Nomura Research Institute, Ltd.

n-sakimura@nri.co.jp

Independent

ve7jtb@ve7jtb.com

Google

breno@google.com

Microsoft

mbj@microsoft.com

Illumila

ejay@mgi1.com

Salesforce

cmortimore@salesforce.com

OpenID Connect 1.0 is a simple identity layer on top of the OAuth 2.0 protocol. It allows Clients to verify the identity of the End-User based on the authentication performed by an Authorization Server, as well as to obtain basic profile information about the End-User in an interoperable and RESTful manner. OpenID Connect Basic Client is a profile of the OpenID Connect Standard 1.0 Specification that is designed to be easy to read and implement for web-based Relying Parties. OpenID Providers should consult the Standard specification. This profile omits implementation and security considerations for OpenID Providers.

The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT", "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in . Throughout this document, values are quoted to indicate that they are to be taken literally. When using these values in protocol messages, the quotes MUST NOT be used as part of the value.

This specification uses the terms "Access Token", "Refresh Token", "Authorization Code", "Authorization Grant", "Authorization Server", "Authorization Endpoint", "Client", "Client Identifier", "Client Secret", "Protected Resource", "Resource Owner", "Resource Server", and "Token Endpoint" defined by OAuth 2.0. This specification also defines the following terms: An application requiring Claims from an OpenID Provider. A service capable of providing Claims to a Relying Party. A piece of information about an Entity that a Claims Provider asserts about that Entity. A Server that can return Claims about an Entity. A human Resource Owner. Something that has a separate and distinct existence and that can be identified in a context. An End-User is one example of an Entity. Any information that (a) can be used to identify the natural person to whom such information relates, or (b) is or might be directly or indirectly linked to a natural person to whom such information relates. An identifier that identifies the Entity to a Relying Party. An Entity's PPID at one Relying Party cannot be correlated with the Entity's PPID at another Relying Party. A token that contains Claims about the authentication event. It is a JSON Web Token (JWT), but can be treated as opaque by Clients that use the Check ID Endpoint. Relying Parties wanting to process the ID Token contents directly should refer to the OpenID Connect Standard 1.0 specification. An Entity that issues a set of Claims. A verifiable identifier for an Issuer. An Issuer Identifier is an HTTPS URL that only contains scheme, host, and OPTIONALLY, port number components. (No path component may be present.) A resource that, when presented with an ID Token by the Client, returns Claims about the authentication event represented by that ID Token. A Protected Resource that, when presented with an Access Token by the Client, returns authorized information about the End-User represented by that Access Token.

Authorization Requests can follow one of two paths; the Implicit Flow or the Authorization Code Flow. The Authorization Code Flow is suitable for Clients that can securely maintain a Client Secret between themselves and the Authorization Server whereas, the Implicit Flow is suitable for Clients that cannot. Clients that do not support TLS MUST use the Authorization Code Flow to prevent the interception of Access Tokens. The OpenID Connect Basic Client profile only documents Clients using the Implicit Flow. OpenID Providers MUST support both flows. Clients wanting to use the Authorization Code Flow and OpenID Providers should consult the OpenID Connect Standard 1.0 Specification.

OpenID Connect Clients use scope values as defined in 3.3 of OAuth 2.0 to specify what access privileges are requested for Access Tokens. The scopes associated with Access Tokens determine what resources will be available when they are used to access OAuth 2.0 protected endpoints. For OpenID Connect, scopes can be used to request that specific sets of information be made available from the UserInfo Endpoint, and to request an ID Token. OAuth 2.0 allows additional scope values to be specified, as extensions. This specification describes only the scope values used by OpenID Connect. OpenID Connect defines the following scope values: REQUIRED. Informs the Authorization Server that the Client is making an OpenID Connect request. If the openid scope value is not present, the request MUST NOT be treated as an OpenID Connect request. This scope value requests access to the user_id Claim at the UserInfo Endpoint. OPTIONAL. Requests default profile information. OPTIONAL. Requests an email address and its verified status. OPTIONAL. Requests address information. OPTIONAL. Requests phone number. Multiple scopes MAY be requested by creating a space delimited, case sensitive list of ASCII scope values. In some cases, the End-User will be given the option to have the OpenID Provider decline to provide some or all information requested by Clients. To increase new account activation, a Client may elect to only request a subset of the information available from the UserInfo Endpoint.

The following is a non-normative example of a scope Request.

The Implicit Flow consists of the following steps: Client prepares an Authorization Request containing the desired request parameters. Client sends a request to the Authorization Server. Authorization Server authenticates the End-User. Authorization Server obtains the End-User Consent/Authorization. Authorization Server sends the End-User back to the Client with an Access Token and ID Token.

When the End-User wishes to access a Protected Resource, and the End-User Authorization has not yet been obtained, the Client prepares an Authorization Request to the Authorization Endpoint. The scheme used in the Authorization Endpoint URL MUST be HTTPS. Clients MAY construct the request using the HTTP GET or the HTTP POST method as defined in RFC 2616. If using the HTTP GET method, the parameters are serialized using Query String Serialization. If using the HTTP POST method, the request parameters are added to the HTTP request entity-body using the application/x-www-form-urlencoded format as defined by . This profile further constrains the following request parameters: It MUST include token and id_token, as a space delimited list. This requests that both an Access Token and an ID Token be returned in the URL fragment of the response. Other REQUIRED parameters in the request include the following: The OAuth 2.0 Client Identifier. It MUST include openid as one of the space delimited ASCII strings. OPTIONAL scope strings of profile, email, address, and phone are also supported. A redirection URI where the response will be sent. This MUST be pre-registered with the provider. A string value used to associate a user-agent session with an ID Token, and to mitigate replay attacks. The value is passed through unmodified to the ID Token. One method is to store a random value as a signed session cookie, and pass the value in the nonce parameter. The nonce in the returned ID Token is compared to the signed session cookie to detect ID Token replay by third parties. The request MAY contain the following OPTIONAL parameters: RECOMENDED. An opaque value used to maintain state between the request and the callback; serves as a protection against XSRF attacks. An ASCII string value that specifies how the Authorization Server displays the authentication and consent user interface pages to the End-User. The following values are supported: The Authorization Server SHOULD display authentication and consent UI consistent with a full user-agent page view. If the display parameter is not specified this is the default display mode. The Authorization Server SHOULD display authentication and consent UI consistent with a popup user-agent window. The popup user-agent window SHOULD be 450 pixels wide and 500 pixels tall. The Authorization Server SHOULD display authentication and consent UI consistent with a device that leverages a touch interface. The Authorization Server MAY attempt to detect the touch device and further customize the interface. The Authorization Server SHOULD display authentication and consent UI consistent with a "feature phone" type display. The Authorization Server SHOULD display authentication and consent UI consistent with the limitations of an embedded user-agent. A space delimited, case sensitive list of ASCII string values that specifies whether the Authorization Server prompts the End-User for reauthentication and consent. The possible values are: This value informs the Authorization Server that it MUST NOT display any authentication or consent user interface pages. An error is returned if the End-User is not already authenticated or the Client does not have pre-configured consent for the requested scopes. This can be used as a method to check for existing authentication and/or consent. The Authorization Server MUST prompt the End-User for reauthentication. The Authorization Server MUST prompt the End-User for consent before returning information to the Client. The Authorization Server MUST prompt the End-User to select a user account. This allows a user who has multiple accounts at the Authorization Server to select amongst the multiple accounts that they may have current sessions for. The prompt parameter can be used by the Client to make sure that the End-User is still present for the current session or to bring attention to the request. If this parameter contains none with any other value, an error is returned.

The following is a non-normative example of an Authorization Request URL. Note that the line wraps within the values are for display purpose only:

Having constructed the Authorization Request, the Client sends it to the Authorization Endpoint. This MAY happen via HTTPS redirect, hyperlinking, or any other secure means of directing the User-Agent to the URL. Following is a non-normative example using HTTP redirect. Note: Line wraps are for display purpose only.

The Authorization Server obtains an authorization decision, for the requested scopes. This can done by presenting the End-User with a dialogue that allows the End-User to recognize what he is consenting to and obtain his consent or by establishing consent via other means (for example, via previous administrative consent). The openid scope grants the RP access to the user identifier of the authenticated End-User of the session. All other scopes are optional. It is up to the OpenID Provider to determine if an error should be returned in the case of the End-User declining to authorize scopes other than openid.

Once the authorization is determined, the Authorization Server returns a successful response or an error response.

If the Resource Owner grants the access request, the Authorization Server issues an Access Token and delivers it to the Client by adding the following parameters to the fragment component of the redirection URI using the application/x-www-form-urlencoded format as defined in Section 4.2.2 of OAuth 2.0 and OAuth 2.0 Multiple Response Type Encoding Practices In the Implicit Flow, the entire response is returned in the fragment component of the redirect URL, as defined in 4.2.2 of OAuth 2.0 REQUIRED. The Access Token for the UserInfo Endpoint. REQUIRED. The value MUST be "bearer" REQUIRED. The ID Token for the Check ID Endpoint. REQUIRED if the state parameter is present in the request. Clients MUST verify that the state value is equal to the exact value of state parameter in the Authorization Request. OPTIONAL. The expiration time in seconds of the Access Token. The Client can then use the Access Token to access protected resources at Resource Servers.

The following is a non-normative example. Line wraps after the second line is for the display purpose only:

If the End-User denies the authorization or the End-User authentication fails, the Authorization Server MUST return the error authorization response as defined in 4.2.2.1 of OAuth 2.0. No other parameters SHOULD be returned.

The Check ID Endpoint validates the ID Token and returns a text JSON object containing the Claims in the ID Token. This endpoint is used by Clients that are not able to or do not wish to directly process ID Tokens. In this case, Clients MAY treat ID Tokens as opaque values. Check ID Endpoints MUST require the use of a transport-layer security mechanism. The endpoint MUST support TLS 1.2 RFC 5246 and/or TLS 1.0 ; when TLS is used, the Client MUST perform a TLS/SSL server certificate check, per RFC 6125. Check ID Endpoints MAY support other transport-layer mechanisms with equivalent security. Clients MAY verify the validity of the ID Token using the Check ID Endpoint. Clients wanting to process the ID Token contents directly should refer to the OpenID Connect Standard 1.0 specification. The ID Token is used to manage the sign-on event and user identifier. It differs from an Access Token, which provides access to the UserInfo Endpoint and other OAuth 2.0 Protected Resources that the End-User is granting access to. The ID Token is restricted to a particular Client via the aud (audience) and nonce Claims.

To request the information about the authentication performed on the End-User, a request is made to the Check ID Endpoint sending the ID Token as the access_token by using the OAuth 2.0 Bearer scheme. Clients MAY send requests with the following parameter to the Check ID Endpoint: REQUIRED. The ID Token obtained from an OpenID Connect Authorization Request. This parameter MUST NOT be sent if the Access Token is sent in the HTTP Authorization header as described in Section 7.1 of OAuth 2.0. Access Tokens sent in the authorization header MUST be Bearer Tokens. Requests to the Check ID Endpoint SHOULD be made with the HTTP "POST" method. In this case, the request parameters are serialized using form serialization.

The Following is a non-normative example of a Check ID request:

The Client MUST ensure that the Check ID Endpoint being used is the trusted Check ID Endpoint for the Entity via pre-configuration meta-data or discovery. A request to the Check ID Endpoint MAY alternatively be made with the HTTP "GET" method; when using GET, the access_token MUST be passed in the header.

The Check ID response returns the JSON serialized Claims contained in the ID Token. The following ID Token Claims are defined by this specification: REQUIRED. The Issuer Identifier for the Issuer of the response. REQUIRED. A locally unique and never reassigned identifier for the End-User, which is intended to be consumed by the Client. e.g. 24400320 or AItOawmwtWwcT0k51BayewNvutrJUqsvl6qs7A4. It MUST NOT exceed 255 ASCII characters in length. REQUIRED. This member identifies the audience that this ID Token is intended for. It is the client_id of the RP. REQUIRED. Type Integer. Identifies the expiration time on or after which the ID Token MUST NOT be accepted for processing. The processing of this parameter requires that the current date/time MUST be before the expiration date/time listed in the value. Implementers MAY provide for some small leeway, usually no more than a few minutes, to account for clock skew. The value is number of seconds from 1970-01-01T0:0:0Z as measured in UTC until the desired date/time. See RFC 3339 for details regarding date/times in general and UTC in particular. OPTIONAL. (Authentication Context Class Reference): Specifies an Authentication Context Class Reference of the ID Token. The values "1", "2", "3", and "4" map to the ITU-T X.1254 | ISO/IEC 29115 entity authentication assurance level of the authentication performed. The value "0" indicates the End User authentication did not meet the requirements of ISO/IEC 29115 level 1. Authentication using a long-lived browser cookie, for instance, is one example where the use of "level 0" is appropriate. Authentications with level 0 should never be used to authorize access to any resource of any monetary value. (This corresponds to the OpenID 2.0 PAPE nist_auth_level 0.) An absolute URI or a registered short name MAY be used as an acr value. REQUIRED. Clients MUST verify that the nonce value is equal to the value of the nonce parameter in the Authorization Request.

The following is a non-normative example of a response from a Check ID Endpoint:

To verify the validity of the Response, the Client MUST do the following: The Check ID Endpoint has not returned an error for the ID Token being expired or invalid. Check that the iss (issuer) is equal to that of the pre-configured or discovered Issuer Identifier for the user session. The value of the nonce Claim MUST be checked to verify that it is the same value as the one that was sent in the Authorization Request. The Client SHOULD check the nonce value for replay attacks. The precise method for detecting replay attacks is Client specific. The Client MUST validate that the client_id in the aud (audience) Claim is one it has registered for the Issuer identified by the value in the iss (issuer) Claim. the ID Token MUST be rejected if the value of aud (audience) is not valid for the Issuer. The current time MUST be less than the value of the exp Claim.

When an error condition occurs, the Check ID Endpoint returns an Error Response as defined in Section 3 of OAuth 2.0 Bearer Tokens.

To obtain the additional attributes and tokens, the Client makes a GET or POST request to the UserInfo Endpoint. UserInfo Endpoint Servers MUST require the use of a transport-layer security mechanism. The UserInfo Endpoint Server MUST support TLS 1.2 RFC 5246 and/or TLS 1.0 and MAY support other transport-layer mechanisms with equivalent security. NOTE: The UserInfo Endpoint response is not guaranteed to be about the Interactive user identified by the user_id element of the ID Token. The user_id Claim in the UserInfo Endpoint response MUST exactly match the user_id Claim in the ID Token, before using additional UserInfo Endpoint Claims.

Clients MAY send requests with the following parameters to the UserInfo Endpoint to obtain further information about the End-User. The UserInfo Endpoint is an OAuth 2.0 Protected Resource that complies with the Bearer Tokens specification. As such, the Access Token SHOULD be specified via the HTTP Authorization header. REQUIRED. The Access Token obtained from an OpenID Connect Authorization Request. This parameter MUST only be sent using one method through either the HTTP Authorization header or a form-encoded HTTP POST body parameter. REQUIRED. The schema in which the data is to be returned. The only defined value is openid. This identifier is reserved. It MUST be ignored by the endpoint when the openid schema is used.

The following is a non-normative example. Line wraps are for display purpose only:

If the requested schema is openid, the response MUST return a JSON object that contains the full set or subset of Claims that are defined below. Additional Claims (not specified below) MAY also be returned. If a Claim is not returned, that Claim Name SHOULD be omitted from the JSON object representing the Claims; it SHOULD NOT be present with a null or empty string value. The members MAY be represented in multiple languages and scripts. To specify the languages and scripts, BCP47 language tags MUST be added to each member names delimited by a #, e.g., familyName#ja-Kana-JP for expressing Family Name in Katakana in Japanese, which is commonly used to index and represent the phonetics of the Kanji representation of the same represented as familyName#ja-Hani-JP. Member Type Description user_id string REQUIRED Identifier for the End-User at the Issuer. name string End-User's full name in displayable form including all name parts, ordered according to End-User's locale and preferences. given_name string Given name or first name of the End-User. family_name string Surname or last name of the End-User. middle_name string Middle name of the End-User. nickname string Casual name of the End-User that may or may not be the same as the given_name. For instance, a nickname value of Mike might be returned alongside a given_name value of Michael. profile string URL of End-User's profile page. picture string URL of the End-User's profile picture. website string URL of End-User's web page or blog. email string The End-User's preferred e-mail address. verified boolean True if the End-User's e-mail address has been verified; otherwise false. gender string The End-User's gender: Values defined by this specification are female and male. Other values MAY be used when neither of the defined values are applicable. birthday string The End-User's birthday, represented as a date string in MM/DD/YYYY format. The year MAY be 0000, indicating that it is omitted. zoneinfo string String from zoneinfo time zone database. For example, Europe/Paris or America/Los_Angeles. locale string The End-User's locale, represented as a BCP47 language tag. This is typically an ISO 639-1 Alpha-2 language code in lowercase and an ISO 3166-1 Alpha-2 country code in uppercase, separated by a dash. For example, en-US or fr-CA. As a compatibility note, some implementations have used an underscore as the separator rather than a dash, for example, en_US; Implementations MAY choose to accept this locale syntax as well. phone_number string The End-User's preferred telephone number. E.164 is RECOMMENDED as the format of this Claim. For example, +1 (425) 555-1212 or +56 (2) 687 2400. address JSON object The End-User's preferred address. The value of the address member is a JSON structure containing some or all of the members defined in . updated_time string Time the End-User's information was last updated, represented as a RFC 3339 datetime. For example, 2011-01-03T23:58:42+0000.

Following is a non-normative example of such response:

The UserInfo Endpoint MUST return Claims in JSON format unless a different format was specified during OpenID Connect Dynamic Client Registration 1.0. The UserInfo Endpoint MUST return a content-type header to indicate which format is being returned. The following are accepted content types: Content-Type Format Returned application/json plain text JSON object application/jwt A JWT

The components of a physical mailing address. Implementations MAY return only a subset of the fields of an address, depending upon the information available and the End-User's privacy preferences. For example, the country and region might be returned without returning more fine-grained address information. Implementations MAY return just the full address as a single string in the formatted sub-field, or they MAY return just the individual component fields using the other sub-fields, or they MAY return both. If both variants are returned, they SHOULD be describing the same address, with the formatted address indicating how the component fields should be combined. The full mailing address, formatted for display or use with a mailing label. This field MAY contain newlines. This is the Primary Sub-Field for this field, for the purposes of sorting and filtering. The full street address component, which may include house number, street name, PO BOX, and multi-line extended street address information. This field MAY contain newlines. The city or locality component. The state, province, prefecture or region component. The zip code or postal code component. The country name component.

When an error condition occurs, the UserInfo Endpoint returns an Error Response as defined in Section 3 of OAuth 2.0 Bearer Tokens. In addition to the error codes defined in Section 3.1 of Bearer Tokens, this specification defines the following error codes: The requested schema is invalid or unsupported.

Some OpenID Connect installations can use a pre-configured set of OpenID Providers and/or Relying Parties. In those cases, it may not be necessary to support dynamic discovery of information about identities or services or dynamic registration of Clients. However, if installations choose to support unanticipated interactions between Relying Parties and OpenID Providers that do not have pre-configured relationships, they SHOULD accomplish this by implementing the facilities defined in the OpenID Connect Discovery 1.0 and OpenID Connect Dynamic Client Registration 1.0 specifications.

In order to serialize the parameters using the query string serialization, the Client constructs the string by adding the parameters and values to the query component using the application/x-www-form-urlencoded format as defined by .

Following is a non-normative example of such serialization:

Parameters and their values are form serialized by adding the parameter names and values to the entity body of the HTTP request using the application/x-www-form-urlencoded format as defined by . Form serialization is typically used in HTTP POST requests.

Following is a non-normative example of such serialization:

Processing some OpenID Connect messages requires comparing values in the messages to known values. For example, the Claim Names returned by the UserInfo Endpoint might be compared to specific Claim Names such as user_id. Comparing Unicode strings, however, has significant security implications. Therefore, comparisons between JSON strings and other Unicode strings MUST be performed as specified below: Remove any JSON applied escaping to produce an array of Unicode code points. Unicode Normalization MUST NOT be applied at any point to either the JSON string or to the string it is to be compared against. Comparisons between the two strings MUST be performed as a Unicode code point to code point equality comparison. In several places, this specification uses space delimited lists of strings. In all such cases, only the ASCII space character (0x20) MAY be used for this purpose.

For security considerations, refer to OpenID Connect Standard 1.0 Specification

The UserInfo response typically contains Personally Identifiable Information. As such, End-User consent for the release of the information for the specified purpose SHOULD be obtained at or prior to the authorization time in accordance with relevant regulations. The purpose of use is typically registered in association with the redirect_uri. Only necessary UserInfo data should be stored at the Client and the Client SHOULD associate the received data with the purpose of use statement. The Resource Server SHOULD make the UserInfo access log available to the End-User so that the End-User can monitor who accessed his data. To protect the End-User from a possible correlation among Clients, the use of a Pairwise Pseudonymous Identifier (PPID) as the user_id SHOULD be considered.

This document makes no requests of IANA.

markdavis@google.com

ken@unicode.org

National Institute of Standards and Technology Yahoo Facebook Microsoft Microsoft Independent Facebook International Organization for Standardization International Organization for Standardization International Telecommunication Union Public Domain Nomura Research Institute, Ltd. Independent Microsoft Google Salesforce Illumila Nomura Research Institute, Ltd. Independent Microsoft Illumila Nomura Research Institute, Ltd. Independent Microsoft Microsoft Google Protoviti Government Services Microsoft Google Nomura Research Institute, Ltd. Facebook Google, Inc. Google, Inc. Facebook NORDUNet

Tulegatan 11 Stockholm Sweden leifj@nordu.net

Identity Assurance This document establishes an IANA registry for Level of Assurance Context Classes for SAML 2.0. The registry is intended to be used as an aid to discovering such LoA definitions.

The OpenID Community would like to thank the following people for the work they've done in the drafting and editing of this specification. Axel Nennker (axel.nennker@telekom.de), Deutsche Telekom Casper Biering (cb@peercraft.com), Peercraft John Bradley (ve7jtb@ve7jtb.com), Independent Breno de Medeiros (breno@gmail.com), Google George Fletcher (gffletch@aol.com), AOL Edmund Jay (ejay@mgi1.com), Illumila Michael B. Jones (mbj@microsoft.com), Microsoft Chuck Mortimore (cmortimore@salesforce.com), Salesforce Hideki Nara (hideki.nara@gmail.com), Takt Communications Nat Sakimura (n-sakimura@nri.co.jp)), Nomura Research Institute, Ltd. Ryo Itou (ritou@yahoo-corp.jp), Yahoo! Japan

Copyright (c) 2011 The OpenID Foundation. The OpenID Foundation (OIDF) grants to any Contributor, developer, implementer, or other interested party a non-exclusive, royalty free, worldwide copyright license to reproduce, prepare derivative works from, distribute, perform and display, this Implementers Draft or Final Specification (i) solely for the purposes of developing specifications, and (ii) implementing Implementers Drafts and Final Specifications based on such documents, provided that attribution be made to OIDF as the source of the material, but that such attribution does not indicate the endorsement by OIDF. The technology described in this specification was made available from contributions from various sources, including members of the OpenID Foundation and others. Although the OpenID Foundation has taken steps to help ensure that the technology is available for distribution, it takes no position regarding the validity or scope of any intellectual property or other rights that might be claimed to pertain to the implementation or use of the technology described in this specification or the extent to which any license under such rights might or might not be available; neither does it represent that it has made any independent effort to identify any such rights. The OpenID Foundation and the contributors to this specification make no (and hereby expressly disclaim any) warranties (express, implied, or otherwise), including implied warranties of merchantability, non-infringement, fitness for a particular purpose, or title, related to this specification, and the entire risk as to implementing this specification is assumed by the implementer. The OpenID Intellectual Property Rights policy requires contributors to offer a patent promise not to assert certain patent claims against other contributors and against implementers. OpenID invites any interested party to bring to its attention any copyrights, patents, patent applications, or other proprietary rights that may cover technology that may be required to practice this specification.

[[ To be removed from the final specification ]] -15 Removed definition and usage for assertion and claim object email scope allows access to the 'verified' claim Removed language pertaining to custom userinfo schemas Moved display=none to prompt=none Added additional 'display' parameter options Redefined 'nonce' in Authorization Request. Changed to REQUIRED parameter. Changed usage of "approval" to "consent" Use RFC 6125 to verify TLS endpoints Allow other gender strings in UserInfo schema ID Token MUST be JWT RECOMMENDED E.164 format for UserInfo 'phone_number' claim Changed UserInfo Error Response to augment and return OAuth 2.0 Bearer Token Error Response Check ID Endpoint SHOULD use POST Added section about string comparison rules needed Added Response Encoding according to Multiple Response Types spec Make openid scope provide user_id from userinfo endpoint Changed Security Considerations to refer to corresponding section in Standard Check ID Endpoint uses ID Token as Access Token according to Bearer Token spec Update John Bradley email and affiliation for Implementer's Draft Removed invalid_id_token error codes -14 Changed section 3.2.1 to refer to access_token ticket #134. Bumped version + date. Changed 7.4 in security considerations to show none is REQUIRED. Changed 3.2.4.1 User Info to UserInfo per Ticket #137. Changed formatting of 7.1 per ticket #140. -13 Changed check_session to check_id. schema=openid now required when requesting UserInfo. Removed issued_to, since not well defined. Removed display values popup, touch, and mobile, since not well defined. -12 Ticket #48 Changed Check Session to take the id_token as a parameter. -11 Renamed from "Lite" to "Basic Client". Numerous cleanups, including updating references. -10 Add back id_token to the response type per issue 27. Changed endpoint name in example from id_token to check_session. Added token_type to the response and explanations of the optional parameters. -09 Clean up typos. Clean up scope explanation. Fix 3.2.4.1 to include id_token in response. -08 Added note about OP needing to read the full spec. Reverted back to GET for introspection based on Google feedback. Changed scopes to openid, profile, address, and email to make them additive. Changed introspection to Check Session Endpoint to be consistent with session management. Changed validation rules, the Check session endpoint will return an error for expired or invalid tokens, so the Client doesn't need to check expiration. Added explanation of why an id_token is used to verify identity rather than the userinfo Access Token. -07 Changed introspection to post Changed userinfo from id to user_id to be consistent with introspection endpoint. Fixed introspection example to use id_token rather than access token. Removed asking for id_token in response type. Fixed Section 3 to be clear it is client secret that is maintained between the client and the OP. -06 Only require the token flow in Lite. Removed code flow. Make id_token required. The id_token is treated as opaque. Rearranged sections for readability. Dropped the schema parameter to the Introspection endpoint, which was formerly a string with the value user_id. This is unnecessary since the id_token parameter already can be used to disambiguate the intended uses(s) of the endpoint. Dropped the requested audience from the Lite spec, which was formerly the identifier of the target audience of the response. This could be part of the Standard spec, but is an advanced scenario, and so not appropriate for Lite. Reference the Discovery and Registration specs, since they're needed for interaction between non-pre-configured parties (so that OpenID Connect installations can be Open). -05 Corrected issues raised by Casper Biering. Created the OpenID Connect Lite specification. -04 Correct issues raised by Pam Dingle and discussed on the mailing list after the 7-Jul-11 working group call. Adopted long_names. -03 Correct issues raised by Johnny Bufu and discussed on the 7-Jul-11 working group call. -02 Consistency and cleanup pass, including removing unused references. -01 Initial draft