TOC 
DraftN. Sakimura
 NRI
 J. Bradley
 Ping Identity
 M. Jones
 Microsoft
 December 27, 2012


OpenID Connect Dynamic Client Registration 1.0 - draft 13

Abstract

OpenID Connect 1.0 is a simple identity layer on top of the OAuth 2.0 protocol. It allows Clients to verify the identity of the End-User based on the authentication performed by an Authorization Server, as well as to obtain basic profile information about the End-User in an interoperable and RESTful manner.

This specification describes how an OpenID Client can obtain the necessary client credentials required by the OpenID Connect protocol suite.



Table of Contents

1.  Introduction
    1.1.  Requirements Notation and Conventions
    1.2.  Terminology
2.  Client Registration Endpoint
    2.1.  Client Registration and Client Update Request
        2.1.1.  sector_identifier_url Validation
    2.2.  Client Registration Response
        2.2.1.  Client Associate or Rotate Secret Response
        2.2.2.  Client Update
    2.3.  Client Registration Error Response
3.  String Operations
4.  IANA Considerations
5.  Security Considerations
6.  Normative References
Appendix A.  Acknowledgements
Appendix B.  Notices
Appendix C.  Document History
§  Authors' Addresses




 TOC 

1.  Introduction

In order for an OpenID Connect Client to utilize OpenID services for a user, the Client needs to register with the OpenID Provider to acquire a Client ID and shared secret. This document describes how a new Client can register with the provider, and how a Client already in possession of a client_id can retrieve updated registration information.

The Client Registration Endpoint may be co-resident with the token endpoint as an optimization in some deployments.



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1.1.  Requirements Notation and Conventions

The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT", "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in RFC 2119 (Bradner, S., “Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate Requirement Levels,” March 1997.) [RFC2119].

Throughout this document, values are quoted to indicate that they are to be taken literally. When using these values in protocol messages, the quotes MUST NOT be used as part of the value.



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1.2.  Terminology

This specification uses the terms "Access Token", "Refresh Token", "Authorization Code", "Authorization Grant", "Authorization Server", "Authorization Endpoint", "Client", "Client Identifier", "Client Secret", "Protected Resource", "Resource Owner", "Resource Server", and "Token Endpoint" defined by OAuth 2.0 (Hardt, D., “The OAuth 2.0 Authorization Framework,” October 2012.) [RFC6749], and the terms defined by OpenID Connect Messages 1.0 (Sakimura, N., Bradley, J., Jones, M., de Medeiros, B., Mortimore, C., and E. Jay, “OpenID Connect Messages 1.0,” December 2012.) [OpenID.Messages]. It defines no additional terms.



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2.  Client Registration Endpoint

The Client Registration Endpoint is an OAuth 2.0 Protected Resource that returns registration information for the Client to configure itself for the OpenID Provider. The OpenID Provider may require an Access Token that is provisioned out-of-band (in a manner that is out of scope for this specification) in order to restrict registration requests to only authorized Clients.

In order to support open registration, the Client Registration Endpoint SHOULD accept requests without OAuth 2.0 Access Tokens. If an Access Token is required for Client registration, the Client Registration Endpoint MUST be able to accept Access Tokens in the manner described in the OAuth 2.0 Bearer Token Usage (Jones, M. and D. Hardt, “The OAuth 2.0 Authorization Framework: Bearer Token Usage,” October 2012.) [RFC6750] specification.



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2.1.  Client Registration and Client Update Request

Client Update Requests replace all previous parameters set for a client_id.

Clients MUST send requests encoded as a POST with the following parameters added to the HTTP request entity-body using "application/x-www-form-urlencoded" format:

type
REQUIRED. Values are client_associate (for new registrations), rotate_secret to request rotation of the client_secret, and client_update (for updating parameters of an existing client_id). If rotate_secret is used no optional parameters other than access_token may be included in the request.
redirect_uris
REQUIRED. A space-delimited list of redirect URIs. One of the URL MUST match the Scheme, Host, and Path segments of the redirect_uri in the authorization request.
application_type
OPTIONAL. The default if not specified is web. The defined values are native or web. Web clients MUST only register https: Scheme redirect_uris that do not use localhost as the hostname. Native clients MUST only register redirect_uris using custom URI schemes or http: scheme URI using localhost as the hostname. Authorization Servers may place additional constraints on Native such as not supporting the token response_type. The Authorization server MUST verify that all the registered redirect_uris conform to the constraints. This prevents sharing a client_id across different types of clients.
access_token
OPTIONAL. If this is a client_associate request this is an Access Token obtained out of band to authorize the registrant. If this is a client_update request this is the registration_access_token returned in the client_associate or rotate_secret response. This parameter MUST NOT be sent if the Access Token is sent in the HTTP Authorization header as described in Section 7.1 of OAuth 2.0 (Hardt, D., “The OAuth 2.0 Authorization Framework,” October 2012.) [RFC6749]. Access Tokens sent in the authorization header must be OAuth 2.0 Bearer Token Usage (Jones, M. and D. Hardt, “The OAuth 2.0 Authorization Framework: Bearer Token Usage,” October 2012.) [RFC6750].
contacts
OPTIONAL. Space delimited list of email addresses for people allowed to administer the information for this Client. This is used by some providers to enable a web UI to modify the Client information.
application_name
OPTIONAL. Name of the Client to be presented to the user. If desired, representation of this claim in different languages and scripts is obtained by applying the rules set in 2.1.1.1.3. "claims" member of OpenID Connect Messages. (Sakimura, N., Bradley, J., Jones, M., de Medeiros, B., Mortimore, C., and E. Jay, “OpenID Connect Messages 1.0,” December 2012.) [OpenID.Messages]
logo_url
OPTIONAL. A URL that references a logo for the Client application.
token_endpoint_auth_type
OPTIONAL. The requested authentication type for the Token Endpoint. The options are client_secret_post, client_secret_basic, client_secret_jwt, and private_key_jwt, as described in Section 2.2.1 of OpenID Connect Messages (Sakimura, N., Bradley, J., Jones, M., de Medeiros, B., Mortimore, C., and E. Jay, “OpenID Connect Messages 1.0,” December 2012.) [OpenID.Messages]. Other Authentication methods may be defined by extension. If unspecified or omitted, the default is client_secret_basic HTTP Basic Authentication Scheme as specified in Section 2.3.1 of OAuth 2.0 (Hardt, D., “The OAuth 2.0 Authorization Framework,” October 2012.) [RFC6749].
policy_url
OPTIONAL. A URL location that the Relying Party Client provides to the End-User to read about the how the profile data will be used. The OpenID Provider SHOULD display this URL to the End-User if it is given.
tos_url
OPTIONAL. A URL location that the Relying Party Client provides to the End-User to read about the Relying Party's terms of service. The OpenID Provider SHOULD display this URL to the End-User if it is given.
jwk_url
OPTIONAL. URL for the Client's JSON Web Key Set [JWK] (Jones, M., “JSON Web Key (JWK),” December 2012.) document containing key(s) that are used for signing Token Endpoint Requests and OpenID Request Objects. If jwk_encryption_url is not provided it is also used to encrypt the ID Token and User Info Endpoint Responses to the Client. If the Client registers both x509_url and jwk_url, the keys contained in both formats SHOULD be the same.
jwk_encryption_url
OPTIONAL. URL for the Client's JSON Web Key Set [JWK] (Jones, M., “JSON Web Key (JWK),” December 2012.) document containing key(s) that are used to encrypt the ID Token and User Info Endpoint Responses to the Client. If the Client registers both jwk_encryption_url and x509_encryption_url, the keys contained in both formats SHOULD be the same.
x509_url
OPTIONAL. URL for the Client's PEM encoded X.509 Certificate or Certificate chain that is used for signing Token Endpoint Requests and OpenID Request Objects. If x509_encryption_url is not provided, x509_url it is also used to encrypt the ID Token and User Info Endpoint Responses to the Client. If the Client registers both x509_url and jwk_url, the keys contained in both formats SHOULD be the same.
x509_encryption_url
OPTIONAL. URL for the Client's PEM encoded X.509 Certificate or Certificate chain that is used to encrypt the ID Token and User Info Endpoint Responses to the Client. If the Client registers both jwk_encryption_url and x509_encryption_url, the keys contained in both formats SHOULD be the same.
sector_identifier_url
OPTIONAL. A HTTPS scheme URL to be used in calculating Pseudonymous Identifiers by the OP. The URL contains a file with a single JSON array of redirect_uri values. Please see Section 2.1.1 (sector_identifier_url Validation).
subject_type
OPTIONAL. The subject_type requested for responses to this client_id. The subject_types_supported element of discovery contains a list of the supported subject_type values for this server. Valid types include pairwise and public.
request_object_signing_alg
OPTIONAL. The JWS (Jones, M., Bradley, J., and N. Sakimura, “JSON Web Signature,” December 2012.) [JWS] alg algorithm [JWA] (Jones, M., “JSON Web Algorithms,” December 2012.) that MUST be required by the Authorization Server. The valid values are listed in Section 3.1 of JWA (Jones, M., “JSON Web Algorithms,” December 2012.) [JWA]. All OpenID Request Objects from this client_id MUST be rejected if not signed by this algorithm. Servers SHOULD support RS256.
userinfo_signed_response_alg
OPTIONAL. The JWS alg algorithm [JWA] (Jones, M., “JSON Web Algorithms,” December 2012.) required for UserInfo responses. The valid values are listed in Section 3.1 of JWA (Jones, M., “JSON Web Algorithms,” December 2012.) [JWA]. If this is specified the response will be JWT (Jones, M., Bradley, J., and N. Sakimura, “JSON Web Token,” December 2012.) [JWT] serialized, and signed using JWS.
userinfo_encrypted_response_alg
OPTIONAL. The JWE (Jones, M., Rescorla, E., and J. Hildebrand, “JSON Web Encryption (JWE),” December 2012.) [JWE] alg algorithm [JWA] (Jones, M., “JSON Web Algorithms,” December 2012.) required for encrypting UserInfo responses. The valid values are listed in Section 4.1 of JWA (Jones, M., “JSON Web Algorithms,” December 2012.) [JWA]. If this is requested in combination with signing the response will be signed then encrypted. If this is specified the response will be JWT (Jones, M., Bradley, J., and N. Sakimura, “JSON Web Token,” December 2012.) [JWT] serialized, and encrypted using JWE.
userinfo_encrypted_response_enc
OPTIONAL. The JWE enc algorithm [JWA] (Jones, M., “JSON Web Algorithms,” December 2012.) required for symmetric encryption of UserInfo responses. The valid values are listed in Section 4.2 JWA (Jones, M., “JSON Web Algorithms,” December 2012.) [JWA]. If "userinfo_encrypted_response_alg" is specified the default for this value is A128CBC+HS256. If this is requested in combination with signing the response will be signed then encrypted. If this is specified the response will be JWT (Jones, M., Bradley, J., and N. Sakimura, “JSON Web Token,” December 2012.) [JWT] serialized, and encrypted using JWE.
id_token_signed_response_alg
OPTIONAL. The JWS alg algorithm [JWA] (Jones, M., “JSON Web Algorithms,” December 2012.) required for the ID Token issued to this client_id. The valid values are listed in Section 3.1 of JWA (Jones, M., “JSON Web Algorithms,” December 2012.) [JWA]. The default if not specified is RS256. The public key for validating the signature is provided by retrieving the document from the jwk_url element or the x509_url element from discovery.
id_token_encrypted_response_alg
OPTIONAL. The JWE alg algorithm [JWA] (Jones, M., “JSON Web Algorithms,” December 2012.) required for encrypting the ID Token issued to this client_id. The valid values are listed in Section 4.1 of JWA (Jones, M., “JSON Web Algorithms,” December 2012.) [JWA]. If this is requested the response will be signed then encrypted. The default if not specified is no encryption.
id_token_encrypted_response_enc
OPTIONAL. The JWE enc algorithm [JWA] (Jones, M., “JSON Web Algorithms,” December 2012.) required for symmetric encryption of the ID Token issued to this client_id. The valid values are listed in Section 4.2 of JWA (Jones, M., “JSON Web Algorithms,” December 2012.) [JWA]. If "id_token_encrypted_response_alg" is specified the default for this value is A128CBC+HS256. If this is requested in combination with signing the response will be signed then encrypted. If this is specified the response will be JWT (Jones, M., Bradley, J., and N. Sakimura, “JSON Web Token,” December 2012.) [JWT] serialized, and encrypted using JWE.
default_max_age
OPTIONAL. (default max authentication age): Type: Integer - Specifies that the End-User must be actively authenticated if any present authentication is older than the specified number of seconds. (The max_age request parameter corresponds to the OpenID 2.0 PAPE max_auth_age request parameter.) The max_age claim in the request object overrides this default value.
require_auth_time
OPTIONAL. (require auth_time claim): Type: Logical - If the value is true, then the auth_time claim in the id_token is REQUIRED. The returned Claim Value is the number of seconds from 1970-01-01T0:0:0Z as measured in UTC until the date/time that the End-User authentication occurred. (The auth_time Claim semantically corresponds to the OpenID 2.0 PAPE auth_time response parameter.) The auth_time claim request in the request object overrides this setting.
default_acr
OPTIONAL. (default authentication context class reference): Type: String - Specifies the default value that the Authorization server must use for processing requests from this client. The acr_values_supported element of discovery contains a list of the supported acr values for this server. The acr claim in the request object overrides this default value.
javascript_origin_uris
OPTIONAL. A space-delimited list of JavaScript origin URIs consisting of a Scheme, Host, and OPTIONAL Port. Client JavaScript from the registered URIs are authorized to communicate with Authorization Server JavaScript in OpenID Connect Session Management (Sakimura, N., Bradley, J., Jones, M., de Medeiros, B., and N. Agarwal, “OpenID Connect Session Management 1.0,” December 2012.) [OpenID.Session].

The Client Registration Endpoint is an OAuth 2.0 Protected Resource that may require an Access Token for client_associate requests in order to restrict registration requests to only authorized Clients.

For client_update requests the registration_access_token is used as the Access Token to restrict update access to only the registered client.

The Client Registration Endpoint MUST accept Access Tokens as OAuth 2.0 Bearer Token Usage (Jones, M. and D. Hardt, “The OAuth 2.0 Authorization Framework: Bearer Token Usage,” October 2012.) [RFC6750].

Following is a non-normative example request (with line wraps for display purposes only):

POST /connect/register HTTP/1.1
Content-Type: application/x-www-form-urlencoded
Host: server.example.com
Authorization: Bearer eyJhbGciOiJSUzI1NiJ9.eyJ ... fQ.8Gj_-sj ... _X

type=client_associate
&application_type=web
&redirect_uris=https://client.example.org/callback
    %20https://client.example.org/callback2
&application_name=My%20Example%20
&application_name%23ja-Jpan-JP=ワタシ用の例
&logo_url=https://client.example.org/logo.png
&subject_type=pairwise
&sector_identifier_url=
    https://othercompany.com/file_of_redirect_uris_for_our_sites.js
&token_endpoint_auth_type=client_secret_basic
&jwk_url=https://client.example.org/my_rsa_public_key.jwks
&userinfo_encrypted_response_alg=RSA1_5
&userinfo_encrypted_response_enc=A128CBC+HS256


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2.1.1.  sector_identifier_url Validation

Providers who use pairwise sub (subject) values SHOULD support this element.

It provides a way for a group of websites under a single administrative control to have consistent pairwise sub values independent of the individual domain names. It also provides a way for Clients to change redirect_uri domains without having to reregister all of their users.

This is further described in Section 2.4.1 of OpenID Connect Messages (Sakimura, N., Bradley, J., Jones, M., de Medeiros, B., Mortimore, C., and E. Jay, “OpenID Connect Messages 1.0,” December 2012.) [OpenID.Messages].

The value of the sector_identifier_url must be a HTTPS scheme URL that identifies a JSON file containing an array containing redirect_uri values. The Registration Server MUST perform a TLS/SSL server certificate check, per RFC 6125 (Saint-Andre, P. and J. Hodges, “Representation and Verification of Domain-Based Application Service Identity within Internet Public Key Infrastructure Using X.509 (PKIX) Certificates in the Context of Transport Layer Security (TLS),” March 2011.) [RFC6125].

The values of the registered redirect_uris must be included in the elements of the array, or registration MUST fail.

GET /connect/sector_identifier.js HTTP/1.1
Accept: application/json
Host: client.example.org

HTTP/1.1 200 OK
Content-Type: application/json
Cache-Control: no-store
Pragma: no-cache

[ "https://client.example.org/callback",
  "https://client.example.org/callback2",
  "https://client.other_company.example.net/callback" ]



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2.2.  Client Registration Response

The response is returned as a JSON object with all the parameters as top level elements.



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2.2.1.  Client Associate or Rotate Secret Response

If the value of type in the request was client_associate or rotate_secret then return the following.

client_id
REQUIRED. The unique Client identifier.
client_secret
OPTIONAL. The Client secret. This MUST be unique for each client_id. This value us used by confidential clients. It is not required for clients selecting a token_endpoint_auth_type of private_key_jwt
registration_access_token
REQUIRED. The Access token used by the client to perform client_update requests.
expires_at
OPTIONAL. The number of seconds from 1970-01-01T0:0:0Z as measured in UTC that the client_secret will expire or 0 if they do not expire. See RFC 3339 (Klyne, G., Ed. and C. Newman, “Date and Time on the Internet: Timestamps,” July 2002.) [RFC3339] for details regarding date/times in general and UTC in particular.

Following is a non-normative example response:

HTTP/1.1 200 OK
Content-Type: application/json
Cache-Control: no-store

{
 "client_id":"s6BhdRkqt3",
 "client_secret":
  "cf136dc3c1fd9153029bb9c6cc9ecead918bad9887fce6c93f31185e5885805d",
  "registration_access_token": "this.is.a.access.token.value.ffx83",
 "expires_at":2893276800
}


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2.2.2.  Client Update

If the value of type in the request was client_update.

client_id
REQUIRED. The unique Client identifier.

Following is a non-normative example response:

HTTP/1.1 200 OK
Content-Type: application/json
Cache-Control: no-store

{
 "client_id":"s6BhdRkqt3"
}


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2.3.  Client Registration Error Response

When an OAuth error condition occurs, the Client Registration Endpoint returns an Error Response as defined in Section 3 of the OAuth 2.0 Bearer Token Usage (Jones, M. and D. Hardt, “The OAuth 2.0 Authorization Framework: Bearer Token Usage,” October 2012.) [RFC6750] specification.

When a registration error condition occurs, the Client Registration Endpoint returns a HTTP 400 status code including a JSON object describing the error in the response body.

The JSON object contains two members:

error_code
The Error code.
error_description
The additional text description of the error for debugging.

This specification defines the following error codes:

invalid_type
The value of type is invalid or not supported.
invalid_client_id
The value of client_id is invalid.
invalid_client_secret
The client_secret provided for a client_update or rotate_secret is not valid for the provided client_id.
invalid_redirect_uri
The value of one or more redirect_uris is invalid.
invalid_configuration_parameter
The value of one of the configuration parameters is invalid.

Following is a non-normative example of an error response:

HTTP/1.1 400 Bad Request
Content-Type: application/json
Cache-Control: no-store

{
 "error_code":"invalid_type",
 "error_description":"The value of the type parameter must be one of client_associate, rotate_secret or client_update."
}


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3.  String Operations

Processing some OpenID Connect messages requires comparing values in the messages to known values. For example, the member names in the Client registration response might be compared to specific member names such as client_id. Comparing Unicode strings, however, has significant security implications.

Therefore, comparisons between JSON strings and other Unicode strings MUST be performed as specified below:

  1. Remove any JSON applied escaping to produce an array of Unicode code points.
  2. Unicode Normalization (Davis, M., Whistler, K., and M. Dürst, “Unicode Normalization Forms,” 09 2009.) [USA15] MUST NOT be applied at any point to either the JSON string or to the string it is to be compared against.
  3. Comparisons between the two strings MUST be performed as a Unicode code point to code point equality comparison.

In several places, this specification uses space delimited lists of strings. In all such cases, only the ASCII space character (0x20) MAY be used for this purpose.



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4.  IANA Considerations

This document makes no requests of IANA.



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5.  Security Considerations

Since requests to the Client Registration Endpoint result in the transmission of clear-text credentials (in the HTTP request and response), the server MUST require the use of a transport-layer security mechanism when sending requests to the Registration Endpoint. The server MUST support TLS 1.2 RFC 5246 (Dierks, T. and E. Rescorla, “The Transport Layer Security (TLS) Protocol Version 1.2,” August 2008.) [RFC5246] and/or TLS 1.0 [RFC2246] (Dierks, T. and C. Allen, “The TLS Protocol Version 1.0,” January 1999.) and MAY support additional transport-layer mechanisms meeting its security requirements. When using TLS, the Client MUST perform a TLS/SSL server certificate check, per RFC 6125 (Saint-Andre, P. and J. Hodges, “Representation and Verification of Domain-Based Application Service Identity within Internet Public Key Infrastructure Using X.509 (PKIX) Certificates in the Context of Transport Layer Security (TLS),” March 2011.) [RFC6125].

Requests to the Registration Endpoint for client_update MUST have some rate limiting on failures to prevent the Client secret from being disclosed though repeated access attempts.

A rogue RP, might use the logo for the legitimate RP, which it is trying to impersonate. An OP needs to take steps to mitigate this phishing risk, since the logo could confuse users into thinking they're logging in to the legitimate RP. An OP could also warn if the domain/site of the logo doesn't match the domain/site of redirect URIs. An OP can also make warnings against untrusted RPs in all cases, especially if they're dynamically registered, have not been trusted by any users at the OP before, and want to use the logo feature.

In a situation where the Authorization Server is supporting open Client registration, it must be extremely careful with any URL provided by the Client that will be displayed to the user (e.g. logo_url and policy_url). A rogue Client could specify a registration request with a reference to a drive-by download in the policy_url. The Authorization Server should check to see if the logo_url and policy_url have the same host as the hosts defined in the array of redirect_uris.



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6. Normative References

[JWA] Jones, M., “JSON Web Algorithms,” draft-ietf-jose-json-web-algorithms (work in progress), December 2012 (HTML).
[JWE] Jones, M., Rescorla, E., and J. Hildebrand, “JSON Web Encryption (JWE),” draft-ietf-jose-json-web-encryption (work in progress), December 2012 (HTML).
[JWK] Jones, M., “JSON Web Key (JWK),” draft-ietf-jose-json-web-key (work in progress), December 2012 (HTML).
[JWS] Jones, M., Bradley, J., and N. Sakimura, “JSON Web Signature,” draft-ietf-jose-json-web-signature (work in progress), December 2012 (HTML).
[JWT] Jones, M., Bradley, J., and N. Sakimura, “JSON Web Token,” draft-ietf-oauth-json-web-token (work in progress), December 2012 (HTML).
[OpenID.Messages] Sakimura, N., Bradley, J., Jones, M., de Medeiros, B., Mortimore, C., and E. Jay, “OpenID Connect Messages 1.0,” December 2012.
[OpenID.Session] Sakimura, N., Bradley, J., Jones, M., de Medeiros, B., and N. Agarwal, “OpenID Connect Session Management 1.0,” December 2012.
[RFC2119] Bradner, S., “Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate Requirement Levels,” BCP 14, RFC 2119, March 1997 (TXT, HTML, XML).
[RFC2246] Dierks, T. and C. Allen, “The TLS Protocol Version 1.0,” RFC 2246, January 1999 (TXT).
[RFC3339] Klyne, G., Ed. and C. Newman, “Date and Time on the Internet: Timestamps,” RFC 3339, July 2002 (TXT, HTML, XML).
[RFC5246] Dierks, T. and E. Rescorla, “The Transport Layer Security (TLS) Protocol Version 1.2,” RFC 5246, August 2008 (TXT).
[RFC6125] Saint-Andre, P. and J. Hodges, “Representation and Verification of Domain-Based Application Service Identity within Internet Public Key Infrastructure Using X.509 (PKIX) Certificates in the Context of Transport Layer Security (TLS),” RFC 6125, March 2011 (TXT).
[RFC6749] Hardt, D., “The OAuth 2.0 Authorization Framework,” RFC 6749, October 2012 (TXT).
[RFC6750] Jones, M. and D. Hardt, “The OAuth 2.0 Authorization Framework: Bearer Token Usage,” RFC 6750, October 2012 (TXT).
[USA15] Davis, M., Whistler, K., and M. Dürst, “Unicode Normalization Forms,” Unicode Standard Annex 15, 09 2009.


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Appendix A.  Acknowledgements



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Appendix B.  Notices

Copyright (c) 2012 The OpenID Foundation.

The OpenID Foundation (OIDF) grants to any Contributor, developer, implementer, or other interested party a non-exclusive, royalty free, worldwide copyright license to reproduce, prepare derivative works from, distribute, perform and display, this Implementers Draft or Final Specification solely for the purposes of (i) developing specifications, and (ii) implementing Implementers Drafts and Final Specifications based on such documents, provided that attribution be made to the OIDF as the source of the material, but that such attribution does not indicate an endorsement by the OIDF.

The technology described in this specification was made available from contributions from various sources, including members of the OpenID Foundation and others. Although the OpenID Foundation has taken steps to help ensure that the technology is available for distribution, it takes no position regarding the validity or scope of any intellectual property or other rights that might be claimed to pertain to the implementation or use of the technology described in this specification or the extent to which any license under such rights might or might not be available; neither does it represent that it has made any independent effort to identify any such rights. The OpenID Foundation and the contributors to this specification make no (and hereby expressly disclaim any) warranties (express, implied, or otherwise), including implied warranties of merchantability, non-infringement, fitness for a particular purpose, or title, related to this specification, and the entire risk as to implementing this specification is assumed by the implementer. The OpenID Intellectual Property Rights policy requires contributors to offer a patent promise not to assert certain patent claims against other contributors and against implementers. The OpenID Foundation invites any interested party to bring to its attention any copyrights, patents, patent applications, or other proprietary rights that may cover technology that may be required to practice this specification.



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Appendix C.  Document History

[[ To be removed from the final specification ]]

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Authors' Addresses

  Nat Sakimura
  Nomura Research Institute, Ltd.
Email:  n-sakimura@nri.co.jp
  
  John Bradley
  Ping Identity
Email:  ve7jtb@ve7jtb.com
  
  Michael B. Jones
  Microsoft
Email:  mbj@microsoft.com