at which the user authenticated via the auth_time Claim, as defined in . OPs MUST support enforcing a maximum authentication age via the max_age parameter, as defined in . OPs MUST support requests for specific Authentication Context Class Reference values via the acr_values parameter, as defined in . (Note that the minimum level of support required for this parameter is simply to have its use not result in an error.)

In addition to the features listed above, OpenID Providers supporting dynamic establishment of relationships with RPs that they do not have a pre-configured relationship with MUST also implement the following features defined in this and related specifications. These OPs MUST support Discovery, as defined in OpenID Connect Discovery 1.0. These OPs MUST support Dynamic Client Registration, as defined in OpenID Connect Dynamic Client Registration 1.0. These OPs MUST publish their public keys as bare keys, rather than in in X.509 format. These OPs MUST support requests made using a Request Object that is retrieved from a Request URI that is provided with the request_uri parameter, as defined in .

This specification is an abstract specification. It needs to be bound to a protocol to be used in practice. One such example of protocol binding is: OpenID Connect Standard 1.0 - Protocol binding for the full set of OpenID Connect messages These related OpenID Connect specifications MAY OPTIONALLY be used in combination with this specification to provide additional functionality: OpenID Connect Discovery 1.0 - Dynamic discovery for user and Authorization Server endpoints and information OpenID Connect Dynamic Client Registration 1.0 - Dynamic registration of OpenID Connect Clients with OpenID Providers OpenID Connect Basic Client Profile 1.0 - Protocol binding for a subset of the OpenID Connect Messages that is intended for use by basic Web-based Relying Parties using the OAuth authorization_code grant type. OpenID Connect Implicit Client Profile 1.0 - Protocol binding for a subset of the OpenID Connect Messages that is intended for use by basic Web-based Relying Parties using the OAuth implicit grant type. OpenID Connect Session Management 1.0 - Session management for OpenID Connect sessions

OAuth 2.0 Threat Model and Security Considerations provides an extensive list of threats and controls that applies to this standard as well. ISO/IEC 29115 also provides threats and controls that implementers should take into account. In addition, this standard provides additional control measures listed below.

If appropriate measures are not taken, a request may be disclosed to an attacker, posing security and privacy threats. In addition to what is stated in Section 5.1.1 of , this standard provides a way to provide the confidentiality of the request end to end through the use of request or request_uri parameters, where the content of the request is an encrypted JWT with the appropriate key and cipher. This protects even against a compromised User-Agent in the case of indirect request.

A malicious Server may masquerade as the legitimate server using various means. To detect such an attack, the Client needs to authenticate the server. In addition to what is stated in Section 5.1.2 of , this standard provides a way to authenticate the Server through either the use of Signed or Encrypted JWTs with an appropriate key and cipher.

An Attacker may generate a bogus token or modify the token content (such as the authentication or attribute statements) of an existing parseable token, causing the RP to grant inappropriate access to the Client. For example, an Attacker may modify the parseable token to extend the validity period; a Client may modify the parseable token to have access to information that they should not be able to view. There are two ways to mitigate this attack: The token can be digitally signed by the OP. The Relying Party SHOULD validate the digital signature to verify that it was issued by a legitimate OP. The token can be sent over a protected channel such as TLS. See for more information on using TLS. In this specification, the token is always sent over a TLS protected channel. Note however, that this measure is only a defense against third party attackers and is not applicable to the case where the Client is the attacker.

Server response may contain authentication and attribute statements that include sensitive Client information. Disclosure of the response contents can make the Client vulnerable to other types of attacks. The server response disclosure can be mitigated in the following two ways: Using the code response type. The response is sent over a TLS protected channel, where the Client is authenticated by the client_id and client_secret. For other response types, the signed response can be encrypted with the Client's public key or a shared secret as an encrypted JWT with an appropriate key and cipher.

A response may be repudiated by the server if the proper mechanisms are not in place. For example, if a Server does not digitally sign a response, the Server can claim that it was not generated through the services of the Server. To mitigate this threat, the response may be digitally signed by the Server using a key that supports non-repudiation. The Client SHOULD validate the digital signature to verify that it was issued by a legitimate Server and its integrity is intact.

Since it is possible for a compromised or malicious Client to send a request to the wrong party, a Client that was authenticated using only a bearer token can repudiate any transaction. To mitigate this threat, the Server MAY require that the request be digitally signed by the Client using a key that supports non-repudiation. The Server SHOULD validate the digital signature to verify that it was issued by a legitimate Client and the integrity is intact.

An Attacker uses the Access Token generated for one resource to obtain access to a second resource. To mitigate this threat, the Access Token should be audience and scope restricted. One way of implementing it is to include the identifier of the resource for whom it was generated as audience. The resource verifies that incoming tokens include its identifier as the audience of the token.

An Attacker attempts to use a one-time use token such as an Authorization Code that has already been used once with the intended Resource. To mitigate this threat, the token SHOULD include a timestamp and a short validity lifetime. The Relying Party then checks the timestamp and lifetime values to ensure that the token is currently valid. Alternatively, the server may record the state of the use of the token and check the status for each request.

In addition to the attack patterns described in Section 4.4.1.1 of , an Authorization Code can be captured in the User-Agent where the TLS session is terminated if the User-Agent is infected by malware. However, capturing it is not useful as long as the profile uses either Client authentication or an encrypted response.

A user may attempt to impersonate a more privileged user by subverting the communication channel between the Token Endpoint and Client, for example by reordering the messages, to convince the Token Endpoint that his or her authorization grant corresponds to the grant sent on behalf of the more privileged user. Responses to Token Requests are bound to the corresponding requests by message order in HTTP, as both token and requests are protected by TLS that can detect and disallow malicious reordering of packets.

A timing attack allows the attacker to obtain an unnecessary large amount of information through the elapsed time differences in the code paths taken by successful and unsuccessful decryption operations or successful and unsuccessful signature validation of a message. It can be used to reduce the effective key length of the cipher used. Implementations should not terminate the validation process at the instant of the finding an error but should continue running until all the octets have been processed to avoid this attack.

There are various crypto related attacks possible depending on the method used for encryption and signature / integrity checking. Implementers should consult the Security Considerations for the JWT specification and specifications that it references to avoid the vulnerabilities identified in these specifications.

Signatures over encrypted text are not considered valid in many jurisdictions. Therefore, for integrity and non-repudiation, this specification requires signing the plain text JSON Claims.

OpenID Connect supports multiple issuers per Host and Port combination. The issuer returned by discovery MUST exactly match the value of iss in the ID Token. OpenID Connect treats the path component of any URI as part of the user identifier. For instance, the subject "1234" with an issuer of "https://example.com" is not equivalent to the subject "1234" with an issuer of "https://example.com/sales". It is RECOMMENDED that only a single issuer per host be used.

Implementations MUST support TLS. Which version(s) ought to be implemented will vary over time, and depend on the widespread deployment and known security vulnerabilities at the time of implementation. At the time of this writing, TLS version 1.2 is the most recent version, but has very limited actual deployment, and might not be readily available in implementation toolkits. TLS version 1.0 is the most widely deployed version, and will give the broadest interoperability. To protect against information disclosure and tampering, confidentiality protection MUST be applied using TLS with a ciphersuite that provides confidentiality and integrity protection. Whenever TLS is used, a TLS server certificate check MUST be performed, per RFC 6125.

Access Token grants are not revocable by the Authorization Server. Access Token grant lifetimes SHOULD be kept to single use or very short lifetimes. If access to the UserInfo Endpoint or other protected resources is required, a Refresh Token should be used. The Client may then exchange the Refresh Token at the Token Endpoint for a fresh short-lived Access Token that can be used to access the resource. The Authorization Server SHOULD clearly identify long-term grants to the User during Authorization. The Authorization Server SHOULD provide a mechanism for the user to revoke Refresh Tokens granted to a Client.

In and , keys are derived from the client_secret value. Thus, when used with symmetric signing or encryption operations, client_secret values MUST contain sufficient entropy to generate cryptographically strong keys. Also, client_secret values MUST also contain at least the minimum of number of bytes required for MAC keys for the particular algorithm used. So for instance, for HS256, the client_secret value MUST contain at least 8 bytes (and almost certainly SHOULD contain more, since client_secret values are likely to use a restricted alphabet.

In some situations, Clients may need to use signed requests to ensure that the desired request parameters are delivered to the OP without having been tampered with. For instance, the max_age and acr_values provide more assurance about the nature of the authentication performed when delivered in signed requests.

In some situations, knowing the contents of an OpenID Connect request may, in and of itself, reveal sensitive information about the End-User. For instance, knowing that the Client is requesting a particular Claim or that it is requesting that a particular authentication method be used may reveal sensitive information about the End-User. OpenID Connect enables requests to be encrypted to the OpenID Provider to prevent such potentially sensitive information from being revealed.

The UserInfo Response typically contains Personally Identifiable Information (PII). As such, End-User consent for the release of the information for the specified purpose SHOULD be obtained at or prior to the authorization time in accordance with relevant regulations. The purpose of use is typically registered in association with the redirect_uris. Only necessary UserInfo data should be stored at the Client and the Client SHOULD associate the received data with the purpose of use statement. The Resource Server SHOULD make the UserInfo access log available to the End-User so that the End-User can monitor who accessed his data. To protect the End-User from a possible correlation among Clients, the use of a Pairwise Pseudonymous Identifier (PPID) as the sub SHOULD be considered.

This specification registers the Claims defined in and in the IANA JSON Web Token Claims registry defined in .

Claim Name: name Change Controller: OpenID Foundation Artifact Binding Working Group - openid-specs-ab@lists.openid.net Specification Document(s): of this document Claim Name: given_name Change Controller: OpenID Foundation Artifact Binding Working Group - openid-specs-ab@lists.openid.net Specification Document(s): of this document Claim Name: family_name Change Controller: OpenID Foundation Artifact Binding Working Group - openid-specs-ab@lists.openid.net Specification Document(s): of this document Claim Name: middle_name Change Controller: OpenID Foundation Artifact Binding Working Group - openid-specs-ab@lists.openid.net Specification Document(s): of this document Claim Name: nickname Change Controller: OpenID Foundation Artifact Binding Working Group - openid-specs-ab@lists.openid.net Specification Document(s): of this document Claim Name: preferred_username Change Controller: OpenID Foundation Artifact Binding Working Group - openid-specs-ab@lists.openid.net Specification Document(s): of this document Claim Name: profile Change Controller: OpenID Foundation Artifact Binding Working Group - openid-specs-ab@lists.openid.net Specification Document(s): of this document Claim Name: picture Change Controller: OpenID Foundation Artifact Binding Working Group - openid-specs-ab@lists.openid.net Specification Document(s): of this document Claim Name: website Change Controller: OpenID Foundation Artifact Binding Working Group - openid-specs-ab@lists.openid.net Specification Document(s): of this document Claim Name: email Change Controller: OpenID Foundation Artifact Binding Working Group - openid-specs-ab@lists.openid.net Specification Document(s): of this document Claim Name: email_verified Change Controller: OpenID Foundation Artifact Binding Working Group - openid-specs-ab@lists.openid.net Specification Document(s): of this document Claim Name: gender Change Controller: OpenID Foundation Artifact Binding Working Group - openid-specs-ab@lists.openid.net Specification Document(s): of this document Claim Name: birthdate Change Controller: OpenID Foundation Artifact Binding Working Group - openid-specs-ab@lists.openid.net Specification Document(s): of this document Claim Name: zoneinfo Change Controller: OpenID Foundation Artifact Binding Working Group - openid-specs-ab@lists.openid.net Specification Document(s): of this document Claim Name: locale Change Controller: OpenID Foundation Artifact Binding Working Group - openid-specs-ab@lists.openid.net Specification Document(s): of this document Claim Name: phone_number Change Controller: OpenID Foundation Artifact Binding Working Group - openid-specs-ab@lists.openid.net Specification Document(s): of this document Claim Name: address Change Controller: OpenID Foundation Artifact Binding Working Group - openid-specs-ab@lists.openid.net Specification Document(s): of this document Claim Name: updated_time Change Controller: OpenID Foundation Artifact Binding Working Group - openid-specs-ab@lists.openid.net Specification Document(s): of this document Claim Name: azp Change Controller: OpenID Foundation Artifact Binding Working Group - openid-specs-ab@lists.openid.net Specification Document(s): of this document Claim Name: nonce Change Controller: OpenID Foundation Artifact Binding Working Group - openid-specs-ab@lists.openid.net Specification Document(s): of this document Claim Name: auth_time Change Controller: OpenID Foundation Artifact Binding Working Group - openid-specs-ab@lists.openid.net Specification Document(s): of this document Claim Name: at_hash Change Controller: OpenID Foundation Artifact Binding Working Group - openid-specs-ab@lists.openid.net Specification Document(s): of this document Claim Name: c_hash Change Controller: OpenID Foundation Artifact Binding Working Group - openid-specs-ab@lists.openid.net Specification Document(s): of this document Claim Name: acr Change Controller: OpenID Foundation Artifact Binding Working Group - openid-specs-ab@lists.openid.net Specification Document(s): of this document Claim Name: amr Change Controller: OpenID Foundation Artifact Binding Working Group - openid-specs-ab@lists.openid.net Specification Document(s): of this document Claim Name: sub_jwk Change Controller: OpenID Foundation Artifact Binding Working Group - openid-specs-ab@lists.openid.net Specification Document(s): of this document

This specification registers the following parameters in the IANA OAuth Parameters registry defined in RFC 6749.

Parameter name: nonce Parameter usage location: Authorization Request Change controller: OpenID Foundation Artifact Binding Working Group - openid-specs-ab@lists.openid.net Specification document(s): of this document Related information: None Parameter name: display Parameter usage location: Authorization Request Change controller: OpenID Foundation Artifact Binding Working Group - openid-specs-ab@lists.openid.net Specification document(s): of this document Related information: None Parameter name: prompt Parameter usage location: Authorization Request Change controller: OpenID Foundation Artifact Binding Working Group - openid-specs-ab@lists.openid.net Specification document(s): of this document Related information: None Parameter name: max_age Parameter usage location: Authorization Request Change controller: OpenID Foundation Artifact Binding Working Group - openid-specs-ab@lists.openid.net Specification document(s): of this document Related information: None Parameter name: ui_locales Parameter usage location: Authorization Request Change controller: OpenID Foundation Artifact Binding Working Group - openid-specs-ab@lists.openid.net Specification document(s): of this document Related information: None Parameter name: claims_locales Parameter usage location: Authorization Request Change controller: OpenID Foundation Artifact Binding Working Group - openid-specs-ab@lists.openid.net Specification document(s): of this document Related information: None Parameter name: id_token_hint Parameter usage location: Authorization Request Change controller: OpenID Foundation Artifact Binding Working Group - openid-specs-ab@lists.openid.net Specification document(s): of this document Related information: None Parameter name: login_hint Parameter usage location: Authorization Request Change controller: OpenID Foundation Artifact Binding Working Group - openid-specs-ab@lists.openid.net Specification document(s): of this document Related information: None Parameter name: acr_values Parameter usage location: Authorization Request Change controller: OpenID Foundation Artifact Binding Working Group - openid-specs-ab@lists.openid.net Specification document(s): of this document Related information: None Parameter name: claims Parameter usage location: Authorization Request Change controller: OpenID Foundation Artifact Binding Working Group - openid-specs-ab@lists.openid.net Specification document(s): of this document Related information: None Parameter name: registration Parameter usage location: Authorization Request Change controller: OpenID Foundation Artifact Binding Working Group - openid-specs-ab@lists.openid.net Specification document(s): of this document Related information: None Parameter name: request Parameter usage location: Authorization Request Change controller: OpenID Foundation Artifact Binding Working Group - openid-specs-ab@lists.openid.net Specification document(s): of this document Related information: None Parameter name: request_uri Parameter usage location: Authorization Request Change controller: OpenID Foundation Artifact Binding Working Group - openid-specs-ab@lists.openid.net Specification document(s): of this document Related information: None Parameter name: id_token Parameter usage location: Authorization Response, Access Token Response Change controller: OpenID Foundation Artifact Binding Working Group - openid-specs-ab@lists.openid.net Specification document(s): of this document Related information: None

This specification registers the following errors in the IANA OAuth Extensions Error registry defined in RFC 6749.

Error name: invalid_redirect_uri Error usage location: Authorization Endpoint Related protocol extension: OpenID Connect Change controller: OpenID Foundation Artifact Binding Working Group - openid-specs-ab@lists.openid.net Specification document(s): of this document Error name: interaction_required Error usage location: Authorization Endpoint Related protocol extension: OpenID Connect Change controller: OpenID Foundation Artifact Binding Working Group - openid-specs-ab@lists.openid.net Specification document(s): of this document Error name: login_required Error usage location: Authorization Endpoint Related protocol extension: OpenID Connect Change controller: OpenID Foundation Artifact Binding Working Group - openid-specs-ab@lists.openid.net Specification document(s): of this document Error name: session_selection_required Error usage location: Authorization Endpoint Related protocol extension: OpenID Connect Change controller: OpenID Foundation Artifact Binding Working Group - openid-specs-ab@lists.openid.net Specification document(s): of this document Error name: consent_required Error usage location: Authorization Endpoint Related protocol extension: OpenID Connect Change controller: OpenID Foundation Artifact Binding Working Group - openid-specs-ab@lists.openid.net Specification document(s): of this document Error name: invalid_request_uri Error usage location: Authorization Endpoint Related protocol extension: OpenID Connect Change controller: OpenID Foundation Artifact Binding Working Group - openid-specs-ab@lists.openid.net Specification document(s): of this document Error name: invalid_request_object Error usage location: Authorization Endpoint Related protocol extension: OpenID Connect Change controller: OpenID Foundation Artifact Binding Working Group - openid-specs-ab@lists.openid.net Specification document(s): of this document Error name: invalid_schema Error usage location: UserInfo Endpoint Related protocol extension: OpenID Connect Change controller: OpenID Foundation Artifact Binding Working Group - openid-specs-ab@lists.openid.net Specification document(s): of this document

markdavis@google.com

ken@unicode.org

Nomura Research Institute, Ltd. Ping Identity Microsoft Illumila Nomura Research Institute, Ltd. Ping Identity Microsoft Microsoft Ping Identity Nomura Research Institute, Ltd. Microsoft Ping Identity Nomura Research Institute, Ltd. Microsoft RTFM, Inc. Cisco Systems, Inc. Microsoft Microsoft Microsoft Ping Identity Corp. Salesforce Ping Identity Corp. Salesforce.com Microsoft Microsoft International Organization for Standardization International Organization for Standardization International Organization for Standardization International Organization for Standardization International Telecommunication Union Public Domain Google Google Facebook Nomura Research Institute, Ltd. Ping Identity Microsoft Google Salesforce Nomura Research Institute, Ltd. Ping Identity Microsoft Google Salesforce Illumila Nomura Research Institute, Ltd. Ping Identity Microsoft Google Salesforce Illumila Nomura Research Institute, Ltd. Ping Identity Microsoft Google Salesforce Illumila OpenID Foundation Six Apart, Ltd.

548 4th Street San Francisco CA 94107 USA david@sixapart.com http://www.sixapart.com/

Microsoft Corporation

One Microsoft Way, Building 40/5138 Redmond WA 98052 USA mbj@microsoft.com http://www.microsoft.com/

Independent

johnny.bufu@gmail.com

JanRain

5331 SW Macadam Ave. #375 Portland OR 97239 USA cygnus@janrain.com http://janrain.com/

Nomura Research Institute, Ltd.

Marunouchi Kitaguchi Building, 1-6-5 Marunouchi Chiyoda-ku Tokyo 100-0005 Japan n-sakimura@nri.co.jp http://www.nri.co.jp/

Cisco Systems, Inc.

mamille2@cisco.com

Ping Identity Corp.

brian.d.campbell@gmail.com

As a successor version of OpenID, this specification heavily relies on ideas explored in OpenID Authentication 2.0. Please refer to Appendix C of OpenID Authentication 2.0 for the full list of the contributors for that specification. In addition, the OpenID Community would like to thank the following people for the work they have done in the drafting and editing of this specification. Naveen Agarwal (naa@google.com), Google Amanda Anganes (aanganes@mitre.org), Mitre Casper Biering (cb@peercraft.com), Peercraft John Bradley (ve7jtb@ve7jtb.com), Ping Identity Johnny Bufu (jbufu@janrain.com), Janrain Tim Bray (tbray@textuality.com), Google Brian Campbell (bcampbell@pingidentity.com), Ping Identity Breno de Medeiros (breno@gmail.com), Google Pamela Dingle (pdingle@pingidentity.com), Ping Identity Vladimir Dzhuvinov (vladimir@nimbusds.com), NimbusDS George Fletcher (george.fletcher@corp.aol.com), AOL Roland Hedberg (roland.hedberg@adm.umu.se), Independent Ryo Ito (ryo.ito@mixi.co.jp), mixi, Inc. Edmund Jay (ejay@mgi1.com), Illumila Michael B. Jones (mbj@microsoft.com), Microsoft Torsten Lodderstedt (t.lodderstedt@telekom.de), Deutsche Telekom Nov Matake (nov@matake.jp), Independent Chuck Mortimore (cmortimore@salesforce.com), Salesforce Anthony Nadalin (tonynad@microsoft.com), Microsoft Hideki Nara (hideki.nara@gmail.com), Takt Communications Axel Nennker (axel.nennker@telekom.de), Deutsche Telekom David Recordon (dr@fb.com), Facebook Justin Richer (jricher@mitre.org), Mitre Nat Sakimura (n-sakimura@nri.co.jp), Nomura Research Institute, Ltd. Luke Shepard (lshepard@fb.com), Facebook Andreas Akre Solberg (andreas.solberg@uninett.no), UNINET Paul Tarjan (pt@fb.com), Facebook

Copyright (c) 2013 The OpenID Foundation. The OpenID Foundation (OIDF) grants to any Contributor, developer, implementer, or other interested party a non-exclusive, royalty free, worldwide copyright license to reproduce, prepare derivative works from, distribute, perform and display, this Implementers Draft or Final Specification solely for the purposes of (i) developing specifications, and (ii) implementing Implementers Drafts and Final Specifications based on such documents, provided that attribution be made to the OIDF as the source of the material, but that such attribution does not indicate an endorsement by the OIDF. The technology described in this specification was made available from contributions from various sources, including members of the OpenID Foundation and others. Although the OpenID Foundation has taken steps to help ensure that the technology is available for distribution, it takes no position regarding the validity or scope of any intellectual property or other rights that might be claimed to pertain to the implementation or use of the technology described in this specification or the extent to which any license under such rights might or might not be available; neither does it represent that it has made any independent effort to identify any such rights. The OpenID Foundation and the contributors to this specification make no (and hereby expressly disclaim any) warranties (express, implied, or otherwise), including implied warranties of merchantability, non-infringement, fitness for a particular purpose, or title, related to this specification, and the entire risk as to implementing this specification is assumed by the implementer. The OpenID Intellectual Property Rights policy requires contributors to offer a patent promise not to assert certain patent claims against other contributors and against implementers. The OpenID Foundation invites any interested party to bring to its attention any copyrights, patents, patent applications, or other proprietary rights that may cover technology that may be required to practice this specification.

[[ To be removed from the final specification ]] -16 Fixed #709 - OpenID Request Object - "registration" in non-Self-Issued case. Fixed #711 - Awkward phrase "The following Claims are REQUIRED and OPTIONAL". Fixed #712 - "azp" definition clarification. Fixed #713 - Explicitly require "sub" claim to be returned from UserInfo endpoint. Fixed #715 - Delete "profile" from request object example. Fixed #729 - ITU-T X.1254 | ISO/IEC 29115 now separate. Fixed #722 - Text on "id_token_hint" needs to be clarified. Fixed #718 - Text on re-encrypting should be clearer. Fixed #738 - Behavior when "openid" scope is omitted. Fixed #714 - Clarified text specifying response_type behaviors, including prohibiting the use of the "token" response_type, since it returns no ID Token. Added statement "whenever TLS is used, a TLS server certificate check MUST be performed, per RFC 6125" to TLS Requirements section in Security Considerations. State that when any validations fail, any operations requiring the information that failed to correctly validate MUST be aborted and the information that failed to validate MUST NOT be used. Fixed #742 - Added new ui_locales parameter. Fixed #743 - Promoted preferred_locales to being a top-level parameter. Also renamed it to claims_locales to disambiguate it from the new ui_locales parameter. Fixed #744 - Promoted max_age to being a top-level parameter. Fixed #748 - Promoted claims to being a top-level parameter separate from the OpenID Request Object. Fixed #765 - Created acr_values top-level request parameter and changed default_acr registration parameter to default_acr_values. Fixed #761 - client_secret as the HMAC key and #762 - client_secret to key. We now use the phrase "the bytes of the UTF-8 representation of the client_secret value". Also added security considerations about symmetric key entropy. Fixed #597 - Changed representation of omitted year in birthdate from 9999 to 0000. Fixed #769 - Added Claim Type identifiers and definition. Fixed #773 - Added request_uris registration parameter to pre-register request_uri values. Also clarified that the referenced resource contents may be cached. Fixed #748 - Changed OpenID Request Object processing rules so that the Request Object parameters are combined with those passed as OAuth 2.0 parameters, with the Request Object parameters taking precedence. This enables fixed parameters to be passed in pre-signed, possibly pre-encrypted, and cached Request Objects, with parameters that will vary per request like state and nonce being passed as OAuth 2.0 parameters. This is particularly important now that request_uri values can be pre-registered. Fixed #765 - Added Security Considerations about the need for signed and encrypted requests. Fixed #763 - OPs MUST treat the inability to return an Essential requested acr Claim value as a failed authentication attempt. Fixed #739 - Added values for Self-Issued registration. Fixed #779 - Parameters missing from IANA Considerations. Fixed #760 - Added rationale for request_uri usage. Fixed #782 - Changed uses of "_url" in identifiers to "_uri". Fixed #703 - Added the PKIX JWK key type (and example) for X.509 certificates and consolidated the x509_uri, x509_encryption_uri, and jwk_encryption_uri parameters into a combined jwk_uri parameter. Also Fixed #704 - Provided suggested guidance about how to do key rotation of asymmetric keys for both signing and encryption using jwk_uri. Made UserInfo Endpoint MTI to support for all OPs that issue Access Tokens. Fixed #719 - Moved message definitions for Self-Issued OPs to the Messages spec. Fixed #671 - Specified that an Access Token must be requested when Claims are requested from the UserInfo endpoint. Fixed #717 - Parameters and values should be distinguished more clearly. Fixed #786 - Changed the name of jwk_uri to jwks_uri. Clarified when the http scheme can and can not be used in redirect_uri values. Fixed #748 - Defined MTI features for OPs. Also added request_not_supported error code. Fixed #784 - Required publication of public keys as bare keys. Fixed #785 - Enabled scope values to be used to request Claims when using the response_type value id_token (for which no Access Token is issued). Fixed #787 - Don't prohibit returning an ID Token from the Token Endpoint when grant types other than authorization_code are used. Fixed #710 - Gave an example of how requesting Claims with scope values is equivalent to requesting them with the claims request parameter. Stated that the azp Claim is only needed when the party requesting the ID Token is different than the audience of the ID Token. Fixed #788 - Renamed "OpenID Request Object" to "Request Object". Use legal acr values in examples. Fixed #789 - Added amr (authentication methods references) Claim. Fixed #790 - Removed "MUST understand" text about request parameters, since OAuth requires that unrecognized parameters MUST be ignored. Added requirements for ID Tokens returned as a result of a token refresh request. -15 Fixed #671 - Section 2.1.1 added test to require client to request an access token for the UserInfo Endpoint if requesting the default scopes. Fixed #637 - Removed requirement for hash of at_token and code to be SHA2 in Section 2.1.2.1 and Section 5.2. Fixes #620 - Update Section 2.1.2 and Section 2.2.3 to allow for other token types, but make bearer mandatory to support for clients. Fixes #684 Removed error response in redirect to client if the redirect_uri is wrong to align with OAuth. Fixed #695 - Contradictory OPTIONAL MUSTs in JWT Client Authentication. Fixed #600 - Register Connect Claims in JWT Claims Registry. Made the OpenID Foundation Artifact Binding Working Group the change controller for the values registered with IANA. Moved OAuth error registrations from Standard to Messages since the errors are defined in Messages and not in Standard. Use "OpenID Connect" as the "Related protocol extension" value in OAuth Extensions Error registry entries. Fixed #657 - Section 2.1.1 Specify the sub is used as the kid if the request object or id_token_hint is encrypted. Added Implementation Considerations section on Mandatory to Implement (MTI) features, per issue #604. Specified that dynamic OPs must publish their public keys in X.509 format, per issue #633. Fixed #648 - Specific response types now used in place of "implicit flow" and "code flow". The wording for at_hash and c_hash is now clearer. Fixed #698 - Inconsistent use of articles. Fixed #699 - OpenID Provider (OP) definition repetitive. Fixed #701 - Mention of SWD without a reference. Fixed #700 - Incomplete specification names. Fixed #702 - Make scopes a reference to the scopes section. Fixed #702 - Consent is for claims - not scopes. Fixed up Scopes section to make it clear that claims requested by the scopes are voluntary. OAuth Threat Model is now RFC 6819. Renamed the user_jwk Claim to sub_jwk, paralleling the change from user_id to sub. Defined and registered the sub_jwk claim. -14 Fixed #687 - Inconsistency between user_id and prn claims. The fix changed these names: user_id -> sub, user_id_types_supported -> subject_types_supported, user_id_type -> subject_type, and prn -> sub. Fixed #689 - Track JWT change that allows JWTs to have multiple audiences. Fixed #660 - Clarified that returning the sub value from the UserInfo endpoint is mandatory. Fixed #636 - ID Token authorized party claim. Fixed #539 - Add scope for offline access. Fixed #690 - Inconsistent language in requirement of id_token response_type. Clarified that jwk_uri and jwk_encryption_uri refer to documents containing JWK Sets - not single JWK keys. Fixed #689 - Add caution about multiple audiences and azp. Fixed #692 typos. -13 Fixed #588 - Messages: Token lifetime not privacy consideration Fixed #597 - Messages: Changed claim name birthday to birthdate and made the format ISO 8601:2004 Fixed #606 - Messages - 2.1.1. ID Token - acr missing the type. Type String. Fixed #617 - Messages - 1.2 Terminology: id_token. Added sentence that it can contain other claims. Fixed #608 - Messages - Request ID Token and Response ID Token. Moved response ID Token from section 2.1 to the response section. Fixed #543 - Messages - Security Consideration. Added ref to X.1254 | ISO 29115. Fixed #611 - Messages - Changed the default test to indicate that the value of auth_time needs to be essential Fixed #646 - Messages - Add login_hint as an OAuth parameter and put in example in request object Fixed #607 - Messages - add example decoded id_token. Fixed #658 - Messages - 2.1.1 "id_token" name crash, id_token renamed to id_token_hint Fixed #612 - Messages - 4.1 change request_object_algs_supported to be RS256 Fixed #662 - Messages - changed id_token_signed_response_algs to id_token_signed_response_alg in 5.1 Fixed #678 - Messages - Changed 5.1.3 terminology of acr to reflect essential vs. required and fixed example Fixed #679 - Messages - update reference to LoA registry from ID to RFC6711. Fixed #614 - Discovery - 3.2 Distinguishing between signature and integrity parameters for HMAC algorithms. This fix tracks the parameter changes made to the JWE spec in draft-ietf-jose-json-web-encryption-06. It deletes the parameters {userinfo,id_token}_encrypted_response_int. It replaces the parameters {userinfo,id_token,request_object,token_endpoint}_algs_supported with {userinfo,id_token,request_object,token_endpoint}_signing_alg_values_supported and {userinfo,id_token,request_object,token_endpoint}_encryption_{alg,enc}_values_supported. Fixed #673 - Registration 2.1: Rename require_signed_request_object to request_object_alg. The actual change was to rename require_signed_request_object to request_object_signing_alg, following the naming convention used in the resolution to issue #614. Fixed #666 - JWS signature validation vs. verification. Referenced OAuth 2.0 RFCs -- RFC 6749 and RFC 6750. Fixed #663 Sec 5.2 to allow for non SHA2 HMAC algs -12 Added preferred_username claim under profile scope Added section on claim stability Changed request_uri to request_uri in Section 2.1.2.1 -11 Removed claims_in_id_token scope value, per decision on June 15, 2012 special working group call -10 Changed verified to email_verified, per issue #564 Added scope value claims_in_id_token as a switch to indicate that the UserInfo claims should be returned in the ID Token, per issue #561 Removed optional claim request parameter and added essential claim request parameter, per issue #577. We changed terminology from "optional" to "voluntary" and "required" to "essential" to better match privacy policy requirements. Removed Check ID Endpoint, per issue #570 Added PAPE Reference to the Informative References, per issue #574 Added "id_token" response type as being MTI for OpenID Providers Specified that parameters present in both the OpenID Request Object and the OAuth 2.0 Authorization Request MUST exactly match, per issue #575 Changed OpenID Request Object from being specified as a JWT to being specified as a JWS signed base64url encoded JSON object, per issue #592 Changed default ID Token signing algorithm to RS256, per issue #571 Changed default OpenID Request Object signing algorithm to RS256, per issue #571 Made use of the nonce REQUIRED when using the implicit flow and OPTIONAL when using the code flow, per issue #569 Changed client.example.com to client.example.org, per issue #251 Listed author of ISO29115 as "International Telecommunication Union and International Organization for Standardization", per issue #589 Added method of calculating signing and encryption keys for symmetric algorithms, per issue #578 Use standards track versions of JSON Web Token (JWT) and OAuth JWT Bearer Token Profiles specs (draft-ietf-oauth-json-web-token and draft-ietf-oauth-oauth-jwt-bearer) -09 Added error interaction_required and removed user_mismatched, per issue #523 Changed invalid_request_redirect_uri to invalid_redirect_uri, per issue #553 Removed "embedded" display type, since its semantics were not well defined, per issue #514 Added optional id_token to authorization request parameters, per issue #535 Now requested claims add to those requested with scope values, rather than replacing them, per issue #547 Make changes to allow path in the issuer_identifier, per issue #513 Make changes to userinfo_encrypted_response_* and id_token_encrypted_response_* to match registration Add hash and hash check of access_token and code to id_token, per issue #510 Updated Notices Updated References -08 Updated the version number and date Fixed #551 Sec 2.1.2.1 to clarify the OpenID Request Object MUST NOT include "request" nor "request_uri" Fixed #540 Sec 2.2.3 id_token MUST NOT be returned for grant_type=refresh Fixed #542 Sec 2.1.2.1 required fields for request object to match Standard Fixed Sec 2.2.1 to refer to client_secret value rather than Client Password Fixed Sec 4.2, 4.3, 4.4 to replace requirement for using x.509 keyuse extension Added reference to RFC2459 Fixed Sec 2.1.1.1.1 added rationale for sector_identifier_url from registration Fixed Sec 2.1.1.1.1 added examples of other ways to generate PPID Added iat as a required claim in ID Tokens Enumerated claims requested by the "profile" scope value Fixed Sec 2.1.2 response_type references standard rather than repeating values that are binding specific Fixed Sec 2.1.2 remove outdated language about openid scope requiring id_token to be returned with token response_type -07 Removed definition and usage for assertion and claim object Consistent use of End-User Removed 'format' from userinfo and id_token object of the OpenID Request Object email scope allows access to the 'verified' claim ID Token 'audience' claim MUST be client_id Rename artifact to authorization code Removed language pertaining to custom userinfo schemas Check ID Endpoint returns only JSON Updated Check ID Response verification Remove 'audience' parameter from Authorization Request Moved display=none to prompt=none Added additional display parameter options Moved IANA considerations to Standard Added error codes to Authorization Endpoint Added client authentication section regarding various supported client authentication schemes and their validation. This includes symmetric and asymmetric authentication, JWT Bearer Token Profiles, OAuth 2.0 Assertion Profile Updated Check ID Response verification Added 'auth_time' to ID Token Added validation for request object encryption and signature Added explanation for user_id type and calculating pairwise identifiers Added steps for signature and validation and encryption and decryption Added verification of issuer identifier Redefined 'nonce' in Authorization Request. Changed to REQUIRED parameter. Changed usage of the word "approval" to "consent" Use RFC 6125 to verify TLS endpoints ID Token MUST be JWT Access Tokens should include an audience claim for the Resource Server Updated Security Considerations OpenID Request Object parameters takes precedence over the same parameters in the Authorization Request Allow other gender strings in UserInfo schema Changed UserInfo claim 'locale' to 'preferred_locales' and changed it to be a list of values Changed UserInfo claim 'user_id' to REQUIRED. Added requirement to compare user_id from userinfo endpoint to id_token RECOMMENDED E.164 format for UserInfo 'phone_number' claim Changed UserInfo Error Response to augment and return OAuth 2.0 Bearer Token Error Response Expanded section regarding UserInfo 'address' claim Added Privacy considerations Added rational for signing then encrypting added to security considerations Added section about string comparison rules needed The Authorization Server MUST understand all the request parameters except for any unsupported claims. Make openid scope provide user_id from userinfo endpoint Added explanation of select_account Check ID Endpoint uses ID Token as Access Token according to Bearer Token spec Clients MUST verify client_id in ID Token Bumped version + date Update John Bradley email and affiliation for Implementer's Draft Removed invalid_authorization_code, invalid_id_token error codes Section 2.3 client MUST NOT send encrypted JWT to the Check ID Endpoint Section 2.1.2.1.2 Added user_id claim and moved iso29115 to claims element of id_token member Defined Authentication Context, Authentication Context Class Reference (acr), replaced iso29115 with acr. Corrected instances of x509_url_encryption to x509_encryption_url and jwk_url_encryption to jwk_encryption_url -06 Changed section 3.1.4.1 to say the errors are returned as defined by the response type not always as query parameters. per ticket #174. Bumped version + date. Fixed section 3.3.3 to refer to errors in Bearer Token. Fixed 3.1.3 to ref the other response types ticket #173. Included reference to multiple response types. Fixed 3.1.2.1 to indicate default Claims in id_token. Fixed section 3.2.2 to reference the access token response from the token endpoint 4.1.4. Fixed section 3.2.1 to include refresh tokens. Fixed section 3.1.1 to be clear on JWT being the token format per ticket #171. -05 Changed check_session to check_id. schema=openid now required when requesting UserInfo. Removed issued_to, since not well defined. Removed display values popup, touch, and mobile, since not well defined. -04 Changes associated with renaming "Lite" to "Basic Client" and replacing "Core" and "Framework" with "Messages" and "Standard". Numerous cleanups, including updating references. -03 Added secret_type to the Token endpoint. Minor edits to the samples. -02 Incorporates feedback from Nat Sakimura. -01 First Draft that incorporates the merge of the Core and Framework specs.