openid-4-vp | August 2024 | |
Terbu, et al. | Standards Track | [Page] |
This specification defines a protocol for requesting and presenting Verifiable Credentials.¶
This specification defines a mechanism on top of OAuth 2.0 [RFC6749] that enables presentation of Verifiable Credentials as Verifiable Presentations. Verifiable Credentials and Verifiable Presentations can be of any format, including, but not limited to W3C Verifiable Credentials Data Model [VC_DATA], ISO mdoc [ISO.18013-5], IETF SD-JWT VC [I-D.ietf-oauth-sd-jwt-vc], and AnonCreds [Hyperledger.Indy].¶
OAuth 2.0 [RFC6749] is used as a base protocol as it provides the required rails to build a simple, secure, and developer-friendly Credential presentation layer on top of it. Moreover, implementers can, in a single interface, support Credential presentation and the issuance of Access Tokens for access to APIs based on Verifiable Credentials in the Wallet. OpenID Connect [OpenID.Core] deployments can also extend their implementations using this specification with the ability to transport Verifiable Presentations.¶
This specification can also be combined with [SIOPv2], if implementers require OpenID Connect features, such as the issuance of Self-Issued ID Tokens [SIOPv2].¶
The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT", "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "NOT RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in RFC 2119 [RFC2119].¶
This specification uses the terms "Access Token", "Authorization Request", "Authorization Response", "Client", "Client Authentication", "Client Identifier", "Grant Type", "Response Type", "Token Request" and "Token Response" defined by OAuth 2.0 [RFC6749], the terms "End-User", "Entity", "Request Object", "Request URI" as defined by OpenID Connect Core [OpenID.Core], the term "JSON Web Token (JWT)" defined by JSON Web Token (JWT) [RFC7519], the term "JOSE Header" and the term "Base64url Encoding" defined by JSON Web Signature (JWS) [RFC7515], the term "JSON Web Encryption (JWE)" defined by [RFC7516], and the term "Response Mode" defined by OAuth 2.0 Multiple Response Type Encoding Practices [OAuth.Responses].¶
This specification also defines the following terms. In the case where a term has a definition that differs, the definition below is authoritative.¶
jwt_vc_json
Credential Format, a Verifiable Credential with Cryptographic Holder Binding contains a public key or a reference to a public key that matches to the private key controlled by the Holder.¶
This specification defines a mechanism on top of OAuth 2.0 to request and present Verifiable Credentials as Verifiable Presentations.¶
As the primary extension, OpenID for Verifiable Presentations introduces the VP Token as a container to enable End-Users to present Verifiable Presentations to Verifiers using the Wallet. A VP Token contains one or more Verifiable Presentations in the same or different Credential formats.¶
This specification supports any Credential format used in the Issuer-Holder-Verifier Model, including, but not limited to those defined in [VC_DATA] (VCDM), [ISO.18013-5] (mdoc), [I-D.ietf-oauth-sd-jwt-vc] (SD-JWT VC), and [Hyperledger.Indy] (AnonCreds). Credentials of multiple formats can be presented in the same transaction. The examples given in the main part of this specification use W3C Verifiable Credentials, while examples in other Credential formats are given in Appendix B.¶
Implementations can use any pre-existing OAuth 2.0 Grant Type and Response Type in conjunction with this specification to support different deployment architectures.¶
OpenID for Verifiable Presentations supports scenarios where the Authorization Request is sent both when the Verifier is interacting with the End-User using the device that is the same or different from the device on which requested Credential(s) are stored.¶
This specification supports the response being sent using a redirect but also using an HTTP POST request. This enables the response to be sent across devices, or when the response size exceeds the redirect URL character size limitation.¶
Implementations can also be built on top of OpenID Connect Core, which is also based on OAuth 2.0. To benefit from the Self-Issued ID Token feature, this specification can also be combined with the Self-Issued OP v2 specification [SIOPv2].¶
Any of the OAuth 2.0 related specifications, such as [RFC9126] and [RFC9101], and Best Current Practice (BCP) documents, such as [RFC8252] and [I-D.ietf-oauth-security-topics], can be implemented on top of this specification.¶
Below is a diagram of a flow where the End-User presents a Credential to a Verifier interacting with the End-User on the same device that the device the Wallet resides on.¶
The flow utilizes simple redirects to pass Authorization Request and Response between the Verifier and the Wallet. The Verifiable Presentations are returned to the Verifier in the fragment part of the redirect URI, when Response Mode is fragment
.¶
Note: The diagram does not illustrate all the optional features of this specification.¶
(1) The Verifier sends an Authorization Request to the Wallet. It contains a Presentation Definition as defined in [DIF.PresentationExchange] that describes the requirements of the Credential(s) that the Verifier is requesting to be presented. Such requirements could include what type of Credential(s), in what format(s), which individual Claims within those Credential(s) (Selective Disclosure), etc. The Wallet processes the Authorization Request and determines what Credentials are available matching the Verifier's request. The Wallet also authenticates the End-User and gathers consent to present the requested Credentials.¶
(2) The Wallet prepares the Verifiable Presentation(s) of the Verifiable Credential(s) that the End-User has consented to. It then sends to the Verifier an Authorization Response where the Verifiable Presentation(s) are contained in the vp_token
parameter.¶
Below is a diagram of a flow where the End-User presents a Credential to a Verifier interacting with the End-User on a different device as the device the Wallet resides on.¶
In this flow, the Verifier prepares an Authorization Request and renders it as a QR Code. The User then uses the Wallet to scan the QR Code. The Verifiable Presentations are sent to the Verifier in a direct HTTP POST request to a URL controlled by the Verifier. The flow uses the Response Type vp_token
in conjunction with the Response Mode direct_post
, both defined in this specification. In order to keep the size of the QR Code small and be able to sign and optionally encrypt the Request Object, the actual Authorization Request contains just a Request URI according to [RFC9101], which the wallet uses to retrieve the actual Authorization Request data.¶
Note: The diagram does not illustrate all the optional features of this specification.¶
Note: The usage of the Request URI as defined in [RFC9101] does not depend on any other choices made in the protocol extensibility points, i.e., it can be used in the Same Device Flow, too.¶
(1) The Verifier sends to the Wallet an Authorization Request that contains a Request URI from where to obtain the Request Object containing Authorization Request parameters.¶
(2) The Wallet sends an HTTP GET request to the Request URI to retrieve the Request Object.¶
(2.5) The HTTP GET response returns the Request Object containing Authorization Request parameters. It especially contains a Presentation Definition as defined in [DIF.PresentationExchange] that describes the requirements of the Credential(s) that the Verifier is requesting to be presented. Such requirements could include what type of Credential(s), in what format(s), which individual Claims within those Credential(s) (Selective Disclosure), etc. The Wallet processes the Request Object and determines what Credentials are available matching the Verifier's request. The Wallet also authenticates the End-User and gathers her consent to present the requested Credentials.¶
(3) The Wallet prepares the Verifiable Presentation(s) of the Verifiable Credential(s) that the End-User has consented to. It then sends to the Verifier an Authorization Response where the Verifiable Presentation(s) are contained in the vp_token
parameter.¶
OpenID for Verifiable Presentations extends existing OAuth 2.0 mechanisms as following:¶
presentation_definition
Authorization Request parameter that uses the [DIF.PresentationExchange] syntax is defined to request presentation of Verifiable Credentials in arbitrary formats. See Section 5 for more details.¶
vp_token
response parameter is defined to return Verifiable Presentations to the Verifier in either Authorization or Token Response depending on the Response Type. See Section 6 for more details.¶
vp_token
and vp_token id_token
are defined to request Verifiable Credentials to be returned in the Authorization Response (standalone or along with a Self-Issued ID Token [SIOPv2]). See Section 6 for more details.¶
direct_post
is defined to support sending the response across devices, or when the size of the response exceeds the redirect URL character size limitation. See Section 6.2 for more details.¶
format
parameter is used throughout the protocol in order to enable customization according to the specific needs of a particular Credential format. Examples in Appendix B are given for Credential formats as specified in [VC_DATA], [ISO.18013-5], [I-D.ietf-oauth-sd-jwt-vc], and [Hyperledger.Indy].¶
client_id_scheme
Authorization Request parameter is defined to enable deployments of this specification to use different mechanisms to obtain and validate metadata of the Verifier beyond the scope of [RFC6749].¶
Presentation of Verifiable Credentials using OpenID for Verifiable Presentations can be combined with the user authentication using [SIOPv2], and the issuance of OAuth 2.0 Access Tokens.¶
The Authorization Request follows the definition given in [RFC6749] taking into account the recommendations given in [I-D.ietf-oauth-security-topics].¶
The Verifier MAY send an Authorization Request as a Request Object either by value or by reference, as defined in the JWT-Secured Authorization Request (JAR) [RFC9101].¶
This specification defines a new mechanism for the cases when the Wallet wants to provide to the Verifier details about its technical capabilities to
allow the Verifier to generate a request that matches the technical capabilities of that Wallet.
To enable this, the Authorization Request can contain a request_uri_method
parameter with the value post
that signals to the Wallet that it can make an HTTP POST request to the Verifier's request_uri
endpoint with information about its capabilities as defined in Section 5.8. The Wallet MAY continue with JAR
when it receives request_uri_method
parameter with the value post
but does not support this feature.¶
The Verifier articulates requirements of the Credential(s) that are requested using presentation_definition
and presentation_definition_uri
parameters that contain a Presentation Definition JSON object as defined in Section 5 of [DIF.PresentationExchange]. Wallet implementations MUST process Presentation Definition JSON object and select candidate Verifiable Credential(s) using the evaluation process described in Section 8 of [DIF.PresentationExchange] unless implementing only a credential profile that provides rules on how to evaluate and process [DIF.PresentationExchange].¶
The Verifier communicates a Client Identifier Scheme that indicate how the Wallet is supposed to interpret the Client Identifier and associated data in the process of Client identification, authentication, and authorization using client_id_scheme
parameter. This parameter enables deployments of this specification to use different mechanisms to obtain and validate Client metadata beyond the scope of [RFC6749]. A certain Client Identifier Scheme MAY require the Verifier to sign the Authorization Request as means of authentication and/or pass additional parameters and require the Wallet to process them.¶
Depending on the Client Identifier Scheme, the Verifier can communicate a JSON object with its metadata using the client_metadata
parameter which contains name/value pairs defined in Section 4.3 and Section 2.1 of the OpenID Connect Dynamic Client Registration 1.0 [OpenID.Registration] specification as well as [RFC7591].¶
This specification enables the Verifier to send both Presentation Definition JSON object and Client Metadata JSON object by value or by reference.¶
This specification defines the following new parameters:¶
presentation_definition
:presentation_definition_uri
parameter, or a scope
value representing a Presentation Definition is not present.¶
presentation_definition_uri
:presentation_definition
parameter, or a scope
value representing a Presentation Definition is not present. See Section 5.2 for more details.¶
client_id_scheme
:client_id
Authorization Request parameter (Client Identifier scheme). The client_id_scheme
parameter namespaces the respective Client Identifier. If an Authorization Request uses the client_id_scheme
parameter, the Wallet MUST interpret the Client Identifier of the Verifier in the context of the Client Identifier scheme. If the parameter is not present, the Wallet MUST behave as specified in [RFC6749]. See Section 5.7 for the values defined by this specification. If the same Client Identifier is used with different Client Identifier schemes, those occurrences MUST be treated as different Verifiers. Note that the Verifier needs to determine which Client Identifier schemes the Wallet supports prior to sending the Authorization Request in order to choose a supported scheme.¶
client_metadata
:A public key to be used by the Wallet as an input to the key agreement to encrypt Authorization Response (see Section 6.3). It MAY be passed by the Verifier using the jwks
or the jwks_uri
claim within the client_metadata
request parameter.¶
request_uri_method
:request_uri
parameter is included in the same request. Two case-sensitive valid values are defined in this specification: get
and post
. If request_uri_method
value is get
, the Wallet MUST send the request to retrieve the Request Object using the HTTP GET method, i.e., as defined in [RFC9101]. If request_uri_method
value is post
, a supporting Wallet MUST send the request using the HTTP POST method as detailed in Section 5.8. If the request_uri_method
parameter is not present, the Wallet MUST process the request_uri
parameter as defined in [RFC9101]. Wallets not supporting the post
method will send a GET request to the Request URI (default behavior as defined in [RFC9101]). request_uri_method
parameter MUST NOT be present if a request_uri
parameter is not present.¶
If the Verifier set the request_uri_method
parameter value to post
and there is no other means to convey its capabilities to the Wallet, it SHOULD add the client_metadata
parameter to the Authorization Request.
This enables the Wallet to assess the Verifier's capabilities, allowing it to transmit only the relevant capabilities through the wallet_metadata
parameter in the Request URI POST request. If the Verifier uses the client_id_scheme
parameter in the Request Object, it MUST also add the same client_id_scheme
value in the Authorization Request.¶
The following additional considerations are given for pre-existing Authorization Request parameters:¶
nonce
:scope
:response_mode
:direct_post
) to ask the Wallet to send the response to the Verifier via an HTTPS connection (see Section 6.2 for more details). It is also used to request signing and encrypting (see Section 6.3 for more details). If the parameter is not present, the default value is fragment
.¶
The following is a non-normative example of an Authorization Request:¶
GET /authorize? response_type=vp_token &client_id=https%3A%2F%2Fclient.example.org%2Fcb &redirect_uri=https%3A%2F%2Fclient.example.org%2Fcb &presentation_definition=... &nonce=n-0S6_WzA2Mj HTTP/1.1¶
The following is a non-normative example of an Authorization Request with a request_uri_method
parameter (including the additional client_id_scheme
and client_metadata
parameters):¶
GET /authorize? client_id=client.example.org &client_id_scheme=x509_san_dns &client_metadata=... &request_uri=https%3A%2F%2Fclient.example.org%2Frequest%2Fvapof4ql2i7m41m68uep &request_uri_method=post HTTP/1.1¶
presentation_definition
Parameter
This parameter contains a Presentation Definition JSON object conforming to the syntax defined in Section 5 of [DIF.PresentationExchange].¶
The following is a non-normative example how presentation_definition
parameter can simply be used to request the presentation of a Credential of a certain type:¶
{ "id": "vp token example", "input_descriptors": [ { "id": "id card credential", "format": { "ldp_vc": { "proof_type": [ "Ed25519Signature2018" ] } }, "constraints": { "fields": [ { "path": [ "$.type" ], "filter": { "type": "string", "pattern": "IDCardCredential" } } ] } } ] }¶
The following non-normative example shows how the Verifier can request selective disclosure or certain claims from a Credential of a particular type.¶
{ "id": "example with selective disclosure", "input_descriptors": [ { "id": "ID card with constraints", "format": { "ldp_vc": { "proof_type": [ "Ed25519Signature2018" ] } }, "constraints": { "limit_disclosure": "required", "fields": [ { "path": [ "$.type" ], "filter": { "type": "string", "pattern": "IDCardCredential" } }, { "path": [ "$.credentialSubject.given_name" ] }, { "path": [ "$.credentialSubject.family_name" ] }, { "path": [ "$.credentialSubject.birthdate" ] } ] } } ] }¶
The following non-normative example shows how the Verifiers can also ask for alternative Verifiable Credentials being presented:¶
{ "id": "alternative credentials", "submission_requirements": [ { "name": "Citizenship Information", "rule": "pick", "count": 1, "from": "A" } ], "input_descriptors": [ { "id": "id card credential", "group": [ "A" ], "format": { "ldp_vc": { "proof_type": [ "Ed25519Signature2018" ] } }, "constraints": { "fields": [ { "path": [ "$.type" ], "filter": { "type": "string", "pattern": "IDCardCredential" } } ] } }, { "id": "passport credential", "format": { "jwt_vc_json": { "alg": [ "RS256" ] } }, "group": [ "A" ], "constraints": { "fields": [ { "path": [ "$.vc.type" ], "filter": { "type": "string", "pattern": "PassportCredential" } } ] } } ] }¶
The Verifiable Credential and Verifiable Presentation formats supported by the Wallet should be published in its metadata using the metadata parameter vp_formats_supported
(see Section 8).¶
The formats supported by a Verifier may be set up using the metadata parameter vp_formats
(see Section 9.1). The Wallet MUST ignore any format
property inside a presentation_definition
object if that format
was not included in the vp_formats
property of the metadata.¶
Note: When a Verifier is requesting the presentation of a Verifiable Presentation containing a Verifiable Credential, the Verifier MUST indicate in the vp_formats
parameter the supported formats of both Verifiable Credential and Verifiable Presentation.¶
presentation_definition_uri
Parameter
presentation_definition_uri
is used to retrieve the Presentation Definition from the resource at the specified URL, rather than being passed by value. The Wallet MUST send an HTTP GET request without additional parameters. The resource MUST be exposed without further need to authenticate or authorize.¶
The protocol for the presentation_definition_uri
MUST be HTTPS.¶
The following is a non-normative example of an HTTP GET request sent after the Wallet received presentation_definition_uri
parameter with the value https://server.example.com/presentationdefs?ref=idcard_presentation_request
:¶
GET /presentationdefs?ref=idcard_presentation_request HTTP/1.1 Host: server.example.com¶
The following is a non-normative example of an HTTP GET response sent by the Verifier in response to the above HTTP GET request:¶
HTTP/1.1 200 OK ... Content-Type: application/json { "id": "vp token example", "input_descriptors": [ { "id": "id card credential", "format": { "ldp_vc": { "proof_type": [ "Ed25519Signature2018" ] } }, "constraints": { "fields": [ { "path": [ "$.type" ], "filter": { "type": "string", "pattern": "IDCardCredential" } } ] } } ] }¶
scope
Parameter to Request Verifiable Credential(s)
Wallets MAY support requesting presentation of Verifiable Credentials using OAuth 2.0 scope values.¶
Such a scope value MUST be an alias for a well-defined Presentation Definition that will be
referred to in the presentation_submission
response parameter.¶
The specific scope values, and the mapping between a certain scope value and the respective Presentation Definition is out of scope of this specification.¶
Possible options include normative text in a separate specification defining scope values along with a description of their semantics or machine readable definitions in the Wallet's server metadata, mapping a scope value to an equivalent Presentation Definition JSON object.¶
Such definition of a scope value MUST allow the Verifier to determine the identifiers of the Presentation Definition and Input Descriptor(s) in the presentation_submission
response parameter (definition_id
and descriptor_map.id
respectively) as well as the Credential formats and types in the vp_token
response parameter defined in Section 6.1.¶
It is RECOMMENDED to use collision-resistant scopes values.¶
The following is a non-normative example of an Authorization Request using the scope value com.example.IDCardCredential_presentation
,
which is an alias for the first Presentation Definition example given in Section 5.1:¶
GET /authorize? response_type=vp_token &client_id=https%3A%2F%2Fclient.example.org%2Fcb &redirect_uri=https%3A%2F%2Fclient.example.org%2Fcb &scope=com.example.healthCardCredential_presentation &nonce=n-0S6_WzA2Mj HTTP/1.1¶
vp_token
This specification defines the Response Type vp_token
.¶
vp_token
:response_type
parameter in an Authorization Request, a successful response MUST include the vp_token
parameter. The Wallet SHOULD NOT return an OAuth 2.0 Authorization Code, Access Token, or Access Token Type in a successful response to the grant request. The default Response Mode for this Response Type is fragment
, i.e., the Authorization Response parameters are encoded in the fragment added to the redirect_uri
when redirecting back to the Verifier. The Response Type vp_token
can be used with other Response Modes as defined in [OAuth.Responses]. Both successful and error responses SHOULD be returned using the supplied Response Mode, or if none is supplied, using the default Response Mode.¶
See Section 6 on how the response_type
value determines the response used to return a VP Token.¶
aud
of a Request Object
When the Verifier is sending a Request Object as defined in [RFC9101], the aud
Claim value depends on whether the recipient of the request can be identified by the Verifier or not:¶
aud
Claim MUST equal to the issuer
Claim value, when Dynamic Discovery is performed.¶
aud
Claim MUST be "https://self-issued.me/v2", when Static Discovery metadata is used.¶
Note: "https://self-issued.me/v2" is a symbolic string and can be used as an aud
Claim value even when this specification is used standalone, without SIOPv2.¶
The client_id_scheme
enables deployments of this specification to use different mechanisms to obtain and validate metadata of the Verifier beyond the scope of [RFC6749]. The term client_id_scheme
is used since the Verifier is acting as an OAuth 2.0 Client.¶
This specification defines the following values for the client_id_scheme
parameter, followed by the examples where applicable:¶
pre-registered
: This value represents the [RFC6749] default behavior, i.e., the Client Identifier needs to be known to the Wallet in advance of the Authorization Request. The Verifier metadata is obtained using [RFC7591] or through out-of-band mechanisms.¶
redirect_uri
: This value indicates that the Verifier's Redirect URI (or Response URI when Response Mode direct_post
is used) is also the value of the Client Identifier. The Authorization Request MUST NOT be signed. The Verifier MAY omit the redirect_uri
Authorization Request parameter (or response_uri
when Response Mode direct_post
is used). All Verifier metadata parameters MUST be passed using the client_metadata
parameter defined in Section 5.¶
The following is a non-normative example of a request when client_id
equals redirect_uri
.¶
HTTP/1.1 302 Found Location: https://client.example.org/universal-link? response_type=vp_token &client_id=https%3A%2F%2Fclient.example.org%2Fcb &client_id_scheme=redirect_uri &redirect_uri=https%3A%2F%2Fclient.example.org%2Fcb &presentation_definition=... &nonce=n-0S6_WzA2Mj &client_metadata=%7B%22vp_formats%22:%7B%22jwt_vp_json%22:% 7B%22alg%22:%5B%22EdDSA%22,%22ES256K%22%5D%7D,%22ldp _vp%22:%7B%22proof_type%22:%5B%22Ed25519Signature201 8%22%5D%7D%7D%7D¶
entity_id
: This value indicates that the Client Identifier is an Entity Identifier defined in OpenID Federation [OpenID.Federation]. Processing rules given in [OpenID.Federation] MUST be followed. Automatic Registration as defined in [OpenID.Federation] MUST be used. The Authorization Request MAY also contain a trust_chain
parameter. The final Verifier metadata is obtained from the Trust Chain after applying the policies, according to [OpenID.Federation]. The client_metadata
parameter, if present in the Authorization Request, MUST be ignored when this Client Identifier scheme is used.¶
did
: This value indicates that the Client Identifier is a DID defined in [DID-Core]. The request MUST be signed with a private key associated with the DID. A public key to verify the signature MUST be obtained from the verificationMethod
property of a DID Document. Since DID Document may include multiple public keys, a particular public key used to sign the request in question MUST be identified by the kid
in the JOSE Header. To obtain the DID Document, the Wallet MUST use DID Resolution defined by the DID method used by the Verifier. All Verifier metadata other than the public key MUST be obtained from the client_metadata
parameter as defined in Section 5.¶
The following is a non-normative example of a header and a body of a signed Request Object when Client Identifier scheme is a did
:¶
Header¶
{ "typ": "oauth-authz-req+jwt", "alg": "RS256", "kid": "did:example:123#1" }¶
Body¶
{ "client_id": "did:example:123", "client_id_scheme": "did", "response_type": "vp_token", "redirect_uri": "https://client.example.org/callback", "nonce": "n-0S6_WzA2Mj", "presentation_definition": "...", "client_metadata": { "vp_formats": { "jwt_vp": { "alg": [ "EdDSA", "ES256K" ] }, "ldp_vp": { "proof_type": [ "Ed25519Signature2018" ] } } } }¶
verifier_attestation
: This Client Identifier Scheme allows the Verifier to authenticate using a JWT that is bound to a certain public key as defined in Section 10. When the Client Identifier Scheme is verifier_attestation
, the Client Identifier MUST equal the sub
claim value in the Verifier attestation JWT. The request MUST be signed with the private key corresponding to the public key in the cnf
claim in the Verifier attestation JWT. This serves as proof of possesion of this key. The Verifier attestation JWT MUST be added to the jwt
JOSE Header of the request object (see Section 10). The Wallet MUST validate the signature on the Verifier attestation JWT. The iss
claim value of the Verifier Attestation JWT MUST identify a party the Wallet trusts for issuing Verifier Attestation JWTs. If the Wallet cannot establish trust, it MUST refuse the request. If the issuer of the Verifier Attestation JWT adds a redirect_uris
claim to the attestation, the Wallet MUST ensure the redirect_uri
request parameter value exactly matches one of the redirect_uris
claim entries. All Verifier metadata other than the public key MUST be obtained from the client_metadata
parameter.¶
x509_san_dns
: When the Client Identifier Scheme is x509_san_dns
, the Client Identifier MUST be a DNS name and match a dNSName
Subject Alternative Name (SAN) [RFC5280] entry in the leaf certificate passed with the request. The request MUST be signed with the private key corresponding to the public key in the leaf X.509 certificate of the certificate chain added to the request in the x5c
JOSE header [RFC7515] of the signed request object. The Wallet MUST validate the signature and the trust chain of the X.509 certificate. All Verifier metadata other than the public key MUST be obtained from the client_metadata
parameter. If the Wallet can establish trust in the Client Identifier authenticated through the certificate, e.g. because the Client Identifier is contained in a list of trusted Client Identifiers, it may allow the client to freely choose the redirect_uri
value. If not, the FQDN of the redirect_uri
value MUST match the Client Identifier.¶
x509_san_uri
: When the Client Identifier Scheme is x509_san_uri
, the Client Identifier MUST be a URI and match a uniformResourceIdentifier
Subject Alternative Name (SAN) [RFC5280] entry in the leaf certificate passed with the request. The request MUST be signed with the private key corresponding to the public key in the leaf X.509 certificate of the certificate chain added to the request in the x5c
JOSE header [RFC7515] of the signed request object. The Wallet MUST validate the signature and the trust chain of the X.509 certificate. All Verifier metadata other than the public key MUST be obtained from the client_metadata
parameter. If the Wallet can establish trust in the Client Identifier authenticated through the certificate, e.g. because the Client Identifier is contained in a list of trusted Client Identifiers, it may allow the client to freely choose the redirect_uri
value. If not, the redirect_uri
value MUST match the Client Identifier.¶
To use client_id_scheme
values entity_id
, did
, verifier_attestation
, x509_san_dns
, and x509_san_uri
, Verifiers MUST be confidential clients. This might require changes to the technical design of native apps as such apps are typically public clients.¶
Other specifications can define further values for the client_id_scheme
parameter. It is RECOMMENDED to use collision-resistant names for such values.¶
post
This request is handled by the Request URI endpoint of the Verifier.¶
The request MUST use the HTTP POST method with the https
scheme, and the content type application/x-www-form-urlencoded
and the accept header set to application/oauth-authz-req+jwt
.¶
The following parameters are defined:¶
wallet_metadata
:wallet_nonce
:wallet_nonce
value in the signed authorization request object. Value can be a base64url encoded, fresh, cryptographically random number with sufficient entropy.If the Wallet requires the Verifier to encrypt the Request Object, it SHOULD use the jwks
or jwks_uri
parameter within the wallet_metadata
parameter to pass the public key for the input to the key agreement. Other mechanisms to pass the encryption key can be used as well. If the Wallet requires an encrypted Authorization Response, it SHOULD specify supported encryption algorithms using the authorization_encryption_alg_values_supported
and authorization_encryption_enc_values_supported
parameters.¶
Additionally, if the client_id_scheme
value permits signed Request Objects, the Wallet SHOULD list supported cryptographic algorithms for securing the Request Object through the request_object_signing_alg_values_supported
parameter. Conversely, the Wallet MUST NOT include this parameter if the client_id_scheme
precludes signed Request Objects.¶
The following is a non-normative example of a request:¶
POST /request HTTP/1.1 Host: client.example.org Content-Type: application/x-www-form-urlencoded wallet_metadata=%7B%22vp_formats_supported%22%3A%7B%22jwt_vc_json%22%3A%7B%22alg_values_supported %22%3A%5B%22ES256K%22%2C%22ES384%22%5D%7D%2C%22jwt_vp_json%22%3A%7B%22alg_values_supported%22%3A% 5B%22ES256K%22%2C%22EdDSA%22%5D%7D%7D%7D& wallet_nonce=qPmxiNFCR3QTm19POc8u¶
The Request URI response MUST be an HTTP response with the content type "application/oauth-authz-req+jwt" and the body being a signed, optionally encrypted, request object as defined in [RFC9101]. The request object MUST fulfill the requirements as defined in Section 5.¶
The following is a non-normative example of a request object:¶
{ "client_id": "client.example.org", "client_id_scheme": "x509_san_dns", "response_uri": "https://client.example.org/post", "response_type": "vp_token", "response_mode": "direct_post", "presentation_definition": {...}, "nonce": "n-0S6_WzA2Mj", "wallet_nonce": "qPmxiNFCR3QTm19POc8u", "state" : "eyJhb...6-sVA" }¶
The Wallet MUST process the request as defined in [RFC9101]. Additionally, if the Wallet passed a wallet_nonce
in the POST request, the Wallet MUST validate whether the request object contains the respective nonce value in a wallet_nonce
claim. If it does not, the Wallet MUST terminate request processing.¶
The Wallet MUST extract the set of Authorization Request parameters from the Request Object. The Wallet MUST only use the parameters in this Request Object, even if the same parameter was provided in an Authorization Request query parameter. The Client Identifier value in the client_id
Authorization Request parameter and the Request Object client_id
claim value MUST be identical. If the Authorization Request contains a client_id_scheme
parameter, the client_id_scheme
Authorization Request parameter and the Request Object client_id_scheme
claim value MUST be identical. If any of these conditions are not met, the Wallet MUST terminate request processing.¶
The Wallet then validates the request as specified in OAuth 2.0 [RFC6749].¶
If the Verifier responds with any HTTP error response, the Wallet MUST terminate the process.¶
A VP Token is only returned if the corresponding Authorization Request contained a presentation_definition
parameter, a presentation_definition_uri
parameter, or a scope
parameter representing a Presentation Definition Section 5.¶
VP Token can be returned in the Authorization Response or the Token Response depending on the Response Type used. See Section 5.4 for more details.¶
If the Response Type value is vp_token
, the VP Token is returned in the Authorization Response. When the Response Type value is vp_token id_token
and the scope
parameter contains openid
, the VP Token is returned in the Authorization Response alongside a Self-Issued ID Token as defined in [SIOPv2].¶
If the Response Type value is code
(Authorization Code Grant Type), the VP Token is provided in the Token Response.¶
The expected behavior is summarized in the following table:¶
response_type parameter value |
Response containing the VP Token |
---|---|
vp_token
|
Authorization Response |
vp_token id_token
|
Authorization Response |
code
|
Token Response |
Table 1: OpenID for Verifiable Presentations response_type
values¶
The behavior with respect to the VP Token is unspecified for any other individual Response Type value, or a combination of Response Type values.¶
When a VP Token is returned, the respective response MUST include the following parameters:¶
vp_token
:vp_token
response parameter. Otherwise, this specification does not require any additional encoding when a Credential format is already represented as a JSON object or a JSON string.¶
presentation_submission
:presentation_submission
element as defined in [DIF.PresentationExchange]. It contains mappings between the requested Verifiable Credentials and where to find them within the returned VP Token. This is expressed via elements in the descriptor_map
array, known as Input Descriptor Mapping Objects. These objects contain a field called path
, which, for this specification, MUST have the value $
(top level root path) when only one Verifiable Presentation is contained in the VP Token, and MUST have the value $[n]
(indexed path from root) when there are multiple Verifiable Presentations, where n
is the index to select. Additional parameters can be defined by Credential Formats, see Appendix B for details.¶
Other parameters, such as state
or code
(from [RFC6749]), or id_token
(from [OpenID.Core]), and iss
(from [RFC9207]) can be included in the response as defined in the respective specifications. state
values MUST only contain ASCII URL safe characters (uppercase and lowercase letters, decimal digits, hyphen, period, underscore, and tilde). For the implementation considerations of a state
parameter, see Section 11.4.¶
The presentation_submission
element MUST be included as a separate response parameter alongside the VP token. Clients MUST ignore any presentation_submission
element included inside a Verifiable Presentation.¶
Including the presentation_submission
parameter as a separate response parameter allows the Wallet to provide the Verifier with additional information about the format and structure in advance of the processing of the VP Token, and can be used even with the Credential formats that do not allow for the direct inclusion of presentation_submission
parameters inside a Credential itself.¶
The following is a non-normative example of an Authorization Response when the Response Type value in the Authorization Request was vp_token
:¶
HTTP/1.1 302 Found Location: https://client.example.org/cb# presentation_submission=... &vp_token=...¶
The following is a non-normative example of a VP Token containing a single Verifiable Presentation:¶
{ "@context": [ "https://www.w3.org/2018/credentials/v1" ], "type": [ "VerifiablePresentation" ], "verifiableCredential": [ { "@context": [ "https://www.w3.org/2018/credentials/v1", "https://www.w3.org/2018/credentials/examples/v1" ], "id": "https://example.com/credentials/1872", "type": [ "VerifiableCredential", "IDCardCredential" ], "issuer": { "id": "did:example:issuer" }, "issuanceDate": "2010-01-01T19:23:24Z", "credentialSubject": { "given_name": "Fredrik", "family_name": "Strömberg", "birthdate": "1949-01-22" }, "proof": { "type": "Ed25519Signature2018", "created": "2021-03-19T15:30:15Z", "jws": "eyJhb...JQdBw", "proofPurpose": "assertionMethod", "verificationMethod": "did:example:issuer#keys-1" } } ], "id": "ebc6f1c2", "holder": "did:example:holder", "proof": { "type": "Ed25519Signature2018", "created": "2021-03-19T15:30:15Z", "challenge": "n-0S6_WzA2Mj", "domain": "https://client.example.org/cb", "jws": "eyJhbG...IAoDA", "proofPurpose": "authentication", "verificationMethod": "did:example:holder#key-1" } }¶
The following is a non-normative example of a presentation_submission
parameter sent alongside a VP Token in the example above. It corresponds to a second Presentation Definition example in Section 5.1:¶
{ "id": "Presentation example 1", "definition_id": "Example with selective disclosure", "descriptor_map": [ { "id": "ID card with constraints", "format": "ldp_vp", "path": "$", "path_nested": { "format": "ldp_vc", "path": "$.verifiableCredential[0]" } } ] }¶
A descriptor_map
element MUST contain a path_nested
parameter referring to the actual Credential carried in the respective Verifiable Presentation.¶
The following is a non-normative example of a VP Token containing multiple Verifiable Presentations:¶
[ { "@context": [ "https://www.w3.org/2018/credentials/v1" ], "type": [ "VerifiablePresentation" ], "verifiableCredential": [ { "@context": [ "https://www.w3.org/2018/credentials/v1", "https://www.w3.org/2018/credentials/examples/v1" ], "id": "https://example.com/credentials/1872", "type": [ "VerifiableCredential", "IDCardCredential" ], "issuer": { "id": "did:example:issuer" }, "issuanceDate": "2010-01-01T19:23:24Z", "credentialSubject": { "given_name": "Fredrik", "family_name": "Strömberg", "birthdate": "1949-01-22" }, "proof": { "type": "Ed25519Signature2018", "created": "2021-03-19T15:30:15Z", "jws": "eyJhb...IAoDA", "proofPurpose": "assertionMethod", "verificationMethod": "did:example:issuer#keys-1" } } ], "id": "ebc6f1c2", "holder": "did:example:holder", "proof": { "type": "Ed25519Signature2018", "created": "2021-03-19T15:30:15Z", "challenge": "n-0S6_WzA2Mj", "domain": "https://client.example.org/cb", "jws": "eyJhb...JQdBw", "proofPurpose": "authentication", "verificationMethod": "did:example:holder#key-1" } }, "eyJhbGciOiAiRVMyNTYiLCAidHlwIjogInZjK3NkLWp3dCIsICJraWQiOiAiZG9jLXNp Z25lci0wNS0yNS0yMDIyIn0.eyJfc2QiOiBbIjA5dktySk1PbHlUV00wc2pwdV9wZE9C VkJRMk0xeTNLaHBINTE1blhrcFkiLCAiMnJzakdiYUMwa3k4bVQwcEpyUGlvV1RxMF9k YXcxc1g3NnBvVWxnQ3diSSIsICJFa084ZGhXMGRIRUpidlVIbEVfVkNldUM5dVJFTE9p ZUxaaGg3WGJVVHRBIiwgIklsRHpJS2VpWmREd3BxcEs2WmZieXBoRnZ6NUZnbldhLXNO NndxUVhDaXciLCAiSnpZakg0c3ZsaUgwUjNQeUVNZmVadTZKdDY5dTVxZWhabzdGN0VQ WWxTRSIsICJQb3JGYnBLdVZ1Nnh5bUphZ3ZrRnNGWEFiUm9jMkpHbEFVQTJCQTRvN2NJ IiwgIlRHZjRvTGJnd2Q1SlFhSHlLVlFaVTlVZEdFMHc1cnREc3JaemZVYW9tTG8iLCAi amRyVEU4WWNiWTRFaWZ1Z2loaUFlX0JQZWt4SlFaSUNlaVVRd1k5UXF4SSIsICJqc3U5 eVZ1bHdRUWxoRmxNXzNKbHpNYVNGemdsaFFHMERwZmF5UXdMVUs0Il0sICJpc3MiOiAi aHR0cHM6Ly9leGFtcGxlLmNvbS9pc3N1ZXIiLCAiaWF0IjogMTY4MzAwMDAwMCwgImV4 cCI6IDE4ODMwMDAwMDAsICJ2Y3QiOiAiaHR0cHM6Ly9jcmVkZW50aWFscy5leGFtcGxl LmNvbS9pZGVudGl0eV9jcmVkZW50aWFsIiwgIl9zZF9hbGciOiAic2hhLTI1NiIsICJj bmYiOiB7Imp3ayI6IHsia3R5IjogIkVDIiwgImNydiI6ICJQLTI1NiIsICJ4IjogIlRD QUVSMTladnUzT0hGNGo0VzR2ZlNWb0hJUDFJTGlsRGxzN3ZDZUdlbWMiLCAieSI6ICJa eGppV1diWk1RR0hWV0tWUTRoYlNJaXJzVmZ1ZWNDRTZ0NGpUOUYySFpRIn19fQ.D43eE W1ae2yAzhzriJuBz-_cgX1wwNJIgNMjsdO28QE0fU8KC8ugjTPaylIp48HMVS0xV2wDQ 9bl1zFzlbDULg~WyJRZ19PNjR6cUF4ZTQxMmExMDhpcm9BIiwgImFkZHJlc3MiLCB7In N0cmVldF9hZGRyZXNzIjogIjEyMyBNYWluIFN0IiwgImxvY2FsaXR5IjogIkFueXRvd2 4iLCAicmVnaW9uIjogIkFueXN0YXRlIiwgImNvdW50cnkiOiAiVVMifV0~eyJhbGciOi AiRVMyNTYiLCAidHlwIjogImtiK2p3dCJ9.eyJub25jZSI6ICIxMjM0NTY3ODkwIiwgI mF1ZCI6ICJodHRwczovL2V4YW1wbGUuY29tL3ZlcmlmaWVyIiwgImlhdCI6IDE3MDk1N zYwMzcsICJzZF9oYXNoIjogIkQtaGVBamp0Q2Z4bkhjTDJyckZtNXNreTBjYXlZakhYd zd3U2dwU3N2bzQifQ.ytKc24j5CGv8So1Iyo5LhPROWCpg-p4YwtyNCt0L1QsSh7MPhS mUtBzlOgb3xvMde0uk3MUpLLUVO96zlrp6zg" ]¶
The following is a non-normative example of a presentation_submission
parameter sent alongside a VP Token in the example above. It does not correspond to any Presentation Definition examples in this specification:¶
{ "id": "Presentation example 2", "definition_id": "Example with multiple VPs", "descriptor_map": [ { "id": "ID Card with constraints", "format": "ldp_vp", "path": "$[0]", "path_nested": { "format": "ldp_vc", "path": "$.verifiableCredential[0]" } }, { "id": "Example credential disclosing only address", "format": "vc+sd-jwt", "path": "$[1]" } ] }¶
The Response Mode direct_post
allows the Wallet to send the Authorization Response to an endpoint controlled by the Verifier via an HTTP POST request.¶
It has been defined to address the following use cases:¶
fragment
) cannot be used. In those cases, the Response Mode direct_post
is the way to convey the Verifiable Presentations to the Verifier without the need for the Wallet to have a backend.¶
The Response Mode is defined in accordance with [OAuth.Responses] as follows:¶
direct_post
:application/x-www-form-urlencoded
content type. The flow can end with an HTTP POST request from the Wallet to the Verifier, or it can end with a redirect that follows the HTTP POST request, if the Verifier responds with a redirect URI to the Wallet.¶
The following new Authorization Request parameter is defined to be used in conjunction with Response Mode direct_post
:¶
response_uri
:direct_post
is used. The Response URI to which the Wallet MUST send the Authorization Response using an HTTP POST request as defined by the Response Mode direct_post
. The Response URI receives all Authorization Response parameters as defined by the respective Response Type. When the response_uri
parameter is present, the redirect_uri
Authorization Request parameter MUST NOT be present. If the redirect_uri
Authorization Request parameter is present when the Response Mode is direct_post
, the Wallet MUST return an invalid_request
Authorization Response error. The response_uri
value MUST be a value that the client would be permitted to use as redirect_uri
when following the rules defined in Section 5.7.¶
Note: When the specification text refers to the usage of Redirect URI in the Authorization Request, that part of the text also applies when Response URI is used in the Authorization Request with Response Mode direct_post
.¶
Note: The Verifier's component providing the user interface (Frontend) and the Verifier's component providing the Response URI (Response Endpoint) need to be able to map authorization requests to the respective authorization responses. The Verifier MAY use the state
Authorization Request parameter to add appropriate data to the Authorization Response for that purpose, for details see Section 11.5.¶
The following is a non-normative example of the payload of a Request Object with Response Mode direct_post
:¶
{ "client_id": "https://client.example.org/post", "client_id_scheme": "redirect_uri", "response_uri": "https://client.example.org/post", "response_type": "vp_token", "response_mode": "direct_post", "presentation_definition": {...}, "nonce": "n-0S6_WzA2Mj", "state": "eyJhb...6-sVA" }¶
The following non-normative example of an Authorization Request refers to the Authorization Request Object from above through the request_uri
parameter. The Authorization Request can be displayed to the End-User either directly (as a link) or as a QR Code:¶
https://wallet.example.com? client_id=https%3A%2F%2Fclient.example.org%2Fcb &request_uri=https%3A%2F%2Fclient.example.org%2F567545564¶
The following is a non-normative example of the Authorization Response that is sent via an HTTP POST request to the Verifier's Response Endpoint:¶
POST /post HTTP/1.1 Host: client.example.org Content-Type: application/x-www-form-urlencoded presentation_submission=...& vp_token=...& state=eyJhb...6-sVA¶
The following is a non-normative example of an Authorization Error Response that is sent as an HTTP POST request to the Verifier's Response Endpoint:¶
POST /post HTTP/1.1 Host: client.example.org Content-Type: application/x-www-form-urlencoded error=invalid_request& error_description=unsupported%20client_id_scheme& state=eyJhb...6-sVA¶
If the Response Endpoint has successfully processed the Authorization Response or Authorization Error Response, it MUST respond with HTTP status code 200.¶
The following new parameter is defined for use in the response from the endpoint:¶
redirect_uri
:redirect_uri
parameter in response to successful Authorization Responses or for Error Responses.¶
Note: Response Mode direct_post
without the redirect_uri
could be less secure than Response Modes with redirects. For details, see (Section 12.2).¶
The value of the redirect URI is an absolute URI as defined by [RFC3986] Section 4.3 and is chosen by the Verifier. The Verifier MUST include a fresh, cryptographically random value in the URL. This value is used to ensure only the receiver of the redirect can fetch and process the Authorization Response. The value can be added as a path component, as a fragment or as a parameter to the URL. It is RECOMMENDED to use a cryptographic random value of 128 bits or more. For implementation considerations see Section 11.5.¶
The following is a non-normative example of the response from the Verifier to the Wallet upon receiving the Authorization Response at the Response Endpoint (using a response_code
parameter from Section 11.5):¶
HTTP/1.1 200 OK Content-Type: application/json Cache-Control: no-store { "redirect_uri": "https://client.example.org/cb#response_code=091535f699ea575c7937fa5f0f454aee" }¶
If the response does not contain the redirect_uri
parameter, the Wallet is not required to perform any further steps.¶
Note: In the Response Mode direct_post
or direct_post.jwt
, the Wallet can change the UI based on the Verifier's callback to the Wallet following the submission of the Authorization Response.¶
This section defines how Authorization Response containing a VP Token can be signed and/or encrypted at the application level when the Response Type value is vp_token
or vp_token id_token
. Encrypting the Authorization Response can prevent personal data in the Authorization Response from leaking, when the Authorization Response is returned through the front channel (e.g., the browser).¶
To sign, or sign and encrypt the Authorization Response, implementations MAY use JWT Secured Authorization Response Mode for OAuth 2.0 (JARM) [JARM].¶
This specification also defines how to encrypt an unsigned Authorization Response by extending the mechanisms defined in [JARM]. The JSON containing the Authorization Response parameters can be encrypted as the payload of the JWE.¶
The advantage of an encrypted but not signed Authorization Response is that it prevents the signing key from being used as a correlation factor. It can also be a challenge to establish trust in the signing key to ensure authenticity. For security considerations with encrypted but unsigned responses, see Section 12.5.¶
If the JWT is only a JWE, the following processing rules MUST be followed:¶
iss
, exp
and aud
MUST be omitted in the JWT Claims Set of the JWE, and the processing rules as per [JARM] Section 2.4 related to these claims do not apply.¶
The following is a non-normative example of the payload of a JWT used in an Authorization Response that is encrypted and not signed:¶
{ "vp_token": "eyJhb...YMetA", "presentation_submission": { "definition_id": "example_jwt_vc", "id": "example_jwt_vc_presentation_submission", "descriptor_map": [ { "id": "id_credential", "path": "$", "format": "jwt_vp_json", "path_nested": { "path": "$.vp.verifiableCredential[0]", "format": "jwt_vc" } } ] } }¶
The JWT response document MUST include vp_token
and presentation_submission
parameters as defined in Section 6.1.¶
The key material used for encryption and signing SHOULD be determined using existing metadata mechanisms.¶
To obtain Verifier's public key for the input to the key agreement to encrypt the Authorization Response, the Wallet MUST use jwks
or jwks_uri
claim within the client_metadata
request parameter, or within the metadata defined in the Entity Configuration when [OpenID.Federation] is used, or other mechanisms.¶
To sign the Authorization Response, the Wallet MUST use a private key that corresponds to a public key made available in its metadata.¶
This specification also defines a new Response Mode direct_post.jwt
, which allows for JARM to be used with Response Mode direct_post
defined in Section 6.2.¶
The Response Mode direct_post.jwt
causes the Wallet to send the Authorization Response using an HTTP POST request instead of redirecting back to the Verifier as defined in Section 6.2. The Wallet adds the response
parameter containing the JWT as defined in Section 4.1. of [JARM] and Section 6.3 in the body of an HTTP POST request using the application/x-www-form-urlencoded
content type.¶
The following is a non-normative example of a response using the presentation_submission
and vp_token
values from Appendix B.1.1. (line breaks for display purposes only):¶
POST /post HTTP/1.1 Host: client.example.org Content-Type: application/x-www-form-urlencoded response=eyJra...9t2LQ¶
The following is a non-normative example of the payload of the JWT used in the example above before base64url encoding and signing:¶
{ "iss": "did:example:ebfeb1f712ebc6f1c276e12ec21", "aud": "https://client.example.org/cb", "exp": 1573029723, "vp_token": "eyJhb...YMetA", "presentation_submission": { "definition_id": "example_jwt_vc", "id": "example_jwt_vc_presentation_submission", "descriptor_map": [ { "id": "id_credential", "path": "$", "format": "jwt_vp_json", "path_nested": { "path": "$.vp.verifiableCredential[0]", "format": "jwt_vc" } } ] } }¶
The error response follows the rules as defined in [RFC6749], with the following additional clarifications:¶
invalid_scope
:¶
invalid_request
:¶
presentation_definition
parameter, a presentation_definition_uri
parameter, or a scope value representing a Presentation Definition.¶
vp_token
Response Type but does not request a Credential using any of the three options¶
client_id_scheme
value passed in the Authorization Request.¶
entity_id
.¶
invalid_client
:¶
client_metadata
parameter defined in Section 5 is present, but the Wallet recognizes Client Identifier and knows metadata associated with it.¶
client_metadata
parameter is also present.¶
access_denied
:¶
This document also defines the following additional error codes and error descriptions:¶
vp_formats_not_supported
:¶
vp_formats
registration parameter.¶
invalid_presentation_definition_uri
:¶
invalid_presentation_definition_reference
:¶
presentation_definition
cannot be found at the URL.¶
invalid_request_uri_method
:¶
request_uri_method
request parameter is neither get
nor post
(case-sensitive).¶
wallet_unavailable
:¶
Verifiers MUST validate the VP Token in the following manner:¶
Note: Some of the processing rules of the Presentation Definition and the Presentation Submission are outlined in [DIF.PresentationExchange].¶
The Verifier has the choice of the following mechanisms to invoke a Wallet:¶
authorization_endpoint
(for example, openid4vp://
as defined in Section 11.1.2)¶
authorization_endpoint
¶
authorization_endpoint
, user scanning a QR code with Authorization Request using a manually opened Wallet, instead of an arbitrary camera application on a user-device (neither custom URL scheme nor Universal/App link is used)¶
This specification defines how the Verifier can determine Credential formats, proof types and algorithms supported by the Wallet to be used in a protocol exchange.¶
This specification defines new metadata parameters according to [RFC8414].¶
presentation_definition_uri_supported
: OPTIONAL. Boolean value specifying whether the Wallet supports the transfer of presentation_definition
by reference, with true indicating support. If omitted, the default value is true.¶
vp_formats_supported
: REQUIRED. An object containing a list of name/value pairs, where the name is a string identifying a Credential format supported by the Wallet. Valid Credential format identifier values are defined in Appendix A of [OpenID.VCI]. Other values may be used when defined in the profiles of this specification. The value is an object containing a parameter defined below:¶
alg_values_supported
: OPTIONAL. An object where the value is an array of case sensitive strings that identify the cryptographic suites that are supported. Parties will need to agree upon the meanings of the values used, which may be context-specific. For specific values that can be used depending on the Credential format, see Appendix B. If alg_values_supported
is omitted, it is unknown what cryptographic suites the wallet supports.¶
The following is a non-normative example of a vp_formats_supported
parameter:¶
"vp_formats_supported": { "jwt_vc_json": { "alg_values_supported": [ "ES256K", "ES384" ] }, "jwt_vp_json": { "alg_values_supported": [ "ES256K", "EdDSA" ] } }¶
client_id_schemes_supported
:pre-registered
, redirect_uri
, entity_id
, did
. If omitted, the default value is pre-registered
. Other values may be used when defined in the profiles of this specification.¶
Verifier utilizing this specification has multiple options to obtain Wallet's metadata:¶
To convey Verifier metadata, Client metadata defined in Section 2 of [RFC7591] is used.¶
This specification defines how the Wallet can determine Credential formats, proof types and algorithms supported by the Verifier to be used in a protocol exchange.¶
This specification defines the following new metadata parameters according to [RFC7591], to be used by the Verifier:¶
vp_formats
:The Verifier Attestation JWT is a JWT especially designed to allow a Wallet to authenticate a Verifier in a secure and flexible manner. A Verifier Attestation JWT is issued to the Verifier by a party that wallets trust for the purpose of authentication and authorization of Verifiers. The way this trust established is out of scope of this specification. Every Verifier is bound to a public key, the Verifier MUST always present a Verifier Attestation JWT along with the proof of possession for this key. In the case of the client_id_scheme
verifier_attestation
, the authorization request is signed with this key, which serves as proof of possession.¶
A Verifier Attestation JWT MUST contain the following claims:¶
iss
: REQUIRED. This claim identifies the issuer of the Verifier Attestation JWT. The iss
value MAY be used to retrieve the issuer's public key. How the trust is established between Wallet and Issuer and how the public key is obtained for validating the attestation's signature is out of scope of this specification.¶
sub
: REQUIRED. The value of this claim MUST be the client_id
of the client making the credential request.¶
iat
: OPTIONAL. (number). The value of this claim MUST be the time at which the Verifier Attestation JWT was issued using the syntax defined in [RFC7519].¶
exp
: REQUIRED. (number). The value of this claim MUST be the time at which the Verifier Attestation JWT expires using the syntax defined in [RFC7519]. The Wallet MUST reject any Verifier Attestation JWT with an expiration time that has passed, subject to allowable clock skew between systems.¶
nbf
: OPTIONAL. The Verifier Attestation JWT MAY contain an "nbf" (not before) claim that identifies the time before which the token MUST NOT be accepted for processing.¶
cnf
: REQUIRED. This claim contains the confirmation method as defined in [RFC7800]. It MUST contain a JWK as defined in Section 3.2 of [RFC7800]. This claim determines the public key for which's corresponding private key the Verifier MUST proof possession of when presenting the Verifier Attestation JWT. This additional security measure allows the Verifier to obtain a Verifier Attestion JWT from a trusted issuer and use it for a long time independent of that issuer without the risk of an advisary impersonating the Verifier by replaying a captured attestation.¶
The Verifier Attestation JWT MAY use any claim registered in the "JSON Web Token Claims" registry as defined in [RFC7519].¶
Verifier Attestation JWTs compliant with this specification MUST use the media type application/verifier-attestation+jwt
as defined in Appendix C.2.1.¶
A Verifier Attestation JWT MUST set the typ
JOSE header to verifier-attestation+jwt
.¶
The Verifier Attestation JWT MAY be conveyed in the header of a JWS signed object (JOSE header).¶
This specification introduces a JOSE header, which can be used to add a JWT to such a header as follows:¶
jwt
: This JOSE header MUST contain a JWT.¶
In the context of this specification, such a JWT MUST set the typ
JOSE header to verifier-attestation+jwt
.¶
This document lists profiles that define static configuration values of the Wallets and defines one set of static configuration values that can be used by the Verifier when it is unable to perform Dynamic Discovery and is not using any of the profiles.¶
The following is a list of profiles that define static configuration values of Wallets:¶
openid4vp://
The following is a non-normative example of a set of static configuration values that can be used with vp_token
parameter as a supported Response Type, bound to a custom URL scheme openid4vp://
as an Authorization Endpoint:¶
{ "authorization_endpoint": "openid4vp:", "response_types_supported": [ "vp_token" ], "vp_formats_supported": { "jwt_vp_json": { "alg_values_supported": ["ES256"] }, "jwt_vc_json": { "alg_values_supported": ["ES256"] } }, "request_object_signing_alg_values_supported": [ "ES256" ] }¶
Often Verifiers will want to request Verifiable Credentials from a Credential Issuer who is a participant of a federation, or adheres to a known trust scheme, rather than from a specific Credential Issuer, for example, a "BSc Chemistry Degree" Credential from the hypothetical "eduCreds" trust scheme rather than from a specifically named university.¶
To facilitate this, federations will need to determine how a Credential Issuer can indicate in a Verifiable Credential that they are a member of one or more federations/trust schemes. Once this is done, the Verifier will be able to create a presentation_definition
that includes this filtering criteria. This will enable the Wallet to select all the Verifiable Credentials that match this criteria and then by some means (for example, by asking the user) determine which matching Verifiable Credential to return to the Verifier. Upon receiving this Verifiable Credential, the Verifier will be able to call its federation API to determine if the Credential Issuer is indeed a member of the federation/trust scheme that it says it is.¶
Indicating the federations/trust schemes used by a Credential Issuer MAY be achieved by defining a termsOfUse
property [VC_DATA].¶
Note: [VC_DATA] describes terms of use as "can be utilized by a Credential Issuer ... to communicate the terms under which a Verifiable Credential ... was issued."¶
The following is a non-normative example of the terms of use that may be defined:¶
{ "termsOfUse": [ { "type": "<uri that identifies this type of terms of use>", "federations": [ "<list of federations/trust schemes the Credential Issuer asserts it is a member of>" ] } ] }¶
Federations that conform to those specified in [OpenID.Federation] are identified by the type
urn:ietf:params:oauth:federation
. Individual federations are identified by the Entity Identifier of the trust anchor. If the federation decides to use trust marks as signs of whether an entity belongs to a federation or not then the federation is identified by the type
urn:ietf:params:oauth:federation_trust_mark
and individual federations are identified by the Entity Identifier of the trust mark issuer.¶
Trust schemes that conform to the TRAIN [TRAIN] trust scheme are identified by the type
https://train.trust-scheme.de/info
. Individual federations are identified by their DNS names.¶
The following is a non-normative example of a claims
parameter containing a presentation_definition
that filters VCs based on their federation memberships:¶
{ "vp_token": { "presentation_definition": { "id": "32f54163-7166-48f1", "input_descriptors": [ { "id": "federationExample", "purpose": "To pick a UK university that is a member of the UK academic federation", "constraints": { "fields": [ { "path": [ "$.termsOfUse.type" ], "filter": { "type": "string", "const": "https://train.trust-scheme.de/info" } }, { "path": [ "$.termsOfUse.federations" ], "filter": { "type": "string", "const": "ukuniversities.ac.uk" } } ] } } ] } } }¶
This example will choose a Verifiable Credential that has been issued by a university that is a member of the ukuniversities.ac.uk
federation and that uses the TRAIN terms of use specification for asserting federation memberships.¶
Current version of this document does not support presentation of a Verifiable Presentation nested inside another Verifiable Presentation, even though [DIF.PresentationExchange] specification theoretically supports this by stating that the nesting of path_nested
objects "may be any number of levels deep".¶
One level of nesting path_nested
objects is sufficient to describe a Verifiable Credential included inside a Verifiable Presentation.¶
The state
parameter defined in Section 4.1.1 of [RFC6749] may be used by a verifier to link requests and responses. Also see Section 3.6 and Section 5.3.5 of [RFC6819], and [I-D.ietf-oauth-security-topics].¶
When using Response Mode direct_post
, also see Section 12.3.¶
direct_post
The design of the interactions between the different components of the Verifier (especially Frontend and Response Endpoint) when using Response Mode direct_post
is at the discretion of the Verifier since it does not affect the interface between the Verifier and the Wallet.¶
In order to support implementers, this section outlines a possible design that fulfills the Security Considerations given in Section 12.¶
The design is illustrated in the following sequence diagram:¶
(1) The Verifier produces a nonce
value by generating at least 16 fresh, cryptographically random bytes with sufficient entropy, associates it with the session and base64url encodes it.¶
(2) The Verifier initiates a new transaction at its Response Endpoint.¶
(3) The Response Endpoint will set up the transaction and respond with two fresh, cryptographically random numbers with sufficient entropy designated as transaction-id
and request-id
. Those values are used in the process to identify the authorization response (request-id
) and to ensure only the Verifier can obtain the Authorization Response data (transaction-id
).¶
(4) The Verifier then sends the Authorization Request with the request-id
as state
and the nonce
value created in step (1) to the Wallet.¶
(5) After authenticating the End-User and getting her consent to share the request Credentials, the Wallet sends the Authorization Response with the parameters vp_token
, presentation_submission
and state
to the response_uri
of the Verifier.¶
(6) The Verifier's Response Endpoint checks whether the state
value is a valid request-id
. If so, it stores the Authorization Response data linked to the respective transaction-id
. It then creates a response_code
as fresh, cryptographically random number with sufficient entropy that it also links with the respective Authorization Response data. It then returns the redirect_uri
, which includes the response_code
to the Wallet.¶
Note: If the Verifier's Response Endpoint does not return a redirect_uri
, processing at the Wallet stops at that step. The Verifier is supposed to fetch the Authorization Response without waiting for a redirect (see step 8).¶
(7) The Wallet sends the user agent to the Verifier (redirect_uri
). The Verifier receives the Request and extracts the response_code
parameter.¶
(8) The Verifier sends the response_code
and the transaction-id
from its session to the Response Endpoint.¶
transaction-id
to look the matching Authorization Response data up, which implicitly validates the transaction-id
associated with the Verifier's session.¶
response_code
was associated with this Authorization Response in step (6).¶
Note: If the Verifier's Response Endpoint did not return a redirect_uri
in step (6), the Verifier will periodically query the Response Endpoint with the transaction-id
to obtain the Authorization Response once it becomes available.¶
(9) The Response Endpoint returns the VP Token and Presentation Submission for further processing to the Verifier.¶
(10) The Verifier checks whether the nonce
received in the Credential(s) in the VP Token in step (9) corresponds to the nonce
value from the session. The Verifier then consumes the VP Token and invalidates the transaction-id
, request-id
and nonce
in the session.¶
An attacker could try to inject a VP Token (or an individual Verifiable Presentation), that was obtained from a previous Authorization Response, into another Authorization Response thus impersonating the End-User that originally presented that VP Token or the respective Verifiable Presentation.¶
Implementers of this specification MUST implement the controls as defined in this section to detect such an attack.¶
This specification assumes that a Verifiable Credential is always presented with a cryptographic proof of possession which can be a Verifiable Presentation. This cryptographic proof of possession MUST be bound by the Wallet to the intended audience (the Client Identifier of the Verifier) and the respective transaction (identified by the nonce
parameter in the Authorization Request). The Verifier MUST verify this binding.¶
The Verifier MUST create a fresh, cryptographically random number with sufficient entropy for every Authorization Request, store it with its current session, and pass it in the nonce
Authorization Request Parameter to the Wallet.¶
The Wallet MUST link every Verifiable Presentation returned to the Verifier in the VP Token to the client_id
and the nonce
values of the respective Authentication Request.¶
The Verifier MUST validate every individual Verifiable Presentation in an Authorization Response and ensure that it is linked to the values of the client_id
and the nonce
parameter it had used for the respective Authorization Request. If the response contains multiple Verifiable Presentations which do not contain the same nonce value, the response is rejected.¶
The client_id
is used to detect the presentation of Verifiable Credentials to a party other than the one intended. This allows Verifiers take appropriate action in that case, such as not accepting the Verifiable Presentation. The nonce
value binds the Presentation to a certain authentication transaction and allows the Verifier to detect injection of a Presentation in the flow, which is especially important in the flows where the Presentation is passed through the front-channel.¶
Note: Different formats for Verifiable Presentations and signature/proof schemes use different ways to represent the intended audience and the session binding. Some use claims to directly represent those values, others include the values into the calculation of cryptographic proofs. There are also different naming conventions across the different formats. The format of the respective presentation is determined from the format information in the presentation submission in the Authorization Response.¶
The following is a non-normative example of the payload of a Verifiable Presentation of a format identifier jwt_vp_json
:¶
{ "iss": "did:example:ebfeb1f712ebc6f1c276e12ec21", "jti": "urn:uuid:3978344f-8596-4c3a-a978-8fcaba3903c5", "aud": "s6BhdRkqt3", "nonce": "343s$FSFDa-", "nbf": 1541493724, "iat": 1541493724, "exp": 1573029723, "vp": { "@context": [ "https://www.w3.org/2018/credentials/v1", "https://www.w3.org/2018/credentials/examples/v1" ], "type": ["VerifiablePresentation"], "verifiableCredential": [""] } }¶
In the example above, the requested nonce
value is included as the nonce
and client_id
as the aud
value in the proof of the Verifiable Presentation.¶
The following is a non-normative example of a Verifiable Presentation of a format identifier ldp_vp
without a proof
property:¶
{ "@context": [ ... ], "type": "VerifiablePresentation", "verifiableCredential": [ ... ], "proof": { "type": "RsaSignature2018", "created": "2018-09-14T21:19:10Z", "proofPurpose": "authentication", "verificationMethod": "did:example:ebfeb1f712ebc6f1c276e12ec21#keys-1", "challenge": "343s$FSFDa-", "domain": "s6BhdRkqt3", "jws": "eyJhb...nKb78" } }¶
In the example above, the requested nonce
value is included as the challenge
and client_id
as the domain
value in the proof of the Verifiable Presentation.¶
To perform a Session Fixation attack, an attacker would start the process using a Verifier executed on a device under his control, capture the Authorization Request and relay it to the device of a victim. The attacker would then periodically try to conclude the process in his Verifier, which would cause the Verifier on his device to try to fetch and verify the Authorization Response.¶
Such an attack is impossible against flows implemented with the Response Mode fragment
as the Wallet will always send the VP Token to the redirect endpoint on the same device where it resides. This means an attacker could extract a valid Authorization Request from a Verifier on his device and trick a Victim into performing the same Authorization Request on her device. But there is technically no way for an attacker to get hold of the resulting VP Token.¶
However, the Response Mode direct_post
is susceptible to such an attack as the result is sent from the Wallet out-of-band to the Verifier's Response Endpoint.¶
This kind of attack can be detected if the Response Mode direct_post
is used in conjunction with the redirect URI, which causes the Wallet to redirect the flow to the Verifier's frontend at the device where the transaction was concluded. The Verifier's Response Endpoint MUST include a fresh secret (Response Code) into the redirect URI returned to the Wallet and the Verifier's Response Endpoint MUST require the frontend to pass the respective Response Code when fetching the Authorization Response. That stops session fixation attacks as long as the attacker is unable to get access to the Response Code.¶
Note that this protection technique is not applicable to cross-device scenarios because the browser used by the wallet will not have the original session. It is also not applicable in same-device scenarios if the wallet uses a browser different from the one used on the presentation request (e.g. device with multiple installed browsers), because the original session will also not be available there.¶
See Section 11.5 for more implementation considerations.¶
When using the Response Mode direct_post
without the further protection provided by the redirect URI, there is no session context for the Verifier to detect session fixation attempts. It is RECOMMENDED for the Verifiers to implement mechanisms to strengthen the security of the flow. For more details on possible attacks and mitigations see [I-D.ietf-oauth-cross-device-security].¶
The Wallet MUST ensure the data in the Authorization Response cannot leak through Response URIs. When using pre-registered Response URIs, the Wallet MUST comply with best practices for redirect URI validation as defined in [I-D.ietf-oauth-security-topics]. The Wallet MAY also rely on a Client Identifier scheme in conjunction with Client Authentication and integrity protection of the request to establish trust in the Response URI provided by a certain Verifier.¶
The Verifier SHOULD protect its Response URI from inadvertent requests by checking that the value of the received state
parameter corresponds to a recent Authorization Request. It MAY also use JARM [JARM] to authenticate the originator of the request.¶
Clients intending to authenticate the end-user utilizing a claim in a Verifiable Credential MUST ensure this claim is stable for the end-user as well locally unique and never reassigned within the Credential Issuer to another end-user. Such a claim MUST also only be used in combination with the Credential Issuer identifier to ensure global uniqueness and to prevent attacks where an attacker obtains the same claim from a different Credential Issuer and tries to impersonate the legitimate user.¶
If an encrypted Authorization Response has no additional integrity protection, an attacker might be able to alter Authorization Response parameters such as presentation_submission
and generate a new encrypted Authorization Response for the Verifier, as encryption is performed using the public key of the Verifier which is likely to be widely known. Note this includes injecting a new VP Token. Since the contents of the VP Token are integrity protected, tampering the VP Token is detectable by the Verifier. For details, see Section 12.1.¶
In many instances the referenced server will be operated by a known federation or other trusted operator, and the URL's domain name will already be widely known. Wallets using this URI can mitigate request forgeries by having a pre-configured set of trusted domain names and only fetching Presentation Definition from these sources. In addition, the Presentation Definitions could be signed by a trusted authority, such as the federation operator.¶
Implementers MUST make sure that JSONPath used as part of presentation_definition
and presentation_submission
parameters cannot be used to execute arbitrary scripts on a server. This can be achieved, for example, by implementing the entire syntax of the query without relying on the parsers of programming language engine. For details, see Section 4 of [I-D.ietf-jsonpath-base].¶
Implementers should be careful with what is used as a filter property in [DIF.PresentationExchange]. For example, when using regular expressions or JSON Schemas as filters, implementers should ensure that computations and resource access are bounded with the security in mind to prevent attacks such as denial of service or unauthorized access.¶
This section defines a profile of OpenID4VP for use with the W3C Digital Credentials API [w3c.digital_credentials_api].¶
The W3C Digital Credentials API defines a Web Platform API which allows web sites acting as Verifiers to request the presentation of Verifiable Credentials. The API itself does not define a Credential exchange protocol but can be used with multiple protocols. The Web Platform, working in conjunction with other layers, such as the app platform/operating system, and based on the permission of the End-User, will send the request data along with the web origin of the Verifier to the End-User's chosen Wallet.¶
This OpenID4VP profile utilizes the mechanisms of the W3C Digital Credentials API while also allowing to leverage advanced security features of OpenID4VP, if needed. It also defines the OpenID4VP request parameters that MAY be used with the W3C Digital Credentials API.¶
The Digital Credentials API offers several advantages for implementers of both Verifiers and Wallets.¶
Firstly, the API serves as a privacy-preserving alternative to invoking Wallets via URLs, particularly custom URL schemes. The underlying app platform will only invoke a Wallet if the user confirms the request based on contextual information about the credential request and the requestor (Verifier).¶
Secondly, the session with the user will always continue in the initial context, typically a browser tab, when the request has been fulfilled (or aborted), which results in an improved user experience.¶
Thirdly, cross-device requests benefit from the use of secure transports with proximity checks, which are handled by the OS platform, e.g., using FIDO CTAP 2.2 with hybrid transports.¶
And lastly, as part of the request, the Wallet is provided with information about the Verifier's origin as authenticated by the user agent, which is important for phishing resistance.¶
The value of the protocol
parameter of the W3C Digital Credentials API MUST be set to openid4vp
for this profile.¶
The request
member of the W3C Digital Credentials API [w3c.digital_credentials_api] contains an OpenID4VP Authorization Request, where every OpenID4VP Authorization Request parameter is represented as a top-level JavaScript object member.¶
The following is a non-normative example of how the W3C Digital Credentials API can be used with an unsigned OpenID4VP request when advanced security features of OpenID4VP are not used:¶
try { const credential = await navigator.identity.get({ digital: { providers: [{ protocol: "openid4vp", request: { response_type: "vp_token", nonce: "n-0S6_WzA2Mj", client_metadata: {...}, presentation_definition: {...} } }] } }); } catch (err) { // Handle errors and/or fallback to other invocation mechanisms }¶
Out of the Authorization Request parameters defined in [RFC6749] and Section 5, the following are supported with this profile:¶
client_id
¶
client_id_scheme
¶
response_type
¶
response_mode
¶
nonce
¶
presentation_definition
¶
client_metadata
¶
request
¶
The client_id
and client_id_scheme
MUST be omitted in unsigned requests defined in Appendix A.3.1. The Wallet determines the Client Identifier from the origin as asserted by the Web Platform and/or app platform. The transport of the request and origin from the Web Platform and/or app platform to the Wallet is platform-specific and is out of scope of this profile.¶
The value of the response_mode
parameter MUST be w3c_dc_api
when the response is neither signed nor encrypted and w3c_dc_api.jwt
when the response is signed and/or encrypted as defined in Section 6.3.¶
In addition to the above-mentioned parameters, this profile introduces a new parameter:¶
expected_origins
: REQUIRED when signed requests defined in Appendix A.3.2 are used with the W3C Digital Credentials API [w3c.digital_credentials_api]. An array of strings, each string representing an origin of the Verifier that is making the request. The Wallet can detect replay of the request from a malicious Verifier by comparing values in this parameter to the origin asserted by the Web Platform.¶
Any OpenID4VP request compliant to this section of this specification can be used with the W3C Digital Credentials API [w3c.digital_credentials_api]. Depending on the mechanism used to identify and authenticate the Verifier, the request can be signed or unsigned. This section defines signed and unsigned OpenID4VP requests for use with the W3C Digital Credentials API.¶
The Verifier MAY send all the OpenID4VP request parameters as members in the request
member passed to the API. In this case, the Wallet will use the Verifier's origin as asserted by the Browser as the Verifer's Client Identifier.¶
The Verifier MAY send a signed request, for example, when identification and authentication of the Verifier is required.¶
The signed Request Object MAY contain all the parameters listed in Appendix A.2, except request
.¶
Below is a non-normative example of such a request:¶
const credential = await navigator.identity.get({ digital: { providers: [{ protocol: "openid4vp", request: { request: "eyJhbGciOiJF..." } }] } });¶
This is an example of the payload of a signed OpenID4VP request used with the W3C Digital Credentials API:¶
{ "client_id": "client.example.org", "client_id_scheme": "entity_id", "expected_origins": [ "https://origin1.example.com", "https://origin2.example.com" ], "response_type": "vp_token", "response_mode": "w3c_dc_api.jwt", "nonce": "n-0S6_WzA2Mj", "client_metadata": { "vp_formats": { "vc+sd-jwt": { "sd-jwt_alg_values": [ "PS256" ], "kb-jwt_alg_values": [ "PS256" ] } }, "jwks": { "keys": [ { "kty": "EC", "crv": "P-256", "x": "MKBCTNIcKUSDii11ySs3526iDZ8AiTo7Tu6KPAqv7D4", "y": "4Etl6SRW2YiLUrN5vfvVHuhp7x8PxltmWWlbbM4IFyM", "use": "enc", "kid": "1" } ] } }, "presentation_definition": {...} }¶
The signed request allows the Wallet to authenticate the Verifier using a trust framework other than the Web PKI utilized by the browser. An example of such a trust framework is the Verifier (RP) management infrastructure set up in the context of the eIDAS regulation in the European Union, in which case, the Wallet can no longer rely only on the web origin of the Verifier. This web origin MAY still be used to further strengthen the security of the flow. The external trust framework could, for example, map the Client Identifier to registered web origins.¶
Every OpenID4VP Authorization Request results in a response being provided through the W3C Digital Credentials API. The response is an instance of the DigitalCredential
credential interface, as defined in [w3c.digital_credentials_api], and the OpenID4VP Authorization Response parameters as defined for the Response Type are represented as an object within the data
attribute.¶
The following is a non-normative example of processing an unsigned OpenID4VP response that could be received from the W3C Digital Credentials API:¶
const credential = await navigator.identity.get(request); if (credential.protocol == "openid4vp") { // Extract relevant data members const { vp_token, presentation_submission } = credential.data; // presentation_submission is a javascript object // vp_token is a string or javascript object depending on the credential type }¶
The following is a non-normative example of processing an encrypted OpenID4VP response that could be received from the W3C Digital Credentials API:¶
const credential = await navigator.identity.get(request); if (credential.protocol == "openid4vp") { // Extract encrypted response const { response } = credential.data; // response is a string containing a JWE, now decrypt it }¶
OpenID for Verifiable Presentations is Credential Format agnostic, i.e., it is designed to allow applications to request and receive Verifiable Presentations and Verifiable Credentials in any Credential Format. This section defines Credential Format Profiles for some of the known Credential Formats. Other specifications or deployments can define their own Credential Format Profiles.¶
W3C Verifiable Credentials may use an additional parameter for the descriptor_map
with the presentation_submission
: The path_nested
object inside an Input Descriptor Mapping Object is used to describe how to find a returned Credential within a Verifiable Presentation, and contains a format
parameter with the Credential format identifier as a value and a path
parameter with a relative path to the Verifiable Credential. Non-normative examples can be found further in this section.¶
This section illustrates presentation of a Credential conformant to [VC_DATA] that is signed using JWS, and does not use JSON-LD.¶
The Credential format identifiers are jwt_vc_json
for a W3C Verifiable Credential and jwt_vp_json
for W3C Verifiable Presentation.¶
Cipher suites should use algorithm names defined in IANA JOSE Algorithms Registry.¶
The following is a non-normative example of the payload of a JWT-based W3C Verifiable Credential that will be used throughout this section:¶
{ "iss": "https://example.gov/issuers/565049", "nbf": 1262304000, "jti": "http://example.gov/credentials/3732", "sub": "did:example:ebfeb1f712ebc6f1c276e12ec21", "vc": { "@context": [ "https://www.w3.org/2018/credentials/v1", "https://www.w3.org/2018/credentials/examples/v1" ], "type": [ "VerifiableCredential", "IDCredential" ], "credentialSubject": { "given_name": "Max", "family_name": "Mustermann", "birthdate": "1998-01-11", "address": { "street_address": "Sandanger 25", "locality": "Musterstadt", "postal_code": "123456", "country": "DE" } } } }¶
The following is a non-normative example of an Authorization Request:¶
GET /authorize? response_type=vp_token &client_id=https%3A%2F%2Fclient.example.org%2Fcb &redirect_uri=https%3A%2F%2Fclient.example.org%2Fcb &presentation_definition=... &nonce=n-0S6_WzA2Mj HTTP/1.1 Host: wallet.example.com¶
The requirements regarding the Credential to be presented are conveyed in the presentation_definition
parameter.¶
The following is a non-normative example of the contents of a presentation_definition
parameter:¶
{ "id": "example_jwt_vc", "input_descriptors": [ { "id": "id_credential", "format": { "jwt_vc_json": { "proof_type": [ "JsonWebSignature2020" ] } }, "constraints": { "fields": [ { "path": [ "$.vc.type" ], "filter": { "type": "array", "contains": { "const": "IDCredential" } } } ] } } ] }¶
This presentation_definition
parameter contains a single input_descriptor
element, which sets the desired format to JWT VC and defines a constraint over the vc.type
parameter to select Verifiable Credentials of type IDCredential
.¶
The following is a non-normative example of an Authorization Response:¶
HTTP/1.1 302 Found Location: https://client.example.org/cb# presentation_submission=... &vp_token=...¶
The following is a non-normative example of the content of the presentation_submission
parameter:¶
{ "definition_id": "example_jwt_vc", "id": "example_jwt_vc_presentation_submission", "descriptor_map": [ { "id": "id_credential", "path": "$", "format": "jwt_vp_json", "path_nested": { "path": "$.vp.verifiableCredential[0]", "format": "jwt_vc_json" } } ] }¶
The following is a non-normative example of the payload of the Verifiable Presentation in the vp_token
parameter provided in the same response and referred to by the presentation_submission
above:¶
{ "iss": "did:example:ebfeb1f712ebc6f1c276e12ec21", "jti": "urn:uuid:3978344f-8596-4c3a-a978-8fcaba3903c5", "aud": "https://client.example.org/cb", "nbf": 1541493724, "iat": 1541493724, "exp": 1573029723, "nonce": "n-0S6_WzA2Mj", "vp": { "@context": [ "https://www.w3.org/2018/credentials/v1" ], "type": [ "VerifiablePresentation" ], "verifiableCredential": [ "eyJhb...ssw5c" ] } }¶
Note: The VP's nonce
claim contains the value of the nonce
of the presentation request and the aud
claim contains the Client Identifier of the Verifier. This allows the Verifier to detect replay of a Presentation as recommended in Section 12.1.¶
This section illustrates presentation of a Credential conformant to [VC_DATA] that is secured using Data Integrity, using JSON-LD.¶
The Credential format identifiers are ldp_vc
for a W3C Verifiable Credential and ldp_vp
for W3C Verifiable Presentation.¶
Cipher suites should use signature suites names defined in Linked Data Cryptographic Suite Registry.¶
The following is a non-normative example of the payload of a Verifiable Credential that will be used throughout this section:¶
{ "@context": [ "https://www.w3.org/2018/credentials/v1", "https://www.w3.org/2018/credentials/examples/v1" ], "id": "https://example.com/credentials/1872", "type": [ "VerifiableCredential", "IDCredential" ], "issuer": { "id": "did:example:issuer" }, "issuanceDate": "2010-01-01T19:23:24Z", "credentialSubject": { "given_name": "Max", "family_name": "Mustermann", "birthdate": "1998-01-11", "address": { "street_address": "Sandanger 25", "locality": "Musterstadt", "postal_code": "123456", "country": "DE" } }, "proof": { "type": "Ed25519Signature2018", "created": "2021-03-19T15:30:15Z", "jws": "eyJhb...JQdBw", "proofPurpose": "assertionMethod", "verificationMethod": "did:example:issuer#keys-1" } }¶
The following is a non-normative example of an Authorization Request:¶
GET /authorize? response_type=vp_token &client_id=https%3A%2F%2Fclient.example.org%2Fcb &redirect_uri=https%3A%2F%2Fclient.example.org%2Fcb &presentation_definition=... &nonce=n-0S6_WzA2Mj HTTP/1.1 Host: wallet.example.com¶
The following is a non-normative example of the contents of a presentation_definition
parameter that contains the requirements regarding the Credential to be presented:¶
{ "id": "example_ldp_vc", "input_descriptors": [ { "id": "id_credential", "format": { "ldp_vc": { "proof_type": [ "Ed25519Signature2018" ] } }, "constraints": { "fields": [ { "path": [ "$.type" ], "filter": { "type": "array", "contains": { "const": "IDCredential" } } } ] } } ] }¶
This presentation_definition
parameter contains a single input_descriptor
element, which sets the desired format to LDP VC and defines a constraint over the type
parameter to select Verifiable Credentials of type IDCredential
.¶
The following is a non-normative example of an Authorization Response:¶
HTTP/1.1 302 Found Location: https://client.example.org/cb# presentation_submission=... &vp_token=...¶
The following is a non-normative example of the content of the presentation_submission
parameter:¶
{ "definition_id": "example_ldp_vc", "id": "example_ldp_vc_presentation_submission", "descriptor_map": [ { "id": "id_credential", "path": "$", "format": "ldp_vp", "path_nested": { "format": "ldp_vc", "path": "$.verifiableCredential[0]" } } ] }¶
The following is a non-normative example of the Verifiable Presentation in the vp_token
parameter provided in the same response and referred to by the presentation_submission
above:¶
{ "@context": [ "https://www.w3.org/2018/credentials/v1" ], "type": [ "VerifiablePresentation" ], "verifiableCredential": [ { "@context": [ "https://www.w3.org/2018/credentials/v1", "https://www.w3.org/2018/credentials/examples/v1" ], "id": "https://example.com/credentials/1872", "type": [ "VerifiableCredential", "IDCredential" ], "issuer": { "id": "did:example:issuer" }, "issuanceDate": "2010-01-01T19:23:24Z", "credentialSubject": { "given_name": "Max", "family_name": "Mustermann", "birthdate": "1998-01-11", "address": { "street_address": "Sandanger 25", "locality": "Musterstadt", "postal_code": "123456", "country": "DE" } }, "proof": { "type": "Ed25519Signature2018", "created": "2021-03-19T15:30:15Z", "jws": "eyJhb...JQdBw", "proofPurpose": "assertionMethod", "verificationMethod": "did:example:issuer#keys-1" } } ], "id": "ebc6f1c2", "holder": "did:example:holder", "proof": { "type": "Ed25519Signature2018", "created": "2021-03-19T15:30:15Z", "challenge": "n-0S6_WzA2Mj", "domain": "https://client.example.org/cb", "jws": "eyJhb...IAoDA", "proofPurpose": "authentication", "verificationMethod": "did:example:holder#key-1" } }¶
Note: The VP's challenge
claim contains the value of the nonce
of the presentation request and the domain
claims contains the Client Identifier of the Verifier. This allows the Verifier to detect replay of a presentation as recommended in Section 12.1.¶
AnonCreds is a Credential format defined as part of the Hyperledger Indy project [Hyperledger.Indy].¶
To be able to request AnonCreds, there needs to be a set of identifiers for Verifiable Credentials, Verifiable Presentations ("proofs" in Indy terminology) and crypto schemes.¶
Credential format identifier is ac_vc
for a Credential, and ac_vp
for a Presentation.¶
Identifier for a CL-signature crypto scheme used in the examples in this section is CLSignature2019
.¶
The following is a non-normative example of an AnonCred Credential that will be used throughout this section.¶
{ "schema_id": "3QowxFtwciWceMFr7WbwnM:2:BasicScheme:0.1", "cred_def_id": "CsiDLAiFkQb9N4NDJKUagd:3:CL:4687:awesome_cred", "rev_reg_id": null, "values": { "given_name": { "raw": "Alice", "encoded": "6874ecdbdb214ee888e37c8c983e2f1c9c0ed16907b519704db42bb6" }, "family_name": { "raw": "Wonderland", "encoded": "f5e16db78511f23bf2bcf0f450f20180951557cd75efe88b276988fd" }, "email": { "raw": "alice@example.com", "encoded": "0fbaa7f92a47fe3c5201e97f063983c702432e90dd7bf0c723386543" } }, "signature": { "p_credential": { "m_2": "99219524012997799443220800218760023447537107640621419137185629243278403921312", "a": "54855652574677988116650236306088516361537734570414909367032672219103444197205489674846545082012012711261249754371310495367475614729209653850720034913398482184757254920537051297936910125023613323255317515823974231493572903991640659741108603715378490408836507643191051986137793268856316333600932915078337920001692235029278931184173692694366223663131943657834349339828618978436402973046999961539444380116581314372906598415014528562207334745774098097000567515212222894771357044500544552372314335894883000614144994856702181141090905033428221403654636324918343808136750040908443212492359485782471636294013062295153997068252", "e": "259344723055062059907025491480697571938277889515152306249728583105665800713306759149981690559193987143012367913206299323899696942213235956742930239825562861075148170278284639129199", "v": "9774232256179658261610308745866736090602538333363396375105120427156273261155207775732400073422905045147609169788952804683922921383859274758479842100138659865591976937215264032734277416744113491766616076612368115891637834588143840477778776159325514034900968730327459279564615858068472282705529798808334108833124505594371791348317639533993310391511620579199112357959170076753792711700533312522910797352842323445933004238048599164039686432144165884599052061538014126710866075791210006585893465085621395503182710866197817129408546193805893321161372355187962990595781339533851533077334790530438016817333603675910702146635975282253747819810788129751055728368937483121363992748831475139233180853145906108476753713239644943541916540123456371366974874702598201796929261151925643543132170495933035112012082080893049915977209167597" }, "r_credential": null }, "signature_correctness_proof": { "se": "8986500246928105545119249693120482606913996376875337975817228090569777886100120575851444392132175485176800946276729875298747664099989412623249056022784348808658577491758644556594901203598819936532435225959211617545841036816799892165118015169512229910557670483101499028188851318984001732266955939801843049852569586066803442690248386970226324039561954050567607010646624132392374280640663854092050106203821468403658338788408023014151088931308776669398184180228869449717267624484235796469721889284094131533549692106113602342932288350356591343546227828642494647872633442330361211149649432468143339518371824496555067302935", "c": "93582993140981799598406702841334282100000866001274710165299804498679784215598" }, "rev_reg": null, "witness": null }¶
The most important parts for the purpose of this section are scheme_id
parameter and values
parameter that contains the actual End-User claims.¶
The following is a non-normative example of an Authorization Request:¶
GET /authorize? response_type=vp_token &client_id=https%3A%2F%2Fclient.example.org%2Fcb &redirect_uri=https%3A%2F%2Fclient.example.org%2Fcb &presentation_definition=... &nonce=n-0S6_WzA2Mj HTTP/1.1 Host: wallet.example.com¶
The following is a non-normative example of the content of the presentation_definition
parameter:¶
{ "id": "example_vc_ac", "input_descriptors": [ { "id": "id_credential", "format": { "ac_vc": { "proof_type": [ "CLSignature2019" ] } }, "constraints": { "fields": [ { "path": [ "$.schema_id" ], "filter": { "type": "string", "const": "did:indy:idu:test:3QowxFtwciWceMFr7WbwnM:2:BasicScheme:0\\.1" } } ] } } ] }¶
The format
object in the input_descrioptor
element uses the format identifier ac_vc
as defined above and sets the proof_type
to CLSignature2019
to denote this descriptor requires a Credential in AnonCreds format signed with a CL signature (Camenisch-Lysyanskaya signature). The rest of the expressions operate on the AnonCreds JSON structure.¶
The constraints
object requires the selected Credential to conform with the schema definition did:indy:idu:test:3QowxFtwciWceMFr7WbwnM:2:BasicScheme:0\\.1
, which is denoted as a constraint over the AnonCred's schema_id
parameter.¶
The next example leverages the AnonCreds' capabilities for selective release by requesting a subset of the claims in the Credential to be disclosed to the Verifier.¶
A non-normative example of an Authorization Request would look the same as in Appendix B.2.2.1.¶
The following is a non-normative example of the difference is in the presentation_definition
parameter:¶
{ "id": "example_vc_ac_sd", "input_descriptors": [ { "id": "id_credential", "format": { "ac_vc": { "proof_type": [ "CLSignature2019" ] } }, "constraints": { "limit_disclosure": "required", "fields": [ { "path": [ "$.schema_id" ], "filter": { "type": "string", "const": "did:indy:idu:test:3QowxFtwciWceMFr7WbwnM:2:BasicScheme:0\\.1" } }, { "path": [ "$.values.given_name" ] }, { "path": [ "$.values.family_name" ] } ] } } ] }¶
This example is identic to the previous one with the following exceptions: It sets the element limit_disclosure
of the constraint to require
and adds two more constraints for the individual claims given_name
and family_name
. Since such claims are stored underneath a values
container in an AnonCred, values
is part of the path to identify the respective claims.¶
A non-normative example of the Authorization Response would look the same as in the examples of other Credential formats. It would contain the presentation_submission
and vp_token
parameters.¶
The following is a non-normative example of the content of the presentation_submission
parameter:¶
{ "definition_id": "example_vc_ac_sd", "id": "example_vc_ac_sd_presentation_submission", "descriptor_map": [ { "id": "id_credential", "path": "$", "format": "ac_vp", "path_nested": { "path": "$.requested_proof.revealed_attr_groups.id_card_credential", "format": "ac_vc" } } ] }¶
The descriptor_map
refers to the input_descriptor
element with an identifier id_credential
and tells the Verifier that there is a proof of AnonCred Credential (format
is ac_vp
) directly in the vp_token (path is the root designated by $
). Furthermore, it indicates using path_nested
parameter that the user claims can be found embedded in the proof underneath requested_proof.revealed_attr_groups.id_card_credential
.¶
The following is the content of the vp_token
parameter:¶
{ "proof": {...}, "requested_proof": { "revealed_attrs": {}, "revealed_attr_groups": { "id_card_credential": { "sub_proof_index": 0, "values": { "family_name": { "raw": "Wonderland", "encoded": "167908493…94017654562035" }, "given_name": { "raw": "Alice", "encoded": "270346400…99344178781507" } } } }, … }, "identifiers": [ { "schema_id": "3QowxFtwciWceMFr7WbwnM:2:BasicScheme:0.1", "cred_def_id": "CsiDLAiFkQb9N4NDJKUagd:3:CL:4687:awesome_cred", "rev_reg_id": null, "timestamp": null } ] }¶
ISO/IEC 18013-5:2021 [ISO.18013-5] defines a mobile driving license (mDL) Credential in the mobile document (mdoc) format. Although ISO/IEC 18013-5:2021 [ISO.18013-5] is specific to mobile driving licenses (mDLs), the Credential format can be utilized with any type of Credential (or mdoc document types). The ISO/IEC 23220 series has extracted components from ISO/IEC 18013-5:2021 [ISO.18013-5] and ISO/IEC TS 18013-7 [ISO.18013-7] that are common across document types to facilitate the profiling of the specification for other document types. The core data structures are shared between ISO/IEC 18013-5:2021 [ISO.18013-5], ISO/IEC 23220-2 [ISO.23220-2], ISO/IEC 23220-4 [ISO.23220-4] which are encoded in CBOR and secured using COSE_Sign1.¶
The Credential format identifier for Credentials in the mdoc format is mso_mdoc
.¶
ISO/IEC TS 18013-7 Annex B [ISO.18013-7] and ISO/IEC 23220-4 [ISO.23220-4] Annex C define a profile of OpenID4VP for requesting and presenting Credentials in the mdoc format.¶
The profile includes the following elements:¶
presentation_definition
Authorization Request parameter.¶
presentation_submission
Authorization Response parameter.¶
mdoc-openid4vp://
custom URI scheme.¶
Handover
CBOR structure and how OpenID4VP Authorization Request and Request Object parameters apply to the SessionTranscript
CBOR structure and DeviceResponse
CBOR structure as specified in ISO/IEC 18013-5 [ISO.18013-5] and ISO/IEC 23220-4 [ISO.23220-4].¶
request_uri
Authorization Request parameter is required, and the Authorization Response has to be encrypted.¶
See ISO/IEC TS 18013-7 Annex B [ISO.18013-7] and ISO/IEC 23220-4 Annex C [ISO.23220-4] for the latest examples on how to use the presentation_definition
parameter for requesting Credentials in the mdoc format.¶
The VP Token contains the base64url encoded DeviceResponse
CBOR structure as defined in ISO/IEC 18013-5 [ISO.18013-5] or ISO/IEC 23220-4 [ISO.23220-4]. Essentially, the DeviceResponse
CBOR structure contains a signature or MAC over the SessionTranscript
CBOR structure including the OpenID4VP-specific Handover
CBOR structure.¶
See ISO/IEC TS 18013-7 Annex B [ISO.18013-7] and ISO/IEC 23220-4 Annex C [ISO.23220-4] for the latest examples on how to use the presentation_submission
parameter and how to generate the Authorizaton Response for presenting Credentials in the mdoc format.¶
This section defines how Credentials complying with [I-D.ietf-oauth-sd-jwt-vc] can be presented to the Verifier using this specification.¶
The Credential format identifier is vc+sd-jwt
.¶
The following is a non-normative example of the unsecured payload of an IETF SD-JWT VC that will be used throughout this section:¶
{ "vct": "https://credentials.example.com/identity_credential", "given_name": "John", "family_name": "Doe", "birthdate": "1940-01-01" }¶
The following is a non-normative example of an IETF SD-JWT VC using the unsecured payload above, containing claims that are selectively disclosable.¶
{ "_sd": [ "3oUCnaKt7wqDKuyh-LgQozzfhgb8gO5Ni-RCWsWW2vA", "8z8z9X9jUtb99gjejCwFAGz4aqlHf-sCqQ6eM_qmpUQ", "Cxq4872UXXngGULT_kl8fdwVFkyK6AJfPZLy7L5_0kI", "TGf4oLbgwd5JQaHyKVQZU9UdGE0w5rtDsrZzfUaomLo", "jsu9yVulwQQlhFlM_3JlzMaSFzglhQG0DpfayQwLUK4", "sFcViHN-JG3eTUyBmU4fkwusy5I1SLBhe1jNvKxP5xM", "tiTngp9_jhC389UP8_k67MXqoSfiHq3iK6o9un4we_Y", "xsKkGJXD1-e3I9zj0YyKNv-lU5YqhsEAF9NhOr8xga4" ], "iss": "https://example.com/issuer", "iat": 1683000000, "exp": 1883000000, "vct": "https://credentials.example.com/identity_credential", "_sd_alg": "sha-256", "cnf": { "jwk": { "kty": "EC", "crv": "P-256", "x": "TCAER19Zvu3OHF4j4W4vfSVoHIP1ILilDls7vCeGemc", "y": "ZxjiWWbZMQGHVWKVQ4hbSIirsVfuecCE6t4jT9F2HZQ" } } }¶
The following are disclosures belonging to the claims from the example above.¶
Claim given_name
:¶
jsu9yVulwQQlhFlM_3JlzMaSFzglhQG0DpfayQwLUK4
¶
WyIyR0xDNDJzS1F2ZUNmR2ZyeU5STjl3IiwgImdpdmVuX25hbWUiLCAiSm9o
biJd
¶
["2GLC42sKQveCfGfryNRN9w", "given_name", "John"]
¶
Claim family_name
:¶
TGf4oLbgwd5JQaHyKVQZU9UdGE0w5rtDsrZzfUaomLo
¶
WyJlbHVWNU9nM2dTTklJOEVZbnN4QV9BIiwgImZhbWlseV9uYW1lIiwgIkRv
ZSJd
¶
["eluV5Og3gSNII8EYnsxA_A", "family_name", "Doe"]
¶
Claim birthdate
:¶
The format
value in the vp_formats
parameter of the Verifier metadata MUST have the key vc+sd-jwt
, and the value is an object consisting of the following name/value pairs:¶
sd-jwt_alg_values
: OPTIONAL. A JSON array containing identifiers of cryptographic algorithms the Verifier supports for signing of an Issuer-signed JWT of an SD-JWT. If present, the alg
JOSE header (as defined in [RFC7515]) of the Issuer-signed JWT of the presented SD-JWT MUST match one of the array values.¶
kb-jwt_alg_values
: OPTIONAL. A JSON array containing identifiers of cryptographic algorithms the Verifier supports for signing of a Key Binding JWT (KB-JWT). If present, the alg
JOSE header (as defined in [RFC7515]) of the presented KB-JWT MUST match one of the array values.¶
The following is a non-normative example of client_metadata
request parameter value in a request to present an IETF SD-JWT VC.¶
{ "vp_formats": { "vc+sd-jwt": { "sd-jwt_alg_values": ["ES256", "ES384"], "kb-jwt_alg_values": ["ES256", "ES384"] } } }¶
The following is a non-normative example of an Authorization Request:¶
GET /authorize? response_type=vp_token &client_id=https%3A%2F%2Fclient.example.org%2Fcb &redirect_uri=https%3A%2F%2Fclient.example.org%2Fcb &presentation_definition=... &nonce=n-0S6_WzA2Mj HTTP/1.1 Host: wallet.example.com¶
The following is a non-normative example of the contents of a presentation_definition
parameter that contains the requirements regarding the Credential to be presented:¶
{ "id": "example_sd_jwt_vc_request", "input_descriptors": [ { "id": "identity_credential", "format": { "vc+sd-jwt": { "sd-jwt_alg_values": ["ES256", "ES384"], "kb-jwt_alg_values": ["ES256", "ES384"] } }, "constraints": { "limit_disclosure": "required", "fields": [ { "path": ["$.vct"], "filter": { "type": "string", "const": "https://credentials.example.com/identity_credential" } }, { "path": ["$.family_name"] }, { "path": ["$.given_name"] } ] } } ] }¶
The presentation of an IETF SD-JWT VC is requested by adding an object named vc+sd-jwt
to the format
object of an input_descriptor
. The input_descriptor
value is applied to the unsecured payload of the IETF SD-JWT VC which correspond to the disclosures of the presented SD-JWT VC.¶
Setting limit_disclosure
property defined in [DIF.PresentationExchange] to required
enables selective release by instructing the Wallet to submit only the disclosures for the matching claims specified in the fields array. The unsecured payload of an IETF SD-JWT VC is used to perform the matching.¶
A non-normative example of the Authorization Response would look the same as in the examples of other Credential formats in this Annex.¶
The following is a non-normative example of the content of the presentation_submission
parameter:¶
{ "definition_id": "example_sd_jwt_vc_request", "id": "example_sd_jwt_vc_presentation_submission", "descriptor_map": [ { "id": "identity_credential", "path": "$", "format": "vc+sd-jwt" } ] }¶
The following is a non-normative example of the vp_token
parameter provided in the same response and referred to by the presentation_submission
above:¶
eyJhbGciOiAiRVMyNTYiLCAidHlwIjogInZjK3NkLWp3dCIsICJraWQiOiAiZG9jLXNp Z25lci0wNS0yNS0yMDIyIn0.eyJfc2QiOiBbIjNvVUNuYUt0N3dxREt1eWgtTGdRb3p6 ZmhnYjhnTzVOaS1SQ1dzV1cydkEiLCAiOHo4ejlYOWpVdGI5OWdqZWpDd0ZBR3o0YXFs SGYtc0NxUTZlTV9xbXBVUSIsICJDeHE0ODcyVVhYbmdHVUxUX2tsOGZkd1ZGa3lLNkFK ZlBaTHk3TDVfMGtJIiwgIlRHZjRvTGJnd2Q1SlFhSHlLVlFaVTlVZEdFMHc1cnREc3Ja emZVYW9tTG8iLCAianN1OXlWdWx3UVFsaEZsTV8zSmx6TWFTRnpnbGhRRzBEcGZheVF3 TFVLNCIsICJzRmNWaUhOLUpHM2VUVXlCbVU0Zmt3dXN5NUkxU0xCaGUxak52S3hQNXhN IiwgInRpVG5ncDlfamhDMzg5VVA4X2s2N01YcW9TZmlIcTNpSzZvOXVuNHdlX1kiLCAi eHNLa0dKWEQxLWUzSTl6ajBZeUtOdi1sVTVZcWhzRUFGOU5oT3I4eGdhNCJdLCAiaXNz IjogImh0dHBzOi8vZXhhbXBsZS5jb20vaXNzdWVyIiwgImlhdCI6IDE2ODMwMDAwMDAs ICJleHAiOiAxODgzMDAwMDAwLCAidmN0IjogImh0dHBzOi8vY3JlZGVudGlhbHMuZXhh bXBsZS5jb20vaWRlbnRpdHlfY3JlZGVudGlhbCIsICJfc2RfYWxnIjogInNoYS0yNTYi LCAiY25mIjogeyJqd2siOiB7Imt0eSI6ICJFQyIsICJjcnYiOiAiUC0yNTYiLCAieCI6 ICJUQ0FFUjE5WnZ1M09IRjRqNFc0dmZTVm9ISVAxSUxpbERsczd2Q2VHZW1jIiwgInki OiAiWnhqaVdXYlpNUUdIVldLVlE0aGJTSWlyc1ZmdWVjQ0U2dDRqVDlGMkhaUSJ9fX0. hBeB-fuMsIQ82QIE_674CSPIufs7w0D9CdfGdP_tGyBVp_vTSlbWb9MInFKSZ6Y3ie-r 0MMeSSEHyuUz9WNGSQ~WyJlbHVWNU9nM2dTTklJOEVZbnN4QV9BIiwgImZhbWlseV9uY W1lIiwgIkRvZSJd~WyIyR0xDNDJzS1F2ZUNmR2ZyeU5STjl3IiwgImdpdmVuX25hbWUi LCAiSm9obiJd~eyJhbGciOiAiRVMyNTYiLCAidHlwIjogImtiK2p3dCJ9.eyJub25jZS I6ICJuLTBTNl9XekEyTWoiLCAiYXVkIjogImh0dHBzOi8vZXhhbXBsZS5jb20vdmVyaW ZpZXIiLCAiaWF0IjogMTcwOTgzODYwNCwgInNkX2hhc2giOiAiRHktUll3WmZhYW9DM2 luSmJMc2xnUHZNcDA5YkgtY2xZUF8zcWJScXRXNCJ9.RmgIhqCHYWerxbDboMuB0lli6 3HPJHI9Vl2ZNOGh20C7_6p7nf3Wkd2wkx5WlmwTwtHKc87MBY2nuRLoeduQMA¶
In this example the vp_token
contains only the disclosures for the claims specified in the presentation_submission
, along with a Key Binding JWT.¶
The following is a non-normative example of the unsecured payload of the Key Binding JWT.¶
{ "nonce": "n-0S6_WzA2Mj", "aud": "https://example.com/verifier", "iat": 1709838604, "sd_hash": "Dy-RYwZfaaoC3inJbLslgPvMp09bH-clYP_3qbRqtW4" }¶
Note: The Key Binding JWT nonce
claim contains the value of the nonce
from the authorization request, and the aud
claim contains the Client Identifier of the Verifier.¶
This section shows how SIOP and OpenID for Verifiable Presentations can be combined to present Verifiable Credentials and pseudonymously authenticate an end-user using subject controlled key material.¶
The following is a non-normative example of a request that combines this specification and [SIOPv2].¶
GET /authorize? response_type=vp_token%20id_token &scope=openid &id_token_type=subject_signed &client_id=https%3A%2F%2Fclient.example.org%2Fcb &redirect_uri=https%3A%2F%2Fclient.example.org%2Fcb &presentation_definition=... &nonce=n-0S6_WzA2Mj HTTP/1.1 Host: wallet.example.com¶
The differences to the example requests in the previous sections are:¶
response_type
is set to vp_token id_token
. This means the Wallet returns the presentation_submission
and vp_token
parameters in the same response as the id_token
parameter as described in Section 6.¶
scope
parameter with value openid
making this an OpenID Connect request. Additionally, the request also contains the parameter id_token_type
with value subject_signed
requesting a Self-Issuer ID Token, i.e., the request is a SIOP request.¶
The following is a non-normative example of a response sent upon receiving a request provided in Appendix B.5.1:¶
HTTP/1.1 302 Found Location: https://client.example.org/cb# id_token= &presentation_submission=... &vp_token=...¶
In addition to the presentation_submission
and vp_token
, it also contains an id_token
.¶
The following is a non-normative example of the payload of a Self-Issued ID Token [SIOPv2] contained in the above response:¶
{ "iss": "did:example:NzbLsXh8uDCcd6MNwXF4W7noWXFZAfHkxZsRGC9Xs", "sub": "did:example:NzbLsXh8uDCcd6MNwXF4W7noWXFZAfHkxZsRGC9Xs", "aud": "https://client.example.org/cb", "nonce": "n-0S6_WzA2Mj", "exp": 1311281970, "iat": 1311280970 }¶
Note: The nonce
and aud
are set to the nonce
of the request and the Client Identifier of the Verifier, respectively, in the same way as for the Verifier, Verifiable Presentations to prevent replay.¶
vp_token
¶
Specification Document(s): https://openid.net/specs/openid-4-verifiable-presentations-1_0.html¶
Response Type Name: vp_token id_token
¶
Change Controller: OpenID Foundation Artifact Binding Working Group - openid-specs-ab@lists.openid.net¶
Specification Document(s): https://openid.net/specs/openid-4-verifiable-presentations-1_0.html¶
Note: Plan to register the following Response Types in the OAuth Authorization Endpoint Response Types IANA Registry.¶
The Internet media type for a Verifier Attestation JWT is application/verifier-attestation+jwt
.¶
Type name: : application
¶
Subtype name: : verifier-attestation+jwt
¶
Required parameters: : n/a¶
Optional parameters: : n/a¶
Encoding considerations: : Compact Serialization as defined in [RFC7519].¶
Security considerations: : See Security Considerations in in [RFC7519].¶
Interoperability considerations: : n/a¶
This specification registers the following JWS header name in the IANA "JSON Web Signature and Encryption Header Parameters" registry established by [RFC7515].¶
jwt
¶
typ
header value of the respective JWT.¶
We would like to thank Richard Barnes, Paul Bastian, Vittorio Bertocci, Christian Bormann, John Bradley, Brian Campbell, Gabe Cohen, David Chadwick, Andrii Deinega, Giuseppe De Marco, Mark Dobrinic, Daniel Fett, Pedro Felix, George Fletcher, Timo Glasta, Mark Haine, Fabian Hauck, Roland Hedberg, Joseph Heenan, Alen Horvat, Andrew Hughes, Jacob Ideskog, Edmund Jay, Michael B. Jones, Tom Jones, Judith Kahrer, Takahiko Kawasaki, Gaurav Khot, Niels Klomp, Ronald Koenig, Markus Kreusch, Adam Lemmon, Daniel McGrogan, Jeremie Miller, Kenichi Nakamura, Rolson Quadras, Nat Sakimura, Arjen van Veen, Jan Vereecken, David Waite, Jacob Ward for their valuable feedback and contributions to this specification.¶
Copyright (c) 2023 The OpenID Foundation.¶
The OpenID Foundation (OIDF) grants to any Contributor, developer, implementer, or other interested party a non-exclusive, royalty free, worldwide copyright license to reproduce, prepare derivative works from, distribute, perform and display, this Implementers Draft or Final Specification solely for the purposes of (i) developing specifications, and (ii) implementing Implementers Drafts and Final Specifications based on such documents, provided that attribution be made to the OIDF as the source of the material, but that such attribution does not indicate an endorsement by the OIDF.¶
The technology described in this specification was made available from contributions from various sources, including members of the OpenID Foundation and others. Although the OpenID Foundation has taken steps to help ensure that the technology is available for distribution, it takes no position regarding the validity or scope of any intellectual property or other rights that might be claimed to pertain to the implementation or use of the technology described in this specification or the extent to which any license under such rights might or might not be available; neither does it represent that it has made any independent effort to identify any such rights. The OpenID Foundation and the contributors to this specification make no (and hereby expressly disclaim any) warranties (express, implied, or otherwise), including implied warranties of merchantability, non-infringement, fitness for a particular purpose, or title, related to this specification, and the entire risk as to implementing this specification is assumed by the implementer. The OpenID Intellectual Property Rights policy requires contributors to offer a patent promise not to assert certain patent claims against other contributors and against implementers. The OpenID Foundation invites any interested party to bring to its attention any copyrights, patents, patent applications, or other proprietary rights that may cover technology that may be required to practice this specification.¶
[[ To be removed from the final specification ]]¶
-21¶
client_metadata_uri
authorization parameter¶
post
request method for Request URI¶
wallet_unavailable
error¶
-20¶
-19¶
-18¶
-17¶
-16¶
client_id_scheme
parameter¶
-15¶
-14¶
-13¶
-12¶
-11¶
-10¶
-09¶
-08¶
-07¶
-06¶
-05¶
-04¶
nonce
& client_id
instead of vp_hash
for replay detection¶
-03¶
-02¶
presentation_definition
as sub parameter of verifiable_presentation
and VP Token¶
-01¶
-00¶