NAT.Consulting

nat@nat.consulting https://nat.sakimura.org/

Yubico

ve7jtb@ve7jtb.com http://www.thread-safe.com/

Self-Issued Consulting

michael_b_jones@hotmail.com https://self-issued.info/

Illumila

ejay@mgi1.com

OpenID Connect Working Group OpenID Connect 1.0 is a simple identity layer on top of the OAuth 2.0 protocol. It enables Clients to verify the identity of the End-User based on the authentication performed by an Authorization Server, as well as to obtain basic profile information about the End-User in an interoperable and REST-like manner. This specification defines a mechanism for an OpenID Connect Relying Party to discover the End-User's OpenID Provider and obtain information needed to interact with it, including its OAuth 2.0 endpoint locations.

OpenID Connect 1.0 is a simple identity layer on top of the OAuth 2.0 protocol. It enables Clients to verify the identity of the End-User based on the authentication performed by an Authorization Server, as well as to obtain basic profile information about the End-User in an interoperable and REST-like manner. In order for an OpenID Connect Relying Party to utilize OpenID Connect services for an End-User, the RP needs to know where the OpenID Provider is. OpenID Connect uses WebFinger to locate the OpenID Provider for an End-User. This process is described in . Once the OpenID Provider has been identified, the configuration information for that OP is retrieved from a well-known location as a JSON document, including its OAuth 2.0 endpoint locations. This process is described in . The previous versions of this specification are: OpenID Connect Discovery 1.0 incorporating errata set 1 OpenID Connect Discovery 1.0 (final)

The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT", "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "NOT RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in RFC 2119. In the .txt version of this specification, values are quoted to indicate that they are to be taken literally. When using these values in protocol messages, the quotes MUST NOT be used as part of the value. In the HTML version of this specification, values to be taken literally are indicated by the use of this fixed-width font. All uses of JSON Web Signature (JWS) and JSON Web Encryption (JWE) data structures in this specification utilize the JWS Compact Serialization or the JWE Compact Serialization; the JWS JSON Serialization and the JWE JSON Serialization are not used.

This specification uses the terms "Access Token", "Authorization Code", "Authorization Endpoint", "Authorization Grant", "Authorization Server", "Client", "Client Authentication", "Client Identifier", "Client Secret", "Grant Type", "Protected Resource", "Redirection URI", "Refresh Token", "Resource Owner", "Resource Server", "Response Type", and "Token Endpoint" defined by OAuth 2.0, the terms "Claim Name", "Claim Value", and "JSON Web Token (JWT)" defined by JSON Web Token (JWT), and the terms defined by OpenID Connect Core 1.0 and OAuth 2.0 Multiple Response Type Encoding Practices. This specification also defines the following terms: Entity that is the target of a request in WebFinger. Server where a WebFinger service is hosted. Value that uniquely characterizes an Entity in a specific context. NOTE: This specification defines various kinds of Identifiers, designed for use in different contexts. Examples include URLs using the https scheme and e-mail addresses. IMPORTANT NOTE TO READERS: The terminology definitions in this section are a normative portion of this specification, imposing requirements upon implementations. All the capitalized words in the text of this specification, such as "Identifier", reference these defined terms. Whenever the reader encounters them, their definitions found in this section must be followed.

OpenID Provider Issuer discovery is the process of determining the location of the OpenID Provider. Issuer discovery is OPTIONAL; if a Relying Party knows the OP's Issuer location through an out-of-band mechanism, it can skip this step and proceed to . The following information is needed to perform issuer discovery using WebFinger: Identifier for the target End-User that is the subject of the discovery request. Server where a WebFinger service is hosted. URI identifying the type of service whose location is being requested. OpenID Connect uses the following discoverable rel value in WebFinger: Rel Type URI OpenID Connect Issuer http://openid.net/specs/connect/1.0/issuer To start discovery of OpenID endpoints, the End-User supplies an Identifier to the Relying Party. Any Web input form MUST employ Cross-Site Request Forgery (CSRF) prevention . The RP applies normalization rules to the Identifier to determine the Resource and Host. Then it makes an HTTP GET request to the Host's WebFinger endpoint with the resource parameter to obtain the location of the requested service. Use of the rel parameter in the request with a value of http://openid.net/specs/connect/1.0/issuer is also RECOMMENDED to narrow the response to the specific link relation type needed. All WebFinger communication MUST utilize TLS in the manner described in . The WebFinger endpoint SHOULD support the use of Cross-Origin Resource Sharing (CORS) and/or other methods as appropriate to enable JavaScript Clients and other Browser-Based Clients to access it. The Issuer location MUST be returned in the WebFinger response as the value of the href member of a links array element with rel member value http://openid.net/specs/connect/1.0/issuer. (Per Section 7 of WebFinger, obtaining the WebFinger response may first involve following some redirects.) The returned Issuer location MUST be a URI RFC 3986 with a scheme component that MUST be https, a host component, and optionally, port and path components and no query or fragment components. Note that since the Host and Resource values determined from the user input Identifier, as described in , are used as input to a WebFinger request, which can return an Issuer value using a completely different scheme, host, port, and path, no relationship can be assumed between the user input Identifier string and the resulting Issuer location.

The purpose of Identifier normalization is to determine normalized Resource and Host values from the user input Identifier. These are then used as WebFinger request parameters to discover the Issuer location. The user input Identifier SHOULD be a URL or URI relative reference defined in RFC 3986. The user input Identifier MUST include the authority component. NOTE: A URI relative reference includes a string that looks like an e-mail address in the form of userinfo@host. This is a valid authority component of a URI but excludes various possible extra strings allowed in addr-spec syntax of RFC 5322. The Identifier normalization rules MAY be extended by additional specifications to enable other identifier types such as telephone numbers or XRIs to also be used.

A user input Identifier can be categorized into the following types, which require different normalization processes: User input Identifiers starting with the XRI global context symbols ('=','@', and '!') are RESERVED. Processing of these identifiers is out of scope for this specification. All other user input Identifiers MUST be treated as a URI in one of the forms scheme "://" authority path-abempty [ "?" query ] [ "#" fragment ] or authority path-abempty [ "?" query ] [ "#" fragment ] or scheme ":" path-rootless, per RFC 3986. NOTE: The user input Identifier MAY be in the form of userinfo@host. For the End-User, this would normally be perceived as being an e-mail address. However, it is also a valid userpart "@" host section of an acct URI , and this specification treats it such as to exclude various extra strings allowed in addr-spec of RFC 5322.

A string of any other type is interpreted as a URI in one of the forms scheme "://" authority path-abempty [ "?" query ] [ "#" fragment ] or authority path-abempty [ "?" query ] [ "#" fragment ] or scheme ":" path-rootless per RFC 3986 and is normalized according to the following rules: If the user input Identifier does not have an RFC 3986 scheme component, the string is interpreted as [userinfo "@"] host [":" port] path-abempty [ "?" query ] [ "#" fragment ] per RFC 3986. Examples are example.com, joe@example.com, example.com/joe, and example.com:8080. If the userinfo and host components are present and all of the scheme, path, query, port, and fragment components are absent, the acct scheme is assumed. In this case, the normalized URI is formed by prefixing acct: to the string as the scheme. Per The 'acct' URI Scheme, if there is an at-sign character ('@') in the userinfo component, it needs to be percent-encoded, as described in RFC 3986. Examples are joe@example.com and Jane.Doe@example.com. For all other inputs without a scheme component, the https scheme is assumed, and the normalized URI is formed by prefixing https:// to the string as the scheme. Examples are example.com, example.com/joe, example.com:8080, and joe@example.com:8080. When the input contains an explicit scheme such as acct or https that matches the RFC 3986 scheme ":" path-rootless syntax, no input normalization is performed. Examples are https://example.com, https://example.com/joe, https://joe@example.com:8080, and acct:joe@example.com. If the resulting URI contains a fragment component, it MUST be stripped off, together with the fragment delimiter character "#". The WebFinger Resource in this case is the resulting URI, and the WebFinger Host is the authority component. NOTE: Since the definition of authority in RFC 3986 is [ userinfo "@" ] host [ ":" port ], it is legal to have a user input identifier like userinfo@host:port, e.g., alice@example.com:8080.

To find the Issuer for the given user input in the form of an e-mail address joe@example.com, the WebFinger parameters are as follows: WebFinger Parameter Value resource acct:joe@example.com host example.com rel http://openid.net/specs/connect/1.0/issuer Note that in this case, the acct: scheme is prepended to the Identifier.

The RP would make the following WebFinger request to discover the Issuer location (with line wraps within lines for display purposes only):

To find the Issuer for the given URL, https://example.com/joe, the WebFinger parameters are as follows: WebFinger Parameter Value resource https://example.com/joe host example.com rel http://openid.net/specs/connect/1.0/issuer

The RP would make the following WebFinger request to discover the Issuer location (with line wraps within lines for display purposes only):

If the user input is in the form of host:port, e.g., example.com:8080, then it is assumed as the authority component of the URL. To find the Issuer for the given hostname, example.com:8080, the WebFinger parameters are as follows: WebFinger Parameter Value resource https://example.com:8080/ host example.com:8080 rel http://openid.net/specs/connect/1.0/issuer

The RP would make the following WebFinger request to discover the Issuer location (with line wraps within lines for display purposes only):

To find the Issuer for the given user input in the form of an account URI acct:juliet%40capulet.example@shopping.example.com, the WebFinger parameters are as follows: WebFinger Parameter Value resource acct:juliet%40capulet.example@shopping.example.com host shopping.example.com rel http://openid.net/specs/connect/1.0/issuer

The RP would make the following WebFinger request to discover the Issuer location (with line wraps within lines for display purposes only):

NOTE: It is common for sites to use e-mail addresses as local identifiers for accounts at those sites, even though the domain in the e-mail address is not one controlled by the site. For instance, the site example.org might have a local account named joe@example.com. This specification uses acct: URIs as defined by to represent such accounts during WebFinger discovery. Such an example is acct:joe%40example.com@example.org. End-Users MAY input values like joe@example.com@example.org to initiate discovery on such accounts.

OpenID Providers have metadata describing their configuration. These OpenID Provider Metadata values are used by OpenID Connect: REQUIRED. URL using the https scheme with no query or fragment components that the OP asserts as its Issuer Identifier. If Issuer discovery is supported (see ), this value MUST be identical to the issuer value returned by WebFinger. This also MUST be identical to the iss Claim value in ID Tokens issued from this Issuer. REQUIRED. URL of the OP's OAuth 2.0 Authorization Endpoint . This URL MUST use the https scheme and MAY contain port, path, and query parameter components. URL of the OP's OAuth 2.0 Token Endpoint . This is REQUIRED unless only the Implicit Flow is used. This URL MUST use the https scheme and MAY contain port, path, and query parameter components. RECOMMENDED. URL of the OP's UserInfo Endpoint . This URL MUST use the https scheme and MAY contain port, path, and query parameter components. REQUIRED. URL of the OP's JWK Set document, which MUST use the https scheme. This contains the signing key(s) the RP uses to validate signatures from the OP. The JWK Set MAY also contain the Server's encryption key(s), which are used by RPs to encrypt requests to the Server. When both signing and encryption keys are made available, a use (public key use) parameter value is REQUIRED for all keys in the referenced JWK Set to indicate each key's intended usage. Although some algorithms allow the same key to be used for both signatures and encryption, doing so is NOT RECOMMENDED, as it is less secure. The JWK x5c parameter MAY be used to provide X.509 representations of keys provided. When used, the bare key values MUST still be present and MUST match those in the certificate. The JWK Set MUST NOT contain private or symmetric key values. RECOMMENDED. URL of the OP's Dynamic Client Registration Endpoint , which MUST use the https scheme. RECOMMENDED. JSON array containing a list of the OAuth 2.0 scope values that this server supports. The server MUST support the openid scope value. Servers MAY choose not to advertise some supported scope values even when this parameter is used, although those defined in SHOULD be listed, if supported. REQUIRED. JSON array containing a list of the OAuth 2.0 response_type values that this OP supports. Dynamic OpenID Providers MUST support the code, id_token, and the id_token token Response Type values. OPTIONAL. JSON array containing a list of the OAuth 2.0 response_mode values that this OP supports, as specified in OAuth 2.0 Multiple Response Type Encoding Practices. If omitted, the default for Dynamic OpenID Providers is ["query", "fragment"]. OPTIONAL. JSON array containing a list of the OAuth 2.0 Grant Type values that this OP supports. Dynamic OpenID Providers MUST support the authorization_code and implicit Grant Type values and MAY support other Grant Types. If omitted, the default value is ["authorization_code", "implicit"]. OPTIONAL. JSON array containing a list of the Authentication Context Class References that this OP supports. REQUIRED. JSON array containing a list of the Subject Identifier types that this OP supports. Valid types include pairwise and public. REQUIRED. JSON array containing a list of the JWS signing algorithms (alg values) supported by the OP for the ID Token to encode the Claims in a JWT . The algorithm RS256 MUST be included. The value none MAY be supported, but MUST NOT be used unless the Response Type used returns no ID Token from the Authorization Endpoint (such as when using the Authorization Code Flow). OPTIONAL. JSON array containing a list of the JWE encryption algorithms (alg values) supported by the OP for the ID Token to encode the Claims in a JWT . OPTIONAL. JSON array containing a list of the JWE encryption algorithms (enc values) supported by the OP for the ID Token to encode the Claims in a JWT . OPTIONAL. JSON array containing a list of the JWS signing algorithms (alg values) supported by the UserInfo Endpoint to encode the Claims in a JWT . The value none MAY be included. OPTIONAL. JSON array containing a list of the JWE encryption algorithms (alg values) supported by the UserInfo Endpoint to encode the Claims in a JWT . OPTIONAL. JSON array containing a list of the JWE encryption algorithms (enc values) supported by the UserInfo Endpoint to encode the Claims in a JWT . OPTIONAL. JSON array containing a list of the JWS signing algorithms (alg values) supported by the OP for Request Objects, which are described in Section 6.1 of OpenID Connect Core 1.0. These algorithms are used both when the Request Object is passed by value (using the request parameter) and when it is passed by reference (using the request_uri parameter). Servers SHOULD support none and RS256. OPTIONAL. JSON array containing a list of the JWE encryption algorithms (alg values) supported by the OP for Request Objects. These algorithms are used both when the Request Object is passed by value and when it is passed by reference. OPTIONAL. JSON array containing a list of the JWE encryption algorithms (enc values) supported by the OP for Request Objects. These algorithms are used both when the Request Object is passed by value and when it is passed by reference. OPTIONAL. JSON array containing a list of Client Authentication methods supported by this Token Endpoint. The options are client_secret_post, client_secret_basic, client_secret_jwt, and private_key_jwt, as described in Section 9 of OpenID Connect Core 1.0. Other authentication methods MAY be defined by extensions. If omitted, the default is client_secret_basic -- the HTTP Basic Authentication Scheme specified in Section 2.3.1 of OAuth 2.0. OPTIONAL. JSON array containing a list of the JWS signing algorithms (alg values) supported by the Token Endpoint for the signature on the JWT used to authenticate the Client at the Token Endpoint for the private_key_jwt and client_secret_jwt authentication methods. Servers SHOULD support RS256. The value none MUST NOT be used. OPTIONAL. JSON array containing a list of the display parameter values that the OpenID Provider supports. These values are described in Section 3.1.2.1 of OpenID Connect Core 1.0. OPTIONAL. JSON array containing a list of the Claim Types that the OpenID Provider supports. These Claim Types are described in Section 5.6 of OpenID Connect Core 1.0. Values defined by this specification are normal, aggregated, and distributed. If omitted, the implementation supports only normal Claims. RECOMMENDED. JSON array containing a list of the Claim Names of the Claims that the OpenID Provider MAY be able to supply values for. Note that for privacy or other reasons, this might not be an exhaustive list. OPTIONAL. URL of a page containing human-readable information that developers might want or need to know when using the OpenID Provider. In particular, if the OpenID Provider does not support Dynamic Client Registration, then information on how to register Clients needs to be provided in this documentation. OPTIONAL. Languages and scripts supported for values in Claims being returned, represented as a JSON array of BCP47 language tag values. Not all languages and scripts are necessarily supported for all Claim values. OPTIONAL. Languages and scripts supported for the user interface, represented as a JSON array of BCP47 language tag values. OPTIONAL. Boolean value specifying whether the OP supports use of the claims parameter, with true indicating support. If omitted, the default value is false. OPTIONAL. Boolean value specifying whether the OP supports use of the request parameter, with true indicating support. If omitted, the default value is false. OPTIONAL. Boolean value specifying whether the OP supports use of the request_uri parameter, with true indicating support. If omitted, the default value is true. OPTIONAL. Boolean value specifying whether the OP requires any request_uri values used to be pre-registered using the request_uris registration parameter. Pre-registration is REQUIRED when the value is true. If omitted, the default value is false. OPTIONAL. URL that the OpenID Provider provides to the person registering the Client to read about the OP's requirements on how the Relying Party can use the data provided by the OP. The registration process SHOULD display this URL to the person registering the Client if it is given. OPTIONAL. URL that the OpenID Provider provides to the person registering the Client to read about the OpenID Provider's terms of service. The registration process SHOULD display this URL to the person registering the Client if it is given. The Token Endpoint, UserInfo Endpoint, jwks_uri endpoint, Dynamic Client Registration Endpoint, and any other endpoints directly accessed by Clients SHOULD support the use of Cross-Origin Resource Sharing (CORS) and/or other methods as appropriate to enable JavaScript Clients and other Browser-Based Clients to access them. The use of CORS at the Authorization Endpoint is NOT RECOMMENDED as it is redirected to by the client and not directly accessed. Additional OpenID Provider Metadata parameters MAY also be used. Some are defined by other specifications, such as OpenID Connect Session Management 1.0.

Using the Issuer location discovered as described in or by other means, the OpenID Provider's configuration information can be retrieved. OpenID Providers supporting Discovery MUST make a JSON document available at the path formed by concatenating the string /.well-known/openid-configuration to the Issuer. The syntax and semantics of .well-known are defined in RFC 5785 and apply to the Issuer value when it contains no path component. openid-configuration MUST point to a JSON document compliant with this specification and MUST be returned using the application/json content type. The openid-configuration endpoint SHOULD support the use of Cross-Origin Resource Sharing (CORS) and/or other methods as appropriate to enable JavaScript Clients and other Browser-Based Clients to access it.

An OpenID Provider's configuration information MUST be retrieved using an HTTP GET request at the previously specified path. The RP would make the following request to the Issuer https://example.com to obtain its Configuration information, since the Issuer contains no path component:

If the Issuer value contains a path component, any terminating / MUST be removed before appending /.well-known/openid-configuration. The RP would make the following request to the Issuer https://example.com/issuer1 to obtain its configuration information, since the Issuer contains a path component:

Using path components enables supporting multiple issuers per host. This is required in some multi-tenant hosting configurations. This use of .well-known is for supporting multiple issuers per host; unlike its use in RFC 5785, it does not provide general information about the host.

The response is a set of Claims about the OpenID Provider's configuration, including all necessary endpoints and public key location information. A successful response MUST use the 200 OK HTTP status code and return a JSON object using the application/json content type that contains a set of Claims as its members that are a subset of the Metadata values defined in . Other Claims MAY also be returned. Claims that return multiple values are represented as JSON arrays. Claims with zero elements MUST be omitted from the response. An error response uses the applicable HTTP status code value.

The following is a non-normative example response:

If any of the validation procedures defined in this specification fail, any operations requiring the information that failed to correctly validate MUST be aborted and the information that failed to validate MUST NOT be used. The issuer value returned MUST be identical to the Issuer URL that was used as the prefix to /.well-known/openid-configuration to retrieve the configuration information. This MUST also be identical to the iss Claim value in ID Tokens issued from this Issuer.

Processing some OpenID Connect messages requires comparing values in the messages to known values. For example, the member names in the provider configuration response might be compared to specific member names such as issuer. Comparing Unicode strings, however, has significant security implications. Therefore, comparisons between JSON strings and other Unicode strings MUST be performed as specified below: Remove any JSON applied escaping to produce an array of Unicode code points. Unicode Normalization MUST NOT be applied at any point to either the JSON string or to the string it is to be compared against. Comparisons between the two strings MUST be performed as a Unicode code point to code point equality comparison.

This specification defines features used by both Relying Parties and OpenID Providers that choose to implement Discovery. All of these Relying Parties and OpenID Providers MUST implement the features that are listed in this specification as being "REQUIRED" or are described with a "MUST". No other implementation considerations for implementations of Discovery are defined by this specification.

NOTE: Potential compatibility issues that were previously described in the original version of this specification have since been addressed.

Implementations MUST support TLS. Which version(s) ought to be implemented will vary over time, and depend on the widespread deployment and known security vulnerabilities at the time of implementation. Implementations SHOULD follow the guidance in BCP 195 , which provides recommendations and requirements for improving the security of deployed services that use TLS. To protect against information disclosure and tampering, confidentiality protection MUST be applied using TLS with a ciphersuite that provides confidentiality and integrity protection. Whenever TLS is used, a TLS server certificate check MUST be performed, per RFC 6125.

TLS certificate checking MUST be performed by the RP, as described in , when making an OpenID Provider Configuration Request. Checking that the server certificate is valid for the Issuer URL prevents man-in-middle and DNS-based attacks. These attacks could cause an RP to be tricked into using an attacker's keys and endpoints, which would enable impersonation of the legitimate Issuer. If an attacker can accomplish this, they can access the accounts of any existing users at the affected RP that can be logged into using the OP that they are impersonating. An attacker may also attempt to impersonate an OpenID Provider by publishing a Discovery document that contains an issuer Claim using the Issuer URL of the OP being impersonated, but with its own endpoints and signing keys. This would enable it to issue ID Tokens as that OP, if accepted by the RP. To prevent this, RPs MUST ensure that the Issuer URL they are using for the Configuration Request exactly matches the value of the issuer Claim in the OP Metadata document received by the RP and that this also exactly matches the iss Claim value in ID Tokens that are supposed to be from that Issuer.

This specification registers the well-known URI defined in in the IANA "Well-Known URIs" registry established by RFC 5785.

URI suffix: openid-configuration Change controller: OpenID Foundation Artifact Binding Working Group - openid-specs-ab@lists.openid.net Specification document: of this specification Related information: (none)

This specification registers the following metadata names in the IANA "OAuth Authorization Server Metadata" registry established by .

Metadata Name: userinfo_endpoint Metadata Description: URL of the OP's UserInfo Endpoint Change Controller: OpenID Foundation Artifact Binding Working Group - openid-specs-ab@lists.openid.net Specification Document(s): of this specification Metadata Name: acr_values_supported Metadata Description: JSON array containing a list of the Authentication Context Class References that this OP supports Change Controller: OpenID Foundation Artifact Binding Working Group - openid-specs-ab@lists.openid.net Specification Document(s): of this specification Metadata Name: subject_types_supported Metadata Description: JSON array containing a list of the Subject Identifier types that this OP supports Change Controller: OpenID Foundation Artifact Binding Working Group - openid-specs-ab@lists.openid.net Specification Document(s): of this specification Metadata Name: id_token_signing_alg_values_supported Metadata Description: JSON array containing a list of the JWS "alg" values supported by the OP for the ID Token Change Controller: OpenID Foundation Artifact Binding Working Group - openid-specs-ab@lists.openid.net Specification Document(s): of this specification Metadata Name: id_token_encryption_alg_values_supported Metadata Description: JSON array containing a list of the JWE "alg" values supported by the OP for the ID Token Change Controller: OpenID Foundation Artifact Binding Working Group - openid-specs-ab@lists.openid.net Specification Document(s): of this specification Metadata Name: id_token_encryption_enc_values_supported Metadata Description: JSON array containing a list of the JWE "enc" values supported by the OP for the ID Token Change Controller: OpenID Foundation Artifact Binding Working Group - openid-specs-ab@lists.openid.net Specification Document(s): of this specification Metadata Name: userinfo_signing_alg_values_supported Metadata Description: JSON array containing a list of the JWS "alg" values supported by the UserInfo Endpoint Change Controller: OpenID Foundation Artifact Binding Working Group - openid-specs-ab@lists.openid.net Specification Document(s): of this specification Metadata Name: userinfo_encryption_alg_values_supported Metadata Description: JSON array containing a list of the JWE "alg" values supported by the UserInfo Endpoint Change Controller: OpenID Foundation Artifact Binding Working Group - openid-specs-ab@lists.openid.net Specification Document(s): of this specification Metadata Name: userinfo_encryption_enc_values_supported Metadata Description: JSON array containing a list of the JWE "enc" values supported by the UserInfo Endpoint Change Controller: OpenID Foundation Artifact Binding Working Group - openid-specs-ab@lists.openid.net Specification Document(s): of this specification Metadata Name: request_object_signing_alg_values_supported Metadata Description: JSON array containing a list of the JWS "alg" values supported by the OP for Request Objects Change Controller: OpenID Foundation Artifact Binding Working Group - openid-specs-ab@lists.openid.net Specification Document(s): of this specification Metadata Name: request_object_encryption_alg_values_supported Metadata Description: JSON array containing a list of the JWE "alg" values supported by the OP for Request Objects Change Controller: OpenID Foundation Artifact Binding Working Group - openid-specs-ab@lists.openid.net Specification Document(s): of this specification Metadata Name: request_object_encryption_enc_values_supported Metadata Description: JSON array containing a list of the JWE "enc" values supported by the OP for Request Objects Change Controller: OpenID Foundation Artifact Binding Working Group - openid-specs-ab@lists.openid.net Specification Document(s): of this specification Metadata Name: display_values_supported Metadata Description: JSON array containing a list of the "display" parameter values that the OpenID Provider supports Change Controller: OpenID Foundation Artifact Binding Working Group - openid-specs-ab@lists.openid.net Specification Document(s): of this specification Metadata Name: claim_types_supported Metadata Description: JSON array containing a list of the Claim Types that the OpenID Provider supports Change Controller: OpenID Foundation Artifact Binding Working Group - openid-specs-ab@lists.openid.net Specification Document(s): of this specification Metadata Name: claims_supported Metadata Description: JSON array containing a list of the Claim Names of the Claims that the OpenID Provider MAY be able to supply values for Change Controller: OpenID Foundation Artifact Binding Working Group - openid-specs-ab@lists.openid.net Specification Document(s): of this specification Metadata Name: claims_locales_supported Metadata Description: Languages and scripts supported for values in Claims being returned, represented as a JSON array of BCP 47 language tag values Change Controller: OpenID Foundation Artifact Binding Working Group - openid-specs-ab@lists.openid.net Specification Document(s): of this specification Metadata Name: claims_parameter_supported Metadata Description: Boolean value specifying whether the OP supports use of the "claims" parameter Change Controller: OpenID Foundation Artifact Binding Working Group - openid-specs-ab@lists.openid.net Specification Document(s): of this specification Metadata Name: request_parameter_supported Metadata Description: Boolean value specifying whether the OP supports use of the "request" parameter Change Controller: OpenID Foundation Artifact Binding Working Group - openid-specs-ab@lists.openid.net Specification Document(s): of this specification Metadata Name: request_uri_parameter_supported Metadata Description: Boolean value specifying whether the OP supports use of the "request_uri" parameter Change Controller: OpenID Foundation Artifact Binding Working Group - openid-specs-ab@lists.openid.net Specification Document(s): of this specification Metadata Name: require_request_uri_registration Metadata Description: Boolean value specifying whether the OP requires any "request_uri" values used to be pre-registered Change Controller: OpenID Foundation Artifact Binding Working Group - openid-specs-ab@lists.openid.net Specification Document(s): of this specification

In many standards track documents several words are used to signify the requirements in the specification. These words are often capitalized. This document defines these words as they should be interpreted in IETF documents. This document specifies an Internet Best Current Practices for the Internet Community, and requests discussion and suggestions for improvements. A Uniform Resource Identifier (URI) is a compact sequence of characters that identifies an abstract or physical resource. This specification defines the generic URI syntax and a process for resolving URI references that might be in relative form, along with guidelines and security considerations for the use of URIs on the Internet. The URI syntax defines a grammar that is a superset of all valid URIs, allowing an implementation to parse the common components of a URI reference without knowing the scheme-specific requirements of every possible identifier. This specification does not define a generative grammar for URIs; that task is performed by the individual specifications of each URI scheme. [STANDARDS-TRACK] This document specifies the Internet Message Format (IMF), a syntax for text messages that are sent between computer users, within the framework of "electronic mail" messages. This specification is a revision of Request For Comments (RFC) 2822, which itself superseded Request For Comments (RFC) 822, "Standard for the Format of ARPA Internet Text Messages", updating it to reflect current practice and incorporating incremental changes that were specified in other RFCs. [STANDARDS-TRACK] This document describes the structure, content, construction, and semantics of language tags for use in cases where it is desirable to indicate the language used in an information object. It also describes how to register values for use in language tags and the creation of user-defined extensions for private interchange. This document specifies an Internet Best Current Practices for the Internet Community, and requests discussion and suggestions for improvements. This memo defines a path prefix for "well-known locations", "/.well-known/", in selected Uniform Resource Identifier (URI) schemes. [STANDARDS-TRACK] Many application technologies enable secure communication between two entities by means of Internet Public Key Infrastructure Using X.509 (PKIX) certificates in the context of Transport Layer Security (TLS). This document specifies procedures for representing and verifying the identity of application services in such interactions. [STANDARDS-TRACK] The OAuth 2.0 authorization framework enables a third-party application to obtain limited access to an HTTP service, either on behalf of a resource owner by orchestrating an approval interaction between the resource owner and the HTTP service, or by allowing the third-party application to obtain access on its own behalf. This specification replaces and obsoletes the OAuth 1.0 protocol described in RFC 5849. [STANDARDS-TRACK] This specification defines the WebFinger protocol, which can be used to discover information about people or other entities on the Internet using standard HTTP methods. WebFinger discovers information for a URI that might not be usable as a locator otherwise, such as account or email URIs. JavaScript Object Notation (JSON) is a lightweight, text-based, language-independent data interchange format. It was derived from the ECMAScript Programming Language Standard. JSON defines a small set of formatting rules for the portable representation of structured data. This document removes inconsistencies with other specifications of JSON, repairs specification errors, and offers experience-based interoperability guidance. This document defines the 'acct' Uniform Resource Identifier (URI) scheme as a way to identify a user's account at a service provider, irrespective of the particular protocols that can be used to interact with the account. This document formally deprecates Transport Layer Security (TLS) versions 1.0 (RFC 2246) and 1.1 (RFC 4346). Accordingly, those documents have been moved to Historic status. These versions lack support for current and recommended cryptographic algorithms and mechanisms, and various government and industry profiles of applications using TLS now mandate avoiding these old TLS versions. TLS version 1.2 became the recommended version for IETF protocols in 2008 (subsequently being obsoleted by TLS version 1.3 in 2018), providing sufficient time to transition away from older versions. Removing support for older versions from implementations reduces the attack surface, reduces opportunity for misconfiguration, and streamlines library and product maintenance. This document also deprecates Datagram TLS (DTLS) version 1.0 (RFC 4347) but not DTLS version 1.2, and there is no DTLS version 1.1. This document updates many RFCs that normatively refer to TLS version 1.0 or TLS version 1.1, as described herein. This document also updates the best practices for TLS usage in RFC 7525; hence, it is part of BCP 195. Transport Layer Security (TLS) and Datagram Transport Layer Security (DTLS) are used to protect data exchanged over a wide range of application protocols and can also form the basis for secure transport protocols. Over the years, the industry has witnessed several serious attacks on TLS and DTLS, including attacks on the most commonly used cipher suites and their modes of operation. This document provides the latest recommendations for ensuring the security of deployed services that use TLS and DTLS. These recommendations are applicable to the majority of use cases. RFC 7525, an earlier version of the TLS recommendations, was published when the industry was transitioning to TLS 1.2. Years later, this transition is largely complete, and TLS 1.3 is widely available. This document updates the guidance given the new environment and obsoletes RFC 7525. In addition, this document updates RFCs 5288 and 6066 in view of recent attacks.

markdavis@google.com

ken@unicode.org

NAT.Consulting Yubico Self-Issued Consulting Google Disney Microsoft Ping Identity Nomura Research Institute, Ltd. Microsoft Ping Identity Nomura Research Institute, Ltd. Microsoft Cisco Systems, Inc. Microsoft Microsoft NAT.Consulting Yubico Self-Issued Consulting Google Google Facebook Microsoft IANA The Unicode Consortium

Opera Software ASA Nomura Research Institute, Ltd. Ping Identity Microsoft Illumila Nomura Research Institute, Ltd. Ping Identity Microsoft Illumila OWASP This specification defines a metadata format that an OAuth 2.0 client can use to obtain the information needed to interact with an OAuth 2.0 authorization server, including its endpoint locations and authorization server capabilities. Google Microsoft NAT.Consulting Yubico Microsoft IANA

The OpenID Community would like to thank the following people for their contributions to this specification: Andrew Arnott (andarno@microsoft.com), Microsoft Dirk Balfanz (balfanz@google.com), Google Casper Biering (cb@peercraft.com), Peercraft John Bradley (ve7jtb@ve7jtb.com), Yubico (was at Ping Identity) Johnny Bufu (johnny.bufu@gmail.com), independent (was at Janrain) Brian Campbell (bcampbell@pingidentity.com), Ping Identity Blaine Cook (romeda@gmail.com), independent Breno de Medeiros (breno@google.com), Google Pamela Dingle (Pamela.Dingle@microsoft.com), Microsoft (was at Ping Identity) Vladimir Dzhuvinov (vladimir@connect2id.com), Connect2id (was at Nimbus Directory Services) George Fletcher (gffletch@aol.com), Capital One (was at AOL) Dick Hardt (dick.hardt@gmail.com), independent Roland Hedberg (roland@catalogix.se), independent (was at University of Umeå) Edmund Jay (ejay@mgi1.com), Illumila Michael B. Jones (michael_b_jones@hotmail.com), Self-Issued Consulting (was at Microsoft) Torsten Lodderstedt (torsten@lodderstedt.net), independent (was at Deutsche Telekom) Nov Matake (nov@matake.jp), independent Chuck Mortimore (charliemortimore@gmail.com), Disney (was at Salesforce) Anthony Nadalin (nadalin@prodigy.net), independent (was at Microsoft) Axel Nennker (axel.nennker@telekom.de), Deutsche Telekom John Panzer (jpanzer@google.com), Google Justin Richer (justin@bspk.io), Bespoke Engineering (was at MITRE) Nat Sakimura (nat@nat.consulting), NAT.Consulting (was at NRI) Owen Shepherd (owen.shepherd@e43.eu), independent Andreas Åkre Solberg (Andreas.Solberg@sikt.no), Sikt (was at UNINET) Kick Willemse (k.willemse@evidos.nl), Evidos B.V.

Copyright (c) 2023 The OpenID Foundation. The OpenID Foundation (OIDF) grants to any Contributor, developer, implementer, or other interested party a non-exclusive, royalty free, worldwide copyright license to reproduce, prepare derivative works from, distribute, perform and display, this Implementers Draft or Final Specification solely for the purposes of (i) developing specifications, and (ii) implementing Implementers Drafts and Final Specifications based on such documents, provided that attribution be made to the OIDF as the source of the material, but that such attribution does not indicate an endorsement by the OIDF. The technology described in this specification was made available from contributions from various sources, including members of the OpenID Foundation and others. Although the OpenID Foundation has taken steps to help ensure that the technology is available for distribution, it takes no position regarding the validity or scope of any intellectual property or other rights that might be claimed to pertain to the implementation or use of the technology described in this specification or the extent to which any license under such rights might or might not be available; neither does it represent that it has made any independent effort to identify any such rights. The OpenID Foundation and the contributors to this specification make no (and hereby expressly disclaim any) warranties (express, implied, or otherwise), including implied warranties of merchantability, non-infringement, fitness for a particular purpose, or title, related to this specification, and the entire risk as to implementing this specification is assumed by the implementer. The OpenID Intellectual Property Rights policy requires contributors to offer a patent promise not to assert certain patent claims against other contributors and against implementers. The OpenID Foundation invites any interested party to bring to its attention any copyrights, patents, patent applications, or other proprietary rights that may cover technology that may be required to practice this specification.

[[ To be removed from the approved errata ]] -36 Fixed #2027: Updated speculative language that anticipated standardization of The 'acct' URI Scheme [RFC 7565]. Fixed #2031: Clarified sentence about issuer value. Fixed #2032: Use phrase JavaScript Clients and other Browser-Based Clients. -35 Fixed #1159: Use TLS guidance from BCP 195. Fixed #1091: Clarified use of WebFinger. -34 Fixed #979 - Required CSRF prevention on Web input forms. Fixed #974: Replaced uses of RSA1_5 with RSA-OAEP-256. Fixed #978: Referenced previous versions. Updated contributor affiliations. -33 Fixed #980 - Specified the use of CORS at endpoints directly accessed by the Client. -32 Updated logout spec references. Updated contributor affiliations. -31 Updated contributor affiliations. Updated many spec URLs from http to https. -30 Corrected Session Management author list. Updated affiliations and acknowledgements. -29 Fixed #1007 - jwks / jwks_uri must not contain private key material. Fixed #1014 - Addressed lack of definition for "Configuration Document". -28 Register metadata values that are unique to this specification in the IANA "OAuth Authorization Server Metadata" registry established by the OAuth 2.0 Authorization Server Metadata specification. -27 Specified that some URLs MUST use the https scheme. Replaced token id_token with id_token token. -26 Referenced completed RFCs. Added missing URLs in references. Tracked terminology changes made in the referenced IETF specs since errata set 1. -25 Final specification incorporating errata set 1.