]> Aserto

ogazitt@gmail.com

Axiomatics

david.brossard@axiomatics.com

SGNL

atul@sgnl.ai

OpenID AuthZEN Authorization Access Management XACML OPA Topaz Cedar PDP PEP ALFA The Authorization API enables Policy Decision Points (PDPs) and Policy Enforcement Points (PEPs) to communicate authorization requests and decisions to each other without requiring knowledge of each other's inner workings. The Authorization API is served by the PDP and is called by the PEP. The Authorization API includes evaluation endpoints, which provide specific access decisions, and search endpoints for discovering permissible subjects, resources, or actions.

Introduction Computational services often implement access control within their components by separating Policy Decision Points (PDPs) from Policy Enforcement Points (PEPs). PDPs and PEPs are defined in XACML () and NIST's ABAC SP 800-162 (). Communication between PDPs and PEPs follows similar patterns across different software and services that require or provide authorization information. The Authorization API described in this document enables different providers to offer PDP and PEP capabilities without having to bind themselves to one particular implementation of a PDP or PEP.

Model By convention, we refer to a service that implements this API as a Policy Decision Point, or PDP. The policy language, architecture, and state management aspects of a PDP are beyond the scope of this specification. By convention, we refer to a client of the Authorization API as a Policy Enforcement Point, or PEP. Clients may consume the Authorization API for use cases that go beyond enforcement of authorization decisions; for example, the Resource Search API () allows a caller to discover the resources on which a subject can perform an action. For consistency, we use the term PEP to describe a client of the API, regardless of the use case. The Authorization API is defined in a transport-agnostic manner. A normative HTTPS binding is described in Transport (). Other bindings, such as gRPC, may be defined in other profiles of this specification. Authentication for the Authorization API itself is out of scope for this document, since authentication for APIs is well-documented elsewhere. Support for OAuth 2.0 () is RECOMMENDED.

Features The core feature of the Authorization API is the Access Evaluation API (), which enables a PEP to determine whether a specific request can be permitted to access a specific resource. The following are non-normative examples: Can Alice view document #123? Can Alice view document #123 at 16:30 on Tuesday, June 11, 2024? Can a manager print? The Access Evaluations API () enables execution of multiple evaluations in a single request. The following are non-normative examples: Can Alice view documents 123, 234 and 345 on Tuesday, June 11, 2024? Can document 123 be viewed by Alice and Bob? The Search APIs () provide lists of resources, subjects or actions that would be allowed access. The following are non-normative examples: Which documents can Alice view? Who can view document 123? What actions can Alice perform on document 123 on Tuesday, June 11, 2024?

API Version This document describes the API version 1.0. Any updates to this API through subsequent revisions of this document or other documents MAY augment this API, but MUST NOT modify the API described here. Augmentation MAY include additional API methods or additional parameters to existing API methods, additional authorization mechanisms, or additional optional headers in HTTPS transport bindings. Endpoints for version 1.0 SHOULD include v1 in the endpoint identifier (e.g. https://pdp.example.com/access/v1/).

Information Model The information model for requests and responses include the following entities: Subject, Action, Resource, Context, and Decision. These are all defined below.

Subject A Subject is the user or machine principal about whom the Authorization API is being invoked. The Subject may be requesting access at the time the Authorization API is invoked. A Subject is an object that contains two REQUIRED keys, type and id, which have a string value, and an OPTIONAL key, properties, with a value of an object.

type:

REQUIRED. A string value that specifies the type of the Subject.

id:

REQUIRED. A string value containing the unique identifier of the Subject, scoped to the type.

properties:

OPTIONAL. An object which can be used to express additional attributes of a Subject.

Subject Properties Many authorization systems are stateless, and expect the PEP to pass in all relevant attributes used in the evaluation of the authorization policy. To satisfy this requirement, Subjects MAY include additional attributes as key-value pairs, under the properties object. A property can contain both simple values, such as strings, numbers, booleans and nulls, and complex values, such as arrays and objects. Examples of subject attributes can include, but are not limited to: department, group memberships, device identifier, IP address.

Examples (non-normative) The following is a non-normative example of a minimal Subject:

The following is a non-normative example of a Subject which adds a string-valued department property:

The following is a non-normative example of a subject which adds IP address and device identifier properties:

Resource A Resource is the target of an access request. It is an object that is constructed similar to a Subject entity. It has the following keys:

type:

REQUIRED. A string value that specifies the type of the Resource.

id:

REQUIRED. A string value containing the unique identifier of the Resource, scoped to the type.

properties:

OPTIONAL. An object which can be used to express additional attributes of a Resource.

Resource Properties Similarly to the Subject properties, the PEP can also provide attributes for the Resource in the properties field. Such attributes can include, but are not limited to, attributes of the resource used in access evaluations or metadata about the resource.

Examples (non-normative) The following is a non-normative example of a Resource with a type and a simple id:

The following is a non-normative example of a Resource containing a library_record property, that is itself an object:

Action An Action is the type of access that the requester intends to perform. Action is an object that contains a REQUIRED name key with a string value, and an OPTIONAL properties key with an object value.

name:

REQUIRED. A string value containing the name of the Action.

properties:

OPTIONAL. An object which can be used to express additional attributes of an Action.

Action Properties Similarly to the Subject and Resource properties, the PEP can also provide attributes for the Action in the properties field. Such attributes can include, but are not limited to, parameters of the action that is being requested.

Examples (non-normative) The following is a non-normative example of an action:

The following is a non-normative example of an action with additional properties:

Context The Context represents the environment of the access evaluation request. Context is an object which can be used to express attributes of the environment. Examples of context attributes can include, but are not limited to: The time of day, Location from which the request was received, Capabilities of the PEP, JSON Schema or JSON-LD definitions for the request.

Examples (non-normative) The following is a non-normative example of a Context:

The following example of a Context provides a JSON Schema definition which can be used to parse and validate the AuthZEN request:

Decision A Decision is the result of the evaluation of an access request. It provides the information required for the PEP to enforce the decision. Decision is an object that contains a REQUIRED decision key with a boolean value, and an OPTIONAL context key with an object value.

decision:

REQUIRED. A boolean value that specifies whether the Decision is to allow or deny the operation.

context:

OPTIONAL. An object which can convey additional information that can be used by the PEP as part of the decision enforcement process.

In this specification, assuming the evaluation was successful, there are only two possible values for the decision: true: The access request is permitted to go forward. If the PEP does not understand information in the context response object, the PEP MAY choose to reject the decision. false: The access request is denied and MUST NOT be permitted to go forward. The following is a non-normative example of a minimal Decision:

Decision Context In addition to a decision, a response MAY contain a context field which contains an object. This context can convey additional information that can be used by the PEP as part of the decision enforcement process. Examples include, but are not limited to: Reason(s) a decision was made, "Advices" and/or "Obligations" tied to the access decision, Hints for rendering UI state, Instructions for step-up authentication, Environmental information, etc.

Examples (non-normative) The following are all non-normative examples of possible and valid contexts, provided to illustrate possible usages. The actual semantics and format of the context object are an implementation concern and outside the scope of this specification. For example, implementations MAY use keys that correspond to concepts from other standards, such as HTTP status codes, to convey common reasons in an interoperable manner.

Non-normative Example 1: conveying decision Reasons The PDP may provide reasons to explain a decision. In the non-normative example below, an implementation might convey different reasons to administrators and end-users, using keys that could correspond to HTTP status codes:

Non-normative Example 2: conveying metadata and environmental elements In the following non-normative example, the PDP justifies its decision by including environmental conditions that did not meet its policies. Metadata pertaining to the decision response times is also provided:

Non-normative Example 3: requesting step-up authentication In the following non-normative example, the PDP requests a step-up authentication of the requesting subject, by signalling the required acr and amr access token claim values it expects to see in order to approve the request:

Access Evaluation API The Access Evaluation API defines the message exchange pattern between a PEP and a PDP for executing a single access evaluation.

The Access Evaluation API Request The Access Evaluation request is an object consisting of four entities previously defined in the Information Model ():

subject:

REQUIRED. The subject (or principal) of type Subject

action:

REQUIRED. The action (or verb) of type Action.

resource:

REQUIRED. The resource of type Resource.

context:

OPTIONAL. The context (or environment) of type Context.

Example (non-normative)

The Access Evaluation API Response The response of the Access Evaluation API consists of the Decision entity as defined in the Information Model ().

Access Evaluations API The Access Evaluations API defines the message exchange pattern between a PEP and a PDP for evaluating multiple access evaluations within the scope of a single message exchange (also known as "boxcarring" requests).

The Access Evaluations API Request The Access Evaluation API Request builds on the information model presented in and the object defined in the Access Evaluation Request (). To send multiple access evaluation requests in a single message, the PEP MAY add an evaluations key to the request. The evaluations key is an array which contains a list of objects, each typed as the object as defined in the Access Evaluation Request (), and specifying a discrete request. If an evaluations array is NOT present or is empty, the Access Evaluations Request behaves in a backwards-compatible manner with the (single) Access Evaluation API Request (). If an evaluations array IS present and contains one or more objects, these form distinct requests that the PDP will evaluate. These requests are independent from each other, and may be executed sequentially or in parallel, left to the discretion of each implementation. The top-level subject, action, resource, and context keys provide default values for their respective fields in the evaluations array. The top-level subject, action and resource keys MAY be omitted if the evaluations array is present, contains one or more objects, and every object in the evaluations array contains the respective top-level key. This behavior is described in . The following is a non-normative example for specifying three requests, with no default values:

Default values While the example above provides the most flexibility in specifying distinct values in each request for every evaluation, it is common for boxcarred requests to share one or more values of the evaluation request. For example, evaluations MAY all refer to a single subject, and/or have the same contextual (environmental) attributes. Default values offer a more compact syntax that avoids unnecessary duplication of request data. The top-level subject, action, resource, and context keys provide default values for each object in the evaluations array. Any of these keys specified within an individual evaluation object overrides the corresponding top-level default. Because subject, action, and resource are required for a valid evaluation, any of these keys omitted from an evaluation object MUST be provided as a top-level key. The following is a non-normative example for specifying three requests that refer to a single subject and context:

The following is a non-normative example for specifying three requests that refer to a single subject and context, with a default value for action, that is overridden by the third request:

Evaluations options The evaluations request payload includes an OPTIONAL options key, with a value that is an object. This provides a general-purpose mechanism for providing PEP-supplied metadata on how the request is to be executed. One such option controls evaluation semantics, and is described in . A non-normative example of the options field is shown below, following an evaluations array provided for the sake of completeness:

Evaluations semantics By default, every request in the evaluations array is executed and a response returned in the same array order. This is the most common use-case for boxcarring multiple evaluation requests in a single payload. This specification supports three evaluation semantics: Execute all of the requests (potentially in parallel), return all of the results. Any failure can be denoted by "decision": false and MAY provide a reason code in the context. Deny on first denial (or failure). This semantic could be desired if a PEP wants to issue a few requests in a particular order, with any denial (error, or "decision": false) "short-circuiting" the evaluations call and returning on the first denial. This essentially works like the && operator in programming languages. Permit on first permit. This is the converse "short-circuiting" semantic, working like the || operator in programming languages. To select the desired evaluation semantic, a PEP can pass in options.evaluations_semantic with exactly one of the following values: execute_all deny_on_first_deny permit_on_first_permit execute_all is the default semantic, so an evaluations request without the options.evaluations_semantic flag will execute using this semantic.

Example: Evaluate read action for three documents using all three semantics Execute all requests:

Response:

Deny on first deny:

Response:

Permit on first permit:

Response:

The Access Evaluations API Response Like the request format, the Access Evaluations Response format for an Access Evaluations Request adds an evaluations array that lists the decisions in the same order they were provided in the evaluations array in the request. Each value of the evaluations array is typed as a Decision as defined in the Information Model (). In case the evaluations array is present, it is RECOMMENDED that the decision key of the response be omitted. If present, it can be ignored by the PEP. The following is a non-normative example of a Access Evaluations Response to an Access Evaluations Request containing three evaluation objects:

Errors There are two types of errors, and they are handled differently: 1. Transport-level errors, or errors that pertain to the entire payload. 2. Errors in individual evaluations. The first type of error is handled at the transport level. For example, for the HTTP binding, the 4XX and 5XX codes indicate a general error that pertains to the entire payload, as described in Transport (). The second type of error is handled at the payload level. Decisions default to closed (i.e. false), but the context field can include errors that are specific to that request. The following is a non-normative example of a response to an Access Evaluations Request containing three evaluation objects, two of them demonstrating how errors can be returned for two of the evaluation requests:

Search APIs The Search APIs enable a PEP to discover the set of subjects, resources, or actions that are permitted within a specific authorization context. Their purpose is to return a list of authorized entities, rather than verify a single access request. To perform a search, the PEP provides the Subject, Resource, Action, and Context entities defined in the Information Model (), but omits the unique identifier of the entity being queried. The PDP then responds with the set of authorized entities for the queried entity type which would be authorized according to the provided criteria.

Semantics A search is designed to return entities that would correspond to a permitted decision. Therefore, any result from a Search API, when subsequently used in an Access Evaluation API call, SHOULD result in a "decision": true response. However, because the evaluation is implementation-specific and may depend on other variables (such as time), this outcome is not guaranteed. In addition, it is RECOMMENDED that a search be performed transitively, traversing intermediate attributes and/or relationships. For example, if user U is a member of group G, and group G is designated as a viewer on a document D, then a search for all subjects of type user that can view document D will include user U.

Pagination Search APIs can return large result sets. To manage this, a PDP MAY support pagination, allowing a PEP to navigate and retrieve subsets of the total result set. Pagination does not guarantee an atomic snapshot of the result set. Consequently, if items are added or removed while paginating, results MAY be repeated or omitted between pages. Pagination is based on the use of opaque tokens. A PEP makes an initial request for data by sending a query that does not contain a token. If the PDP determines that the result set contains too many results to fit in a single response, the PDP returns a partial result set and a token that the PEP can use to retrieve the next page of results. A paginated response MUST be clearly identified by the inclusion of a page object containing a non-empty, opaque next_token. This token is the signal to the PEP that more results are available. To retrieve the next page, the PEP sends a subsequent request containing a page object with the token field set to the next_token value from the previous response. This process is repeated until the PDP returns a page object in which the value of the next_token field is an empty string, signaling the end of the result set. When a request contains a token, all entities (e.g., subject, resource, action, context) and pagination parameters (e.g., limit) MUST be identical to the preceding request. PDPs SHOULD return an error when any entity or parameter has been changed. PEPs that wish to sequentially iterate through the entire result set SHOULD use the core pagination mechanism described above, which is designed to work consistently across all PDPs that support the search APIs.

Paginated Requests A Search API Request MAY include a page object indicating which subset of the larger result set the PEP would like to receive. The page object in a Search API Request consists of the following keys:

token:

OPTIONAL. An opaque string value from the next_token of a previous response.

limit:

OPTIONAL. A non-negative integer indicating the maximum number of results to return in the response.

properties:

OPTIONAL. An object containing additional implementation-specific pagination request attributes, such as, but not limited to, sorting and filtering.

Apart from the token, all values from the initial request MUST remain identical for subsequent pages. If a different value is provided mid-pagination the PDP SHOULD return an error. Additional keys MAY be included in the page object. If they are, they MUST be defined in a specification referenced in the AuthZEN Policy Decision Point Capabilities Registry (). Furthermore, the PDP MUST declare support for the corresponding capability URN in its supported_capabilities metadata ().

Paginated Responses Any Search API Response MAY include a page object, but if a response does not contain the entire result set, it MUST include this object. The page object contains the following keys:

next_token:

REQUIRED. An opaque string value indicating the next page of results to return. If there are no more results after this page, its value MUST be an empty string.

count:

OPTIONAL. A non-negative integer indicating the number of results included in this response. When included at the start of a response, as described in the Search API Response (), this enables a PEP to display a progress indicator when processing large or slow responses.

total:

OPTIONAL. A non-negative integer indicating the total number of results matching the query criteria at the time of the request. This value is not guaranteed to equal the total number of items returned across all pages if the underlying data set changes during pagination.

properties:

OPTIONAL. An object containing additional pagination response attributes. Examples include, but are not limited to, estimated totals or the number of remaining results.

Examples (non-normative) The following is a non-normative example of a request-response cycle to retrieve a total of three results with a page size limit of two.

The Search API Response The response to a Search API Request always follows the same structure. Each Search API Response is a JSON object with the following keys:

page:

OPTIONAL. An object providing pagination information, as defined in Paginated Responses (). It is RECOMMENDED that the page object be the first key in the response, as this allows a PEP to use the count value to display a progress indicator when processing large or slow responses.

context:

OPTIONAL. An object that can convey additional information that can be used by the PEP, similar to its function in the Access Evaluation Response (see ).

results:

REQUIRED. An array containing zero or more entities, as defined in the Information Model (). It MUST contain only entities of the type being searched for (e.g., Subjects, Resources, or Actions).

The following is a non-normative example of a search response returning resources:

Subject Search API The Subject Search API returns all subjects of a given type that are permitted according to the provided Action (), Resource (), and Context ().

The Subject Search API Request The Subject Search request is an object consisting of the following entities:

subject:

REQUIRED. The subject (or principal) of type Subject. The Subject MUST contain a type, but the Subject id SHOULD be omitted, and if present, MUST be ignored.

action:

REQUIRED. The action (or verb) of type Action.

resource:

REQUIRED. The resource of type Resource.

context:

OPTIONAL. Contextual data about the request.

page:

OPTIONAL. A page object for paginated requests.

Example (non-normative) The following payload defines a request for the subjects of type user that can perform the can_read action on the resource of type account and ID 123.

The following payload defines a valid response to this request.

Resource Search API The Resource Search API returns all resources of a given type that are permitted according to the provided Action (), Subject (), and Context ().

The Resource Search API Request The Resource Search request is an object consisting of the following entities:

subject:

REQUIRED. The subject (or principal) of type Subject.

action:

REQUIRED. The action (or verb) of type Action.

resource:

REQUIRED. The resource of type Resource. The Resource MUST contain a type, but the Resource id SHOULD be omitted, and if present, MUST be ignored.

context:

OPTIONAL. Contextual data about the request.

page:

OPTIONAL. A page object for paginated requests.

Example (non-normative) The following payload defines a request for the resources of type account on which the subject of type user and ID alice@example.com can perform the can_read action.

The following payload defines a valid response to this request.

Action Search API The Action Search API returns all actions that are permitted according to the provided Subject (), Resource (), and Context ().

The Action Search API Request The Action Search request is an object consisting of the following entities:

subject:

REQUIRED. The subject (or principal) of type Subject.

resource:

REQUIRED. The resource of type Resource.

context:

OPTIONAL. Contextual data about the request.

page:

OPTIONAL. A page object for paginated requests.

Note: Unlike the Subject and Resource Search APIs, the action key is omitted from the Action Search request payload.

Example (non-normative) The following payload defines a request for the actions that the subject of type user with ID 123 may perform on the resource of type account and ID 123 at 01:22 AM.

The following payload defines a valid response to this request.

Policy Decision Point Metadata It is RECOMMENDED that PDPs provide metadata describing their configuration.

Data structure The following Policy Decision Point metadata parameters are used by this specification and are registered in the IANA "AuthZEN Policy Decision Point Metadata" registry established in .

Endpoint Parameters

policy_decision_point:

REQUIRED. The Policy Decision Point identifier, which is a URL that uses the "https" scheme and has no query or fragment components. Policy Decision Point metadata is published at a location that is ".well-known" according to derived from this Policy Decision Point identifier, as described in . The Policy Decision Point identifier is used to prevent Policy Decision Point mix-up attacks.

access_evaluation_endpoint:

REQUIRED. URL of Access Evaluation API endpoint

access_evaluations_endpoint:

OPTIONAL. URL of Access Evaluations API endpoint

search_subject_endpoint:

OPTIONAL. URL of Search API endpoint for subject entities

search_action_endpoint:

OPTIONAL. URL of Search API endpoint for action entities

search_resource_endpoint:

OPTIONAL. URL of Search API endpoint for resource entities

Note: the absence of any of these parameters is sufficient for the PEP to determine that the PDP is not capable and therefore will not return a result for the associated API.

Capabilities Parameters

capabilities:

OPTIONAL. JSON array containing a list of registered IANA URNs referencing PDP specific capabilities.

Signature Parameter In addition to JSON elements, metadata parameters MAY also be provided as a signed_metadata value, which is a JSON Web Token that asserts metadata values about the PDP as a bundle. A set of metadata parameters that can be used in signed metadata as claims are defined in . The signed metadata MUST be digitally signed or MACed using JSON Web Signature and MUST contain an iss (issuer) claim denoting the party attesting to the claims in the signed metadata. A PEP MAY ignore the signed metadata if they do not support this feature. If the PEP supports signed metadata, metadata values conveyed in the signed metadata MUST take precedence over the corresponding values conveyed using plain JSON elements. Signed metadata is included in the Policy Decision Point metadata JSON object using this OPTIONAL metadata parameter:

signed_metadata:

A JWT containing metadata parameters about the protected resource as claims. This is a string value consisting of the entire signed JWT. A signed_metadata parameter SHOULD NOT appear as a claim in the JWT; it is RECOMMENDED to reject any metadata in which this occurs.

Obtaining Policy Decision Point Metadata PDPs supporting metadata MUST make a JSON document containing metadata as specified in the AuthZEN Policy Decision Point Metadata Registry () available at a URL formed by inserting a well-known URI string between the host component and the path and/or query components, if any. The well-known URI string used is /.well-known/authzen-configuration. The syntax and semantics of .well-known are defined in . The well-known URI path suffix used is registered in the IANA "Well-Known URIs" registry . An example of a PDP supporting multiple tenants will have a discovery endpoint as follows:

Policy Decision Point Metadata Request A Policy Decision Point metadata document MUST be queried using an HTTP GET request at the previously specified URL. The consumer of the metadata would make the following request when the resource identifier is https://pdp.example.com:

Policy Decision Point Metadata Response The response is a set of metadata parameters about the protected resource's configuration. A successful response MUST use the HTTP status code 200 and a Content-Type of application/json. Its body MUST be a JSON object that contains a set of metadata parameters as defined in the AuthZEN Policy Decision Point Metadata Registry (). Any metadata parameters in the response that are not understood by the PEP MUST be ignored. Parameters that have multiple values are represented as JSON arrays. Parameters that have no values MUST be omitted from the response. An error response uses the applicable HTTP status code value. The following is a non-normative example response:

Policy Decision Point Metadata Validation The policy_decision_point value returned MUST be identical to the Policy Decision Point identifier value into which the well-known URI string was inserted to create the URL used to retrieve the metadata. If these values are not identical, the data contained in the response MUST NOT be used. The recipient MUST validate that any signed metadata was signed by a key belonging to the issuer and that the signature is valid. If the signature does not validate or the issuer is not trusted, the recipient SHOULD treat this as an error condition.

Transport This specification defines an HTTPS binding using JSON serialization which MUST be implemented by a compliant PDP. Additional transport bindings (e.g. gRPC or CoAP) MAY be defined in the future in the form of profiles, and MAY be implemented by a PDP.

HTTPS JSON Binding All API requests within this binding are made via an HTTPS POST request. Requests MUST include a Content-Type header with the value application/json, and the request body for each endpoint MUST be a JSON object that conforms to the corresponding request structure, as defined in . A successful response is an HTTPS response with a status code of 200 and a Content-Type of application/json. Its body is a JSON object that conforms to the corresponding response structure, as defined in . The request URL MUST be the value of the corresponding endpoint parameter, as defined in , if it is provided in the Policy Decision Point metadata (). If the parameter is not provided, the URL SHOULD be formed by appending the default path, as defined in , to the PDP's base URL (which is the policy_decision_point value from the Policy Decision Point metadata, if available. The following table provides an overview of the API endpoints defined in this binding: API Endpoint Default Path Metadata Parameter Request Schema Response Schema Access Evaluation /access/v1/evaluation access_evaluation_endpoint Access Evaluations /access/v1/evaluations access_evaluations_endpoint Subject Search /access/v1/search/subject search_subject_endpoint Resource Search /access/v1/search/resource search_resource_endpoint Action Search /access/v1/search/action search_action_endpoint

JSON Serialization This section specifies the serialization of the information model entities and API schemas defined in this document to the JSON format . The top-level element of all request and response bodies MUST be a JSON object (). Implementations SHOULD also adhere to the security recommendations in JSON Payload Considerations (). The data types defined in this specification are mapped to JSON types as follows:

Object:

Represented as a JSON object (). The values of its members can be any valid JSON value as defined in , including other objects and arrays, unless specified otherwise.

Array:

Represented as a JSON array ().

String:

Represented as a JSON string ().

Integer:

Represented as a JSON number (). Note the recommendation in to not encode values that exceed IEEE 754 double-precision.

Boolean:

Represented as the JSON literals true or false ().

If a required attribute in the information model is omitted, the server MUST return a "Bad Request" error, as defined in . To ensure forward compatibility, receivers MUST ignore unknown fields present in request or response bodies. Implementations MUST NOT assume a particular ordering of JSON object members.

Error Responses The following error responses are common to all methods of the Authorization API. The error response is indicated by an HTTPS status code () that indicates error. The following errors are indicated by the status codes defined below: Code Description HTTPS Body Content 400 Bad Request An error message string 401 Unauthorized An error message string 403 Forbidden An error message string 500 Internal Error An error message string Note: HTTPS errors are returned by the PDP to indicate an error condition relating to the request or its processing; they are unrelated to the outcome of an authorization decision and are distinct from it. A successful request that results in a "deny" is indicated by a 200 OK status code with a { "decision": false } payload. To make this concrete: a 401 HTTPS status code indicates that the PEP did not properly authenticate to the PDP - for example, by omitting a required Authorization header, or using an invalid access token. the PDP indicates to the PEP that the authorization request is denied by sending a response with a 200 HTTPS status code, along with a payload of { "decision": false }.

Request Identification All requests to the API MAY have request identifiers to uniquely identify them. The PEP is responsible for generating the request identifier. If present, it is RECOMMENDED to use the HTTPS Header X-Request-ID as the request identifier. The value of this header is an arbitrary string. The following non-normative example describes this header:

When an Authorization API request contains a request identifier the PDP MUST include a request identifier in the response. It is RECOMMENDED to specify the request identifier using the HTTPS Response header X-Request-ID. If the PEP specified a request identifier in the request, the PDP MUST include the same identifier in the response to that request. The following is a non-normative example of an HTTPS Response with this header:

Examples (non-normative) The following is a non-normative example of the HTTPS binding of the Access Evaluation Request:

X-Request-ID: bfe9eb29-ab87-4ca3-be83-a1d5d8305716 { "subject": { "type": "user", "id": "alice@example.com" }, "resource": { "type": "todo", "id": "1" }, "action": { "name": "can_read" }, "context": { "time": "1985-10-26T01:22-07:00" } } ]]>

The following is a non-normative example of an HTTPS Access Evaluation Response:

The following is a non-normative example of a the HTTPS binding of the Access Evaluations Request:

X-Request-ID: bfe9eb29-ab87-4ca3-be83-a1d5d8305716 { "subject": { "type": "user", "id": "alice@example.com" }, "context": { "time": "2024-05-31T15:22-07:00" }, "action": { "name": "can_read" }, "evaluations": [ { "resource": { "type": "document", "id": "boxcarring.md" } }, { "resource": { "type": "document", "id": "subject-search.md" } }, { "action": { "name": "can_edit" }, "resource": { "type": "document", "id": "resource-search.md" } } ] } ]]>

The following is a non-normative example of an HTTPS Access Evaluations Response:

The following is a non-normative example of the HTTPS binding of the Subject Search Request:

X-Request-ID: bfe9eb29-ab87-4ca3-be83-a1d5d8305716 { "subject": { "type": "user" }, "action": { "name": "can_read" }, "resource": { "type": "account", "id": "123" } } ]]>

The following is a non-normative example of an HTTPS Subject Search Response:

The following is a non-normative example of the HTTPS binding of the Resource Search Request:

X-Request-ID: bfe9eb29-ab87-4ca3-be83-a1d5d8305716 { "subject": { "type": "user", "id": "alice@example.com" }, "action": { "name": "can_read" }, "resource": { "type": "account" } } ]]>

The following is a non-normative example of an HTTPS Resource Search Response:

The following is a non-normative example of the HTTPS binding of the Action Search Request:

X-Request-ID: bfe9eb29-ab87-4ca3-be83-a1d5d8305716 { "subject": { "type": "user", "id": "alice@example.com" }, "resource": { "type": "account", "id": "123" }, "context": { "time": "2024-10-26T01:22-07:00" } } ]]>

The following is a non-normative example of an HTTPS Action Search Response:

Security Considerations

Communication Integrity and Confidentiality In the ABAC architecture, the PEP-PDP connection is the most sensitive one and needs to be secured to guarantee: Integrity Confidentiality As a result, the connection between the PEP and the PDP MUST be secured using the most adequate means given the choice of transport (e.g. TLS for HTTP REST).

Policy Confidentiality and Sender Authentication Additionally, the PDP SHOULD authenticate the calling PEP. There are several ways authentication can be established. These ways are out of scope of this specification. They MAY include: Mutual TLS OAuth-based authentication API key The choice and strength of either mechanism is not in scope. Authenticating the PEP allows the PDP to avoid common attacks (such as DoS - see below) and/or reveal its internal policies. A malicious actor could craft a large number of requests to try and understand what policies the PDP is configured with. Requesting a PEP be authenticated mitigates that risk.

Sender Authentication Failure If the protected resource request does not include the proper authentication credentials, or does not have a valid authentication scheme proof that enables access to the protected resource, the resource server MUST respond with a 401 HTTP status code and SHOULD include the HTTP "WWW-Authenticate" response header field; it MAY include it in response to other conditions as well. The "WWW-Authenticate" header field uses the framework defined by HTTP/1.1 and indicates the expected authentication scheme as well as the realm that has authority for it. The following is a non-normative example response: http HTTP/1.1 401 Unauthorized WWW-Authenticate: Bearer realm="https://as.example.com"

Trust In ABAC, there are occasionally conversations around the trust between PEP and PDP: how can the PDP trust that the PEP is sending the correct values? The architecture of this model assumes the PDP must trust the PEP, as the PEP is ultimately responsible for enforcing the decision the PDP produces.

JSON Payload Considerations To ensure the unambiguous interpretation of JSON payloads, implementations SHOULD process and generate JSON payloads in a manner consistent with the I-JSON profile (). In particular, implementations SHOULD ensure that: JSON text is encoded as UTF-8, and strings do not contain invalid Unicode sequences such as unpaired surrogates (). Numeric values do not exceed the magnitude or precision supported by IEEE 754 double-precision (). Member names within a JSON object are unique after processing escape characters (). To avoid ambiguity between a property that is absent and one that is present with a null value, properties with a value of null SHOULD be omitted from JSON objects.

Authorization Response Integrity The PDP MAY choose to sign its authorization response, ensuring the PEP can verify the integrity of the data it receives. This practice is valuable for maintaining trust in the authorization process. The PEP can ensure that the authorization response is not tampered with by verifying the signature of the authorization decision if it is signed. It ensures response accuracy and completeness. TLS effectively protects data in transit for a direct, point-to-point connection but does not guarantee data integrity for the full connection path between the PEP and the PDP if there are intermediaries, such as proxies or gateways. Digital signatures offer important advantages in this context. They provide non-repudiation, allowing verification that the response genuinely originated from the PDP. Moreover, digital signatures ensure the integrity of the authorization response, confirming that its contents have not been altered in transit.

Availability & Denial of Service The PDP SHOULD apply reasonable protections to avoid common attacks tied to request payload size, the number of requests, invalid JSON, nested JSON attacks, or memory consumption. Rate limiting is one such way to address such issues.

Differences between Unsigned and Signed Metadata Unsigned metadata is integrity protected by use of TLS at the site where it is hosted. This means that its security is dependent upon the Internet Public Key Infrastructure (PKI) . Signed metadata is additionally integrity protected by the JWS signature applied by the issuer, which is not dependent upon the Internet PKI. When using unsigned metadata, the party issuing the metadata is the PDP itself. Whereas, when using signed metadata, the party issuing the metadata is represented by the iss (issuer) claim in the signed metadata. When using signed metadata, applications can make trust decisions based on the issuer that performed the signing -- information that is not available when using unsigned metadata. How these trust decisions are made is out of scope for this specification.

Metadata Caching Policy Decision Point metadata is retrieved using an HTTP GET request, as specified in . Normal HTTP caching behaviors apply, meaning that the GET may retrieve a cached copy of the content, rather than the latest copy. Implementations should utilize HTTP caching directives such as Cache-Control with max-age, as defined in , to enable caching of retrieved metadata for appropriate time periods.

IANA Considerations This specification requests IANA to take four actions: the creation of a new protocol registry group named 'AuthZEN', the establishment of two new registries within this group ('AuthZEN Policy Decision Point Metadata' and 'AuthZEN Policy Decision Point Capabilities'), the registration of a new Well-Known URI ('authzen-configuration'), and the registration of a new URN sub-namespace ('authzen'). The following registration procedure is used for the registries established by this specification. Values are registered on a Specification Required basis after a two-week review period on the openid-specs-authzen@lists.openid.net mailing list, following review and approval by one or more Designated Experts. However, to allow for the allocation of values prior to publication of the final version of a specification, the Designated Experts may approve registration once they are satisfied that the specification will be completed and published. However, if the specification is not completed and published in a timely manner, as determined by the Designated Experts, the Designated Experts may request that IANA withdraw the registration. Registration requests sent to the mailing list for review should use an appropriate subject (e.g., "Request to register AuthZEN Policy Decision Point Metadata: example"). Within the review period, the Designated Experts will either approve or deny the registration request, communicating this decision to the review list and IANA. Denials should include an explanation and, if applicable, suggestions as to how to make the request successful. The IANA escalation process is followed when the Designated Experts are not responsive within 14 days. Criteria that should be applied by the Designated Experts includes determining whether the proposed registration duplicates existing functionality, determining whether it is likely to be of general applicability or whether it is useful only for a single application, and whether the registration makes sense. IANA must only accept registry updates from the Designated Experts and should direct all requests for registration to the review mailing list. It is suggested that multiple Designated Experts be appointed who are able to represent the perspectives of different applications using this specification, in order to enable broadly-informed review of registration decisions. In cases where a registration decision could be perceived as creating a conflict of interest for a particular Expert, that Expert should defer to the judgment of the other Experts. The reason for the use of the mailing list is to enable public review of registration requests, enabling both Designated Experts and other interested parties to provide feedback on proposed registrations. The reason to allow the Designated Experts to allocate values prior to publication as a final specification is to enable giving authors of specifications proposing registrations the benefit of review by the Designated Experts before the specification is completely done, so that if problems are identified, the authors can iterate and fix them before publication of the final specification.

AuthZEN Policy Decision Point Metadata Registry This specification asks IANA to establish the "AuthZEN Policy Decision Point Metadata" registry under the registry group "AuthZEN Parameters". The registry records the Policy Decision Point metadata parameter and a reference to the specification that defines it.

Registry Definition Registry Name: AuthZEN Policy Decision Point Metadata Registration Policy: Specification Required per Reference: [This Document]

Registration Template

Metadata Name:

The name requested (e.g., "resource"). This name is case-sensitive. Names may not match other registered names in a case-insensitive manner unless the Designated Experts state that there is a compelling reason to allow an exception.

Metadata Description:

Brief description of the metadata (e.g., "Resource identifier URL").

Change Controller:

For IETF stream RFCs, list the "IETF". For others, give the name of the responsible party. Other details (e.g., postal address, email address, home page URI) may also be included.

Specification Document(s):

Reference to the document or documents that specify the parameter, preferably including URIs that can be used to retrieve copies of the documents. An indication of the relevant sections may also be included but is not required.

Initial Registrations

Metadata Name:

policy_decision_point

Metadata Description:

Base URL of the Policy Decision Point

Change Controller:

OpenID Foundation AuthZEN Working Group

mailto:openid-specs-authzen@lists.openid.net

Specification Document(s):

of [This Document]

Metadata Name:

access_evaluation_endpoint

Metadata Description:

URL of the Policy Decision Point's Access Evaluation API endpoint

Change Controller:

OpenID Foundation AuthZEN Working Group

mailto:openid-specs-authzen@lists.openid.net

Specification Document(s):

of [This Document]

Metadata Name:

access_evaluations_endpoint

Metadata Description:

URL of the Policy Decision Point's Access Evaluations API endpoint

Change Controller:

OpenID Foundation AuthZEN Working Group

mailto:openid-specs-authzen@lists.openid.net

Specification Document(s):

of [This Document]

Metadata Name:

search_subject_endpoint

Metadata Description:

URL of the Policy Decision Point's Search API endpoint for Subject entities

Change Controller:

OpenID Foundation AuthZEN Working Group

mailto:openid-specs-authzen@lists.openid.net

Specification Document(s):

of [This Document]

Metadata Name:

search_resource_endpoint

Metadata Description:

URL of the Policy Decision Point's Search API endpoint for Resource entities

Change Controller:

OpenID Foundation AuthZEN Working Group

mailto:openid-specs-authzen@lists.openid.net

Specification Document(s):

of [This Document]

Metadata Name:

search_action_endpoint

Metadata Description:

URL of the Policy Decision Point's Search API endpoint for Action entities

Change Controller:

OpenID Foundation AuthZEN Working Group

mailto:openid-specs-authzen@lists.openid.net

Specification Document(s):

of [This Document]

Metadata Name:

capabilities

Metadata Description:

Array of URNs describing specific Policy Decision Point capabilities

Change Controller:

OpenID Foundation AuthZEN Working Group

mailto:openid-specs-authzen@lists.openid.net

Specification Document(s):

of [This Document]

Metadata Name:

signed_metadata

Metadata Description:

JWT containing metadata parameters about the protected resource as claims.

Change Controller:

OpenID Foundation AuthZEN Working Group

mailto:openid-specs-authzen@lists.openid.net

Specification Document(s):

of [This Document]

Well-Known URI Registry This specification asks IANA to register the well-known URI defined in in the IANA "Well-Known URIs" registry .

Registry Contents

URI Suffix:

authzen-configuration

Reference:

[This Document]

Status:

permanent

Change Controller:

OpenID Foundation AuthZEN Working Group

mailto:openid-specs-authzen@lists.openid.net

Related Information:

(none)

AuthZEN Policy Decision Point Capabilities Registry This specification asks IANA to establish the "AuthZEN Policy Decision Point Capabilities" registry under the registry group "AuthZEN Parameters". The registry contains PDP-specific capabilities or features. These URNs are intended to be used in Policy Decision Point metadata discovery documents (as described in ) to allow a PEP to determine the supported functionality of a given PDP instance. The content of this registry will be specified by AuthZEN-compliant PDP vendors that want to declare interoperable capabilities.

Registry Definition Registry Name: AuthZEN Policy Decision Point Capabilities Registration Policy: Specification Required per Reference: [This Document]

Registration Template

Capability Name:

The name of the capability. This name MUST begin with the colon (":") character. This name is case-sensitive. Names may not match other registered names in a case-insensitive manner unless the Designated Experts state that there is a compelling reason to allow an exception.

Capability URN: The URN of the AuthZEN Policy Decision Point Capability.

Capability Description:

Brief description of the capability.

Change Controller:

OpenID Foundation AuthZEN Working Group

mailto:openid-specs-authzen@lists.openid.net

Specification Document(s):

Reference to the document or documents that specify the parameter, preferably including URIs that can be used to retrieve copies of the documents. An indication of the relevant sections may also be included but is not required.

Registration of "authzen" URN Sub-namespace This specification asks IANA to register a new URN sub-namespace within the "IETF URN Sub-namespace for Registered Protocol Parameter Identifiers" registry defined in . Registry Name: authzen Specification: [This Document] Repository: "AuthZEN Policy Decision Point Capabilities" registry ( of [This Document]) Index value: Sub-parameters MUST be specified in UTF-8, using standard URI encoding where necessary.

The OAuth 2.0 authorization framework enables a third-party application to obtain limited access to an HTTP service, either on behalf of a resource owner by orchestrating an approval interaction between the resource owner and the HTTP service, or by allowing the third-party application to obtain access on its own behalf. This specification replaces and obsoletes the OAuth 1.0 protocol described in RFC 5849. [STANDARDS-TRACK] JavaScript Object Notation (JSON) is a lightweight, text-based, language-independent data interchange format. It was derived from the ECMAScript Programming Language Standard. JSON defines a small set of formatting rules for the portable representation of structured data. This document removes inconsistencies with other specifications of JSON, repairs specification errors, and offers experience-based interoperability guidance. This memo defines a path prefix for "well-known locations", "/.well-known/", in selected Uniform Resource Identifier (URI) schemes. In doing so, it obsoletes RFC 5785 and updates the URI schemes defined in RFC 7230 to reserve that space. It also updates RFC 7595 to track URI schemes that support well-known URIs in their registry. This document describes a new sub-delegation for the 'ietf' URN namespace for registered protocol items. The 'ietf' URN namespace is defined in RFC 2648 as a root for persistent URIs that refer to IETF- defined resources. This document specifies an Internet Best Current Practices for the Internet Community, and requests discussion and suggestions for improvements. The Hypertext Transfer Protocol (HTTP) is a stateless application-level protocol for distributed, collaborative, hypertext information systems. This document describes the overall architecture of HTTP, establishes common terminology, and defines aspects of the protocol that are shared by all versions. In this definition are core protocol elements, extensibility mechanisms, and the "http" and "https" Uniform Resource Identifier (URI) schemes. This document updates RFC 3864 and obsoletes RFCs 2818, 7231, 7232, 7233, 7235, 7538, 7615, 7694, and portions of 7230. Overxeer Entrust JSON Web Token (JWT) is a compact, URL-safe means of representing claims to be transferred between two parties. The claims in a JWT are encoded as a JSON object that is used as the payload of a JSON Web Signature (JWS) structure or as the plaintext of a JSON Web Encryption (JWE) structure, enabling the claims to be digitally signed or integrity protected with a Message Authentication Code (MAC) and/or encrypted. JSON Web Signature (JWS) represents content secured with digital signatures or Message Authentication Codes (MACs) using JSON-based data structures. Cryptographic algorithms and identifiers for use with this specification are described in the separate JSON Web Algorithms (JWA) specification and an IANA registry defined by that specification. Related encryption capabilities are described in the separate JSON Web Encryption (JWE) specification. Many protocols make use of points of extensibility that use constants to identify various protocol parameters. To ensure that the values in these fields do not have conflicting uses and to promote interoperability, their allocations are often coordinated by a central record keeper. For IETF protocols, that role is filled by the Internet Assigned Numbers Authority (IANA). To make assignments in a given registry prudently, guidance describing the conditions under which new values should be assigned, as well as when and how modifications to existing values can be made, is needed. This document defines a framework for the documentation of these guidelines by specification authors, in order to assure that the provided guidance for the IANA Considerations is clear and addresses the various issues that are likely in the operation of a registry. This is the third edition of this document; it obsoletes RFC 5226. IANA Many application technologies enable secure communication between two entities by means of Transport Layer Security (TLS) with Internet Public Key Infrastructure using X.509 (PKIX) certificates. This document specifies procedures for representing and verifying the identity of application services in such interactions. This document obsoletes RFC 6125. The Hypertext Transfer Protocol (HTTP) is a stateless \%application- level protocol for distributed, collaborative, hypertext information systems. This document defines HTTP caches and the associated header fields that control cache behavior or indicate cacheable response messages. This document provides the specification for HTTP's authentication framework, the original Basic authentication scheme and a scheme based on cryptographic hashes, referred to as "Digest Access Authentication". [STANDARDS-TRACK] Information Technology Laboratory Information Technology Laboratory Information Technology Laboratory Information Technology Laboratory Information Technology Laboratory Information Technology Laboratory Information Technology Laboratory National Institute of Standards and Technology

US Gaithersburg

I-JSON (short for "Internet JSON") is a restricted profile of JSON designed to maximize interoperability and increase confidence that software can process it successfully with predictable results.

Terminology

Subject:

The user or machine principal for whom an authorization decision is being requested.

Resource:

The target of the request; the resource about which the authorization decision is being made.

Action:

The operation the Subject is attempting on the Resource, in the context an authorization decision.

Context:

When present in a request, the environmental or contextual attributes for this request. When present in a response, additional contextual information associated with a decision or search result.

Decision:

The value of the evaluation decision made by the PDP: true for "allow", false for "deny".

PDP:

Policy Decision Point. The component or system that provides authorization decisions over the network interface defined here as the Authorization API.

PEP:

Policy Enforcement Point. The component or system that acts as a client to the PDP. The most common use case for a PEP is to request decisions and enforce access based on the decisions obtained from the PDP. It can also request decisions or search results for other purposes, such as determining which resources a subject may have access to.

Acknowledgements This template uses extracts from templates written by , and .

Notices Copyright (c) 2026 The OpenID Foundation. The OpenID Foundation (OIDF) grants to any Contributor, developer, implementer, or other interested party a non-exclusive, royalty free, worldwide copyright license to reproduce, prepare derivative works from, distribute, perform and display, this Implementers Draft, Final Specification, or Final Specification Incorporating Errata Corrections solely for the purposes of (i) developing specifications, and (ii) implementing Implementers Drafts, Final Specifications, and Final Specification Incorporating Errata Corrections based on such documents, provided that attribution be made to the OIDF as the source of the material, but that such attribution does not indicate an endorsement by the OIDF. The technology described in this specification was made available from contributions from various sources, including members of the OpenID Foundation and others. Although the OpenID Foundation has taken steps to help ensure that the technology is available for distribution, it takes no position regarding the validity or scope of any intellectual property or other rights that might be claimed to pertain to the implementation or use of the technology described in this specification or the extent to which any license under such rights might or might not be available; neither does it represent that it has made any independent effort to identify any such rights. The OpenID Foundation and the contributors to this specification make no (and hereby expressly disclaim any) warranties (express, implied, or otherwise), including implied warranties of merchantability, non-infringement, fitness for a particular purpose, or title, related to this specification, and the entire risk as to implementing this specification is assumed by the implementer. The OpenID Intellectual Property Rights policy (found at openid.net) requires contributors to offer a patent promise not to assert certain patent claims against other contributors and against implementers. OpenID invites any interested party to bring to its attention any copyrights, patents, patent applications, or other proprietary rights that may cover technology that may be required to practice this specification.

Contributors SGNL

marc@sgnl.ai

SGNL

erik@sgnl.ai

Indykite

alex.babeanu@indykite.com

ID Partners

dave@idpartners.com.au

AWS

jeffsec@amazon.com

Cerbos

alex@cerbos.dev

VNG Realisatie

michiel.trimpe@vng.nl

Independent Contributor

elie.azerad@gmail.com